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National governments are accused of being evasive and opportunistic in their presen-
tation of European integration, thereby exacerbating the EU’s crisis of legitimacy. Yet
empirical evidence on how governments present Europe at home is limited to a small hand-
ful of qualitative studies. This thesis provides the first comparative, quantitative study of
how governments - and the parties that form them - present Europe in their domestic public
spheres, and what these presentational strategies mean for representation and legitimacy in
the EU. Inspired by Fenno’s 1978 classic, I call this their ‘home style’.
Through innovative text as data methods combining machine translation, automated
text analysis, and hand coding, I show that rather than adopting a nationalist home style
marked by evasiveness and opportunism, governments have responded to EU politicization
by adopting a home style I label technocratic-patriotic. Technocratic, in the sense that gov-
ernments actually talk frequently about the EU, but avoid clear position taking on the issue
by defusing it with complex language. Patriotic, in the sense that governments extensively
claim credit for defending the national interest on the European stage, but in fact rarely
blame or criticise the EU directly. I argue that despite not fitting the stereotypical image of
evasive, opportunistic blame shifters, this technocratic-patriotic home style still poses deep
problems for democratic accountability in Europe’s multilevel system of governance. The
thesis also contributes two resources to the academic community: EUCOSpeech, an original
dataset of over 6,000 statements by national leaders in the aftermath of EU summits, and
EUParlspeech, an original dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made
in parliamentary speeches between 1989 and 2019.
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Introduction
The Eurocrat’s Complaint – Home Style in a European Context –
Original Data to Study Home Style – Evasive and Opportunistic? –
My Contribution
1.1 The Eurocrat’s Complaint
In the summer of 2019, the departing president of the European Commission sat down
with German newspaper Bild to reflect on his time in office. It had been a turbulent few
years for Jean-Claude Juncker. Having overseen some of the most serious crises in the
EU’s history, from the Greek bailout negotiations to Brexit, he had also had to contend
with the growing influence of Eurosceptic parties whose success at European elections had
translated to national politics (Schulte-Cloos 2018). As he contemplated this increase in
Euroscepticism, Juncker was unsurprisingly critical of populist leaders who offered no work-
able solutions to Europe’s multiple challenges. Yet more surprisingly, he was equally critical
of the leaders of ostensibly pro-European parties with whom he had worked so closely in the
previous five years. “National governments have a habit of congratulating themselves for
what goes right and blaming Brussels for what goes wrong” he complained “it’s no wonder
that anti-European tendencies are on the rise.”
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This complaint had been a feature of the Juncker presidency. In his first State of the
Union address, he decried the EU’s blame game where “fingers had been pointed from na-
tional capitals towards Brussels” (2015). If national governments weren’t blaming Europe,
then they were avoiding the issue of European integration altogether, retreating inwards to
small minded domestic considerations: “Never before have I heard so many leaders speak
only of their domestic problems, with Europe mentioned only in passing, if at all,” he com-
plained in a speech to the European Parliament (2016). As his interview with Bild drew to
a close, Juncker contrasted the current batch of national leaders with the great European
leaders of the past. Recounting the late Helmut Kohl, Juncker noted that at EU summits,
Kohl would broker agreements for which he would be criticised by his domestic electorate.
This willingness to unambiguously defend Europe at home, even in the face of short term
electoral costs, is the standard to which Juncker judged current national governments. He
found them desperately wanting.
However, if pronouncements by previous Commision presidents are anything to go by,
Juncker’s nostalgia seems misplaced. Indeed, his exact concern had been articulated con-
sistently by previous holders of the most powerful office in Brussels. At the height of the
economic crisis, President Barroso placed the plunge in EU popularity firmly at the hands of
national governments who had “failed to defend European integration when it was needed
the most” (2010). Even Jacques Delors, Commission President at the time of Helmut Khol,
admonished governments for their cynicism: “Yes, we can be more transparent” he admit-
ted in Strasbourg (1995) “but to make Europe the scapegoat for the democratic malaise we
find ourselves in - that is crossing the line.”
This voiced concern that governments are evasive and opportunistic in their presentation
of European integration is what I call the Eurocrat’s Complaint. The Eurocrat1 understands
that he cannot reach European citizens directly and that he depends on national govern-
ments to present and defend European integration to voters. According to the Eurocrat,
governments fail in this communicative function, and in doing so contribute to rising Eu-
roscepticism. The Eurocrat’s complaint is not new, nor is it exclusively the preserve of
Brussels technocrats. In the following section, I show how scholars of European integration
also raise concerns about the evasiveness and opportunism of national governments. I also
explain how a concept borrowed from American political science - that of home style - can
help us conceptualize the presentational strategies employed by national governments when
communicating EU integration in their domestic public spheres.
1I do not mean ’Eurocrat’ in any disparaging sense, simply as a memorable term to refer to senior EU
officials.
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1.2 Home Style in a European Context
How do national governments - and the mainstream parties that form them - present Eu-
ropean integration in their domestic public spheres? Why do they present it in this way?
And what are the consequences of these presentational strategies for the legitimacy of the
European project? These are the broad questions addressed in this thesis. The conven-
tional view on this question, both amongst policymakers and scholars, is that governments
are evasive and opportunistic in their presentation of EU integration, and thereby exacer-
bate the EU’s crisis of legitimacy. Yet this widely held belief is based on surprisingly little
empirical evidence. In this thesis, I will use original datasets and innovative text as data
methods to show that despite not fitting the stereotypical image of evasive, opportunistic
blame shifters, the way national governments and mainstream parties present the EU to
domestic audiences still poses deep problems for democratic accountability in Europe’s mul-
tilevel system of governance. In doing so, I make the case for placing the concept of home
style at the heart of debates on democratic representation in the EU.
1.2.1 The Concept of Home Style
‘Home Style’ is a classic of American political science. In his 1978 study, Richard Fenno
makes the case for studying the ways members of Congress present their work in Wash-
ington back to their constituents. Like most pathbreaking contributions, Fenno’s central
insight was both simple and illuminating: he outlined the central role of communication
in the process of democratic representation. Representation is not simply about the votes
representatives cast, nor how they invest their time and resources in national capitals (Grim-
mer 2014, 2015); it is also about how the work of the representative is presented back to
constituents. Home style - defined by Fenno as the way ‘representatives present themselves
and explain their work’ (1978, p. 34) matters so much to representation because it is the
primary tool representatives use to connect with, and ultimately gain reelection from, their
constituents.
The impact of Fenno’s ‘Home Style’ is undeniable (1978). With over four-thousand
citations, it remains one the most regularly cited books in political science and is present in
most classrooms, regularly taught at both the undergraduate and graduate levels (Lipinski
2004). Furthermore, the advances in computational methods has led to a resurgence in the
study of home style in national politics, complementing Fenno’s anthropological approach
with quantitative textual analyses of how elected representative communicate with their
constituents (Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012, 2014). And home style is
not limited to American politics - it has become a widely used tool of comparative politics,
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applied across different national cultures and contexts (Ingall and Crisp 2001; Samuels 2002;
Bonoli and Shinkawa 2006).
In sum, homes style refers to how representatives communicate and present their work
back to constituents in order to gain reelection. Home style in a European context then,
refers to how representatives in EU policymaking - national governments - present their
work in Brussels back to their constituents - national electorates. This thesis rests on two
fundamental premises. The first is that this concept of home style can be applied to national
governments in the EU. The second is that studying home style is a worthwhile endeavour for
scholars interested in democratic representation, accountability, and legitimacy in Europe’s
multilevel system of governance. Let me address these in turn.
Concept Definition: Home Style
The presentational strategies employed by national governments when communi-
cating European integration in their domestic public spheres.
At first glance, it may seem puzzling to apply home style in the EU to national govern-
ments rather than to MEPs who represent citizens in the European Parliament. And indeed,
one could apply the concept of home style both to the ‘European’ and to the ‘domestic’
routes of citizen representation in the EU. Whilst the European route links citizens pref-
erences to policy outputs through EP elections, the domestic route links preferences with
EU policy outputs through the election of national governments in the Council (Wratil
2016). I focus on the domestic route, both because the Council is widely considered the
most powerful institution in the EU (Costello and Thomson 2013; Franchino and Mariotto
2012; Thomson 2011d), and because European elections are still considered second order
contests, with MEPs that have little to no recognition in domestic public spheres (Hix and
Marsh 2008). By contrast, the Council and its high profile summits dominate the coverage
of EU affairs by bringing together the most recognisable political figures on the continent
(Moravcsik 1999; Menon 2008; Alexandrova 2014)
It is worth noting that the literature has already established that the EU can be treated
as political system, and that the analytical tools of comparative politics - of which home
style is one - can be applied to its multilevel polity (Hix 2016). Yet my justification for
applying home style to national governments in the EU goes further still. I argue that the
application of home style to a multilevel system must satisfy a number of conditions. First,
home style implies some distinction between the policymaking venue, where policies are
made, and the communication venue where policies are presented back to the constituents
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who are affected by them. In Fenno’s work, representatives make (or obstruct) policy in
Capitol Hill and then communicate this work back in their home state through local media,
press releases, newsletters, and the like. This distinction is also applicable to EU poli-
cymaking. Policies are made in Brussels in a complex process involving commissioners,
bureaucrats, national governments, and MEPs. Yet these policies are then communicated
largely through domestic channels, with national media particularly interested in how gov-
ernments have defended the national interest in the Council (Alexandrova 2014). Fenno’s
initial work distinguishes between Hill Style (the way representatives allocate their resources
in Washington) and Home Style (how this work is communicated back to constituents in
the district). Likewise, we can distinguish between national governments’ Brussels’ style
(the way they conduct their policymaking in Europe’s capital) and their home style (the
way they present EU policymaking to domestic audiences).
In fact, in many ways this distinction between policymaking and communication venues
is even more pronounced in the EU than in other multilevel systems. Whilst multilevel
polities usually share a coherent public sphere with universal media outlets and a common
language, this European public sphere is largely lacking in the EU (Riise 2014). Despite
hopes that further integration would lead to the creation of a genuine transnational public
sphere in Europe, this has largely failed to materialise save for a few elite circles (Boom-
gaarden and de Vreese 2016; Downey and Koenig 2006). Due to cultural and linguistic
barriers, it is still the case that most European citizens receive information on the EU and
its policies through domestic channels, rather than pan-European ones (van der Brug and
de Vreese 2016; Menon 2008).
The application of home style also requires some sort of electoral connection (Mayhew
1974). That is to say, that the reelection of a representative depends at least in part on
their performance in the policymaking venue. The existence of this electoral connection at
the EU level was once questionable, as governments benefited from a ‘permissive consensus’
where voters were broadly supportive but generally uninterested in European integration
(Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970). No longer. European integration now matters to national
electorates, who are increasingly divided on the issue, and reward governments that ‘bring
back the bacon’ from major European summits (Zurn, 2014; Rauh 2016; Schneider 2018;
Hooghe and Marks, 2019; De Vries 2012). One of the clearest manifestations of this electoral
connection is the growing literature on responsiveness in the EU, with evidence that national
governments in the Council signal that they are defending the interests of domestic audiences
through votes, negotiation positions, and their use of formal policy statements (Schneider
2018; Hagemann et al 2017; Wratil 2016, 2017; Hobolt and Wratil 2020).
To be clear, I am not saying that governments depend solely on their EU positions and
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their performance in Brussels for reelection, nor that this is even the principal criteria on
which voters judge their performance in office. What I am saying, and what the evidence
points toward, is that the positions they take and defend at the European level are far from
insignificant in their prospects for reelection. The electoral connection linking citizens’
preferences and the behaviour of national governments in EU policymaking is real. The
concept of home style - the way representatives present and defend their work to constituents
- is therefore applicable to national governments in the EU. Of course, it is one thing to
argue that the concept of home style can be applied to the European context, quite another
to argue that it should be the focus of a whole thesis. In the following section I explain
why home style matters by presenting the major contributions its study can make to the
literatures on cue-taking, representation, and democratic legitimacy in the EU.
1.2.2 Why Home Style Matters
Home style matters because national governments are the central messengers of European
integration in domestic public spheres. The way they present and cue Europe to voters
shapes how pubic opinion towards the EU is formed, is central to the representation they
offer their constituents in Brussels, and plays an important role in legitimising (and dele-
gitimising) EU authority in the eyes of European citizens.
First, it is well established that political elites shape public opinion, as most voters
lack the time and willingness to develop deep political knowledge. To overcome these
informational shortfalls, voters rely on cues and heuristics from politicians (see, e.g., Brady
and Sniderman 1985; McKelvey and Ordeshook 1986; Sniderman et al. 1991; Lupia 1992,
1994; Sniderman 2000). This role of elites as cue-givers is even more relevant in the context
of European integration because while voters generally have little knowledge of national
political affairs, they are even more ignorant about affairs at the European level (Hobolt
2007). Amongst these EU cues, the home style of national governments is particularly
central. This is because national governments dominate the domestic coverage of political
affairs (Roberts 2006). As they wield power and are in a position to deliver policies, the
media pay close attention to what governments do and say. Indeed, opposition politicians
often complain about governments ‘hogging the spotlight’ and the difficulties they face in
receiving coverage that match that conferred onto national governments.
To illustrate the centrality of national governments as cue-givers on European inte-
gration, I draw on the dataset that is the centrepiece of this thesis. EUParlspeech is a
dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made in ten national parlia-
ments between 1989 and 2019. The third chapter in this thesis presents more details on the
methodology employed to create the dataset, and Figure 1.1 below outlines the share of EU
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Figure 1.1: Number of EU References in National Parliaments
communication made by mainstream governing parties, mainstream opposition parties, and
challenger parties 2 . The figure demonstrates not only the increased salience of European
integration in domestic parliamentary debates, but also the dominance of governments (and
mainstream parties more generally) in the domestic presentation of EU affairs. Indeed, the
mainstream parties that tend to form governments are responsible for 73 per cent of the EU
communication that takes place in parliamentary debates. Governing parties, which make
up just a handful of the parties in parliaments, are responsible for half.
As further evidence of the centrality of national governments and leaders as cue-givers
on EU, I also pick out the speakers who make the most references to European integra-
tion in each of the ten parliaments in EUParlspeech. Table 1.1 shows how seven of the
ten speakers with the most EU references in parliamentary debates held senior positions
in government. In fact, in five of the ten parliaments, the speaker who makes the most
references to European integration is or was a head of government (Merkel, Aznar, Rutte,
Sobotka, Cowen). Even in a relatively permissive communication venue, where parliaments
are expected to divide speaking time in a proportional manner, governments still end up
dominating the communication of European integration.
2Figure 1.1 does not include the Irish Dail as data is only available until 2013.
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Table 1.1: Who Speaks Most About Europe? (National Parliaments, 1989 - 2019)
Parliament Speaker with most EU references
AT - Nationalrat Herbert Scheibner (Minister in Government)
CZ - Poslanecká sněmovna Bohuslav Sobotka (Head of Government)
DE - Bundestag Angela Merkel (Head of Government)
DK - Folketing Per Stig Møller (Minister in Government)
ES - Congreso José Maŕıa Aznar (Head of Government)
GR - Hellenic Parliament Nikolaos Karathanasopoulos (Member of Parliament)
IRL - Dail Brian Cowen (Head of Government)
NL - Tweede Kamer Bohuslav Sobotka (Head of Government)
SE - Riksdag Ulf Holm (Member of Parliament)
UK - House of Commons Bill Cash (Member of Parliament)
Source: EUParlspeech (see Chapter 3 for details on the construction of the dataset). Speakers who
held senior positions in government are in bold.
Of course, governments do not exist in a vacuum in national politics: they also compete
with opposition parties to gain reelection and maintain power. A growing literature em-
phasises the conflict in Europe between mainstream parties (centre right and centre left pro
EU parties that dominate national elections and are therefore likely to form governments),
and challenger parties (parties without government experience who mobilise new issues).
Whilst the concept of home style applies specifically to governments, researchers interested
in the domestic presentation of European integration should also consider more broadly
how national parties frame and communicate the issue ‘at home’. This thesis will therefore
consider not simply how governments present Europe, but how national parties - and in
particular how the mainstream parties that tend to form governments - present the issue in
their domestic public spheres. This is important empirically because citizens receive most
of their cues on international cooperation from their own national governments, politicians,
and parties. But home style also matters normatively, because citizens are represented
in the EU by their governments, and because communication plays a central role in this
process of representation.
The literature on citizen representation is one of the richest in EU scholarship. Initial
concerns about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ have since been subsumed by a growing liter-
ature demonstrating responsiveness by national governments in the EU (Wratil 2014, 2017,
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2018; Hagemann et al 2017; Schneider 2020). Yet as we have seen in the previous section,
representation is not simply about what representatives do in policymaking venues; it is
also about what they say about this activity in their own domestic public spheres. Indeed,
scholars have made the case that communication - and in particular home style - is central
to a broader notion of democratic representation (Grimmer 2010, 2014).
Home style matters to representation in two fundamental ways, both of which are appli-
cable to the EU. First, home style is important on its own, because it allows representatives
to strategically define how they are responsive to constituents. To create this image, leg-
islators adopt diverse and stable home styles, for example by focusing on their ability to
bring in funds from federal budgets (appropriators) or on defending clear policy positions at
the federal level (position takers). Likewise, national governments can adopt diverse home
styles in the EU. Governments of smaller member states may emphasise their ability to
receive generous structural funds for example; whereas the governments of larger member
states may want to emphasise their ability to place their own national priorities at the top
of the European agenda.
Second, home style is important because it both reflects and affects what representatives
can do in policymaking venues. Scholars outline the correspondence between legislators’
home style and their ‘Hill style’: the issues they emphasise in their communication at home
are likely to be those they spend time on in Washington DC. For example, legislators intro-
duce more bills on issues they discuss frequently at home and articulate similar positions
in floor speeches and press releases aimed at their domestic audiences (Grimmer, 2014).
Likewise, the home styles adopted by national governments in the EU may constrain the
goals they pursue in negotiations in the Council. A government who is fiercely critical of the
EU in its public communication for example, may find its room for manoeuvre restricted
in the Council, as domestic audiences expect their tough talk at home to be reflected by
tough stances in Brussels.
Ultimately, home style matters because it speaks to a question that goes to the very heart
of the European project: that of democratic legitimacy. The EU is of course legitimised
through institutional channels like national and European elections, and major integration
events such as treaties are also legitimised through national referendums (Hobolt 2006).
Yet legitimation (and delegitimation) is also a discursive process. Participants in the public
sphere establish and cultivate the belief in the legitimacy of systems of authority through
their discourse and public statements (Habermas 1976; Van Leuween 2007). In the case of
the EU, this discourse has been marked by a tension between between legitimation down
the ‘input’ and ‘output’ routes (Scharpf 1999) and a balancing act between forces actively
politicizing and deliberately depoliticizing the stakes of EU politics (Sternberg 2013).
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If we accept that discourse is central to the legitimation and delegitimation of European
integration, then we must accept the centrality of home style to the legitimacy of the EU.
National governments are naturally not the only actor to participate in the public debates
that legitimise and delegitimise systems of authority - but they are certainly an important
one (as are national political parties more generally). Their privileged and prominent po-
sition in domestic public spheres means their words are likely to be influential, and their
position as elected representatives confers their speech with a certain democratic legitimacy
that is unavailable to most contributors to the public sphere.
Home style therefore matters. It matters because elites cue public opinion towards inte-
gration, and because governments and the mainstream parties that form them are amongst
the most influential cue-givers in domestic public spheres. It matters because home style is
central to the representation offered to citizens in EU policymaking. And it matters because
home style is central to the legitimation and legitimacy of the European project. In the
following section I show how major EU scholars have contemplated the question of home
style and that their conclusions largely mirror the concerns articulated in the Eurocrat’s
complaint.
1.2.3 Europeanist and Nationalist Home Styles
While the term ‘home style’ is currently absent from the EU literature, the concept itself
has been contemplated by some of the most important scholars of European integration.
Let us begin with neofunctionalists. Whilst Ernst Haas (1958) defended an elite perspective
on European integration, later neofunctionalists had the profound insight that international
integration as a purely elite-driven project was a temporary state of affairs (Hooghe and
Marks 2009). As functionalist pressures meant more and more issues shifted to the European
level, this would eventually lead the mass public to engage with European integration (see
also Zurn 2014). Rather than acting as a constraint on elites, this would in fact speed up
the process of integration, as citizens would eventually transfer their allegiances from the
national level to the European one, and increasingly direct popular pressures for welfare to
the international stage. In a much quoted article in International Organization, Schmitter
(1969) hypothesised that the politicization of international cooperation would lead not to
a constraining dissensus but to “a shift in actor expectations and loyalty toward the new
regional center” (1969, p.166).
According to this view, far from being punished for presenting integration clearly and
defending it in public, governments and parties would therefore benefit from adopting what
we might call a Europeanist home style. As domestic interest groups and electorates support
the further pooling of sovereignty, national governments and mainstream parties do not need
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to mask their pro-integration preferences and in fact benefit electorally from showing what
they have done (or would do) to pursue further integration on the international stage.
In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists argued that governments use the communica-
tion of international cooperation opportunistically, as a way to redistribute power resources
in their favour (Moravcsik 1994). Specifically, they argue that international cooperation
creates domestic informational asymmetries which executives can use to manipulate do-
mestic public opinion. By shifting domestic perceptions about the technical and political
constraints under which states act, executives shift domestic expectations about responsbil-
ity for and alternatives to government policy. The practice of blaming unpopular policies on
international constraints is commmon (see Putnam 1988; Cruz and Schneider 2017; Menon
2008) and Moravcsik’s conclusion in a 1994 presentation at the Annual Meeting of the
America Political Science Association (APSA) is reminiscent of the Eurocrat’s complaint
quoted in this chapter’s introduction:
“EC executives have grown adept at claiming credit and shifting blame. Former
national representatives testify that majority voting in the Council of Ministers
serves a useful political function by permitting executives to scapegoat their
foreign counterparts by being ‘outvoted’ on certain issues. Supranational officials
offer an even more inviting scapegoat. When things go badly, a technocratic
Commission receives the blame; when things go well, national leaders claim the
credit.” (Moravcsik 1994, 23)
The instincts of liberal intergovernmentalists on the presentational opportunities offered
by EU integration would later be formalised in the blame avoidance literature (see Weaver
1984, Hood 2004; Hood et al. 2009, 2011). This literature argues that given the desire by the
media, the public, and politicians to find scapegoats, executives exhibit a ‘negativity bias’
and focus on avoiding blame at all costs. To do so they employ both operational strategies
that delegate authority to non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs), and presentational strate-
gies that shift responsibility onto these NMIs for negative policy outcomes (Hood 2006).
Hood makes the compelling case that the EU’s multilevel polity facilitates this behaviour,
by blurring competencies and creating a regulatory regime of such complexity that anyone
who is not throughly steeped in such matters will struggle to identify who is responsible
when adverse events occur. Shifting blame towards the EU’s supranational institutions is
therefore an appealing strategy for reelection seeking executives whose main objective is
less about claiming credit when things go right, than about avoiding responsibility when
things go wrong.
Unsurprisingly, discursive institutionalists have also paid close attention to the home
style of national governments. In her seminal ‘Democracy in Europe’ (2005), Schmidt
20
recognises the central communicative role of governments in the legitimation of Europe’s
new multilevel polity. However, rather than adopting Europeanist home styles which engage
citizens in a meaningful discourse on how Europeanization alters democracy within the
nation state, Schmidt argues that executives have largely avoided the issue because of short-
term political costs. She concludes that rather than a democratic deficit at the European
level, EU integration has led to a democratic deficit at the national level precisely because
governments have adopted evasive home styles that fail to legitimize Europe’s new multilevel
polity in the eyes of its citizens:
“The democratic deficit thus results not so much because national governance
practices have changed as because national leaders have bungled their commu-
nicative role. So far they have failed to generate ideas and discourse that en-
gage national publics in deliberations about the EU-related changes to national
democracies. Nor have they generated the ideas and discourse that would enable
each member-state to fashion its own new, distinct ‘democratic compromise’ to
legitimize the new realities of its more Europeanized polity.” (Schmidt 2006, 5,
emphasis added)
Finally, scholars of party competition have also made the case that mainstream parties
are highly incentivised to avoid the issue of European integration in their public commu-
nication (De Vries and Hobolt 2020). Because their success is built on the left-right axis
of political competition, and because European integration cannot easily be integrated into
this dimension of political conflict, mainstream parties (and thus executives) will seek to
lower its salience by blurring their position or downplaying the issue’s importance.
This combination of opportunism, as outlined by liberal intergovernmentalists and the
blame avoidance literature, and evasiveness, as outlined by discursive institutionalists and
scholars of party competition, is what we might call a nationalist home style. Table 1.2
summarises the two home styles described in this section. While the Europeanist home
style emphasises a clear unambiguous defence of integration, governments and mainstream
parties who adopt a nationalist home style contribute to the delegitimation of the EU by
failing to engage citizens in a meaningful discourse on Europe, and by using the EU’s
supranational institutions as scapegoats to avoid responsibility for negative outcomes.
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Table 1.2: Europeanist and Nationalist Home Styles in the European Union
Home Style Europeanist Nationalist
Evasiveness Low: government communicates High: government does not
frequently on EU integration with engage its citizenry in a
clear, unambiguous, and meaningful discourse on
positive cues. European integration.
Opportunism Low: government rarely blames High: government does not
the EU and frequently shares share credit for collective
credit with the EU and its policies and shifts blame
institutions for salient onto the EU and its
policy issues. supranational institutions.
Effect on EU Legitimation Delegitimation
Legitimacy
Scholars of European integration, then, have undeniably been interested in the concept
of home style despite not using the term directly. Their conclusions also largely mirror the
concerns articulated in the Eurocrat’s Complaint: governments are incentivised to adopt
nationalist home styles that damage the legitimacy of the EU and contribute to rising
Euroscepticism. In the following section, I show that despite the widespread popularity of
this view, empirical evidence on how governments present Europe at home is limited to
a small number of qualitative studies. I then show that this empirical neglect is not as
justified as it once was, as advances in automated text analysis and machine translation
have significantly lowered barriers to the comparative, quantitative study of home style.
1.2.4 The Empirical Neglect of Home Style
Despite the conviction amongst EU scholars and policymakers that governments adopt eva-
sive, opportunistic home styles, empirical work that investigates what governments and
parties directly say about Europe is surprisingly limited. Some scholars have explored
blame-shifting during the economic crisis by hand coding speeches, and find that govern-
ments rarely shift blame onto the EU, instead employing other blame avoidance strategies,
in particular historical blame–shifting that places responsibility at the hands of previous
governments (Hobolt and Tilley 2014; Ladi and Tsagkroni 2019). Other researchers also use
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hand coding and find evidence of blame shifting towards the EU by national governments
(Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020; Heinkelmann-Wild and Zangl, 2020). This research focuses
on a small number of member states, on specific policy areas and proposals, and includes
only brief investigation periods that allow for little variation in the independent variables
that may affect the home styles adopted by national governments3.
The relatively small samples included in these studies are perhaps unsurprising when we
consider how time consuming the ‘gold standard’ of human handcoding can be (Grimmer
and Stewart 2013). Scholars have therefore made use of advances in automated text anal-
ysis to investigate the language used by national leaders in association with the EU. This
research makes important contributions to our understanding of executive communication
of European integration, but is limited as evidence of the adoption of nationalist home
styles. Whilst they show how leaders use more complex and negative language about the
EU during crises (Rauh et al., 2020, Traber et al., 2019), it is highly debatable whether neg-
ative language equates to blame-shifting.4 Additionally, by failing to measure the salience
of European integration in governments’ communication, this research also fails to address
the central accusation of evasiveness levelled at national governments.
Finally, scholars have also used discourse analysis to explore how Europe is presented
and framed in domestic public spheres (see Sternberg 2013, 2014 Schmidt 2005, Howarth
2004). Yet this work also makes it difficult to draw inferences about the home style of
national governments. Discursive institutionalists in particular draw on a dynamic concep-
tualization of ‘discourse’, which emerges from the interaction and debates between political
actors. These actors of course include national leaders and governments, but also party
activists, media pundits, community leaders, social activists, public intellectuals, experts,
think-tanks, organised interests and social movements, amongst others (Habermas 1989,
Schmidt 2008). This can make it difficult to distinguish discourse on the EU that comes
directly from governments (home style) from the discourse that comes from other elites that
are not in government. Overall, we can conclude that the empirical neglect highlighted by
Hobolt and Tilley in Blaming Europe (2014), still holds true today.
“There is currently little work that examines, theoretically or empirically, how
the EU institutions facilitate blame avoidance. While it is generally assumed
3The research of Heinkelmann et al. for example focuses largely on migration in Germany and Austria;
Ladi and Tsagkroni (2019) focus exclusively on bailouts in Greece; Hobolt and Tilley’s conclusions are based
on 211 statements that refer to the financial crisis by heads of government in the UK, Ireland, and Germany.
4Consider the statement: ‘The EU is going through difficult, turbulent, and uncertain times’. According
to the methodology employed by Traber et al. this would qualify as blame shifting due to the proximity
of negative words to the token ‘EU’. Yet the statement does not attribute responsibility for this negative
situation to the EU or its institutions.
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that the EU facilitates blame-shifting by politicians, we have very little evidence
of how national governments actually behave.” (Hobolt and Tilley 2014, 5,
emphasis added)
The EU literature is yet to offer a systematic, quantitative, comparative study of how na-
tional governments and mainstream parties present Europe in their domestic public spheres.
This neglect is in many ways unsurprising given the large resources required to conduct com-
parative studies of political communication across countries. In the following section, I show
how progress in computational methods in the social sciences - particularly the advances
in machine translation - means these barriers are not as insurmountable as they once were
and allow me to develop original datasets of elite communication to study home style, and
the domestic presentation of European integration more generally.
1.3 Original Data to Study Home Style
1.3.1 Overcoming Obstacles
The comparative study of home style is made challenging by a number of obstacles. First,
and most obviously, the difficulties in collecting data. While governments frequently pub-
lish their communication such as speeches, press conferences, and press releases, they also
archive these materials and most official websites delete the speeches of outgoing premiers
or presidents, leaving only communication from incumbents (Schumacher et al 2016). How-
ever, ingenuous ‘hacks’ such as the Wayback machine, web scraping, and platforms that
distribute tasks across workers allow researchers to overcome these difficulties and create
machine readable datasets of communication by national executives and legislatures in Eu-
rope (see in particular Rauh and Schwalbach 2020; Schumacher et al 2016; Merz et al 2016;
Martini and Walter 2020; De Bruyker 2017).
Second, researchers now have a wide range of sophisticated automated text analysis
methods at our disposal that make possible the previously impossible in political science:
they allow us to systematically analyse large-scale text collections without massive funding
support (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). The usefulness of techniques such as dictionary
methods, supervised methods, unsupervised algorithms and scaling is evident from their
widespread adoption in political science. Automated text analysis has been employed to
capture, amongst other things, the tone, simplicity, emotiveness, familiarity, sentiment,
substantive topics and sophistication in communication by political elites (see e.g. Rauh
2016, 2021; Spirling 2016; Schumacher et al. 2016; Bischof 2018; Benoit et al 2019; Kosmidis
et al 2019; Lin and Osnabrügge 2018). This thesis will make use of these wide range of
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methods to draw inferences about the home styles of national governments and the domestic
presentation of European integration.
Third, arguably the largest barrier to the comparative study of home style is the diversity
of languages spoken on the continent. Following successive rounds of enlargement, the EU
now has three alphabets and 24 official languages, with 60 other languages currently spoken
in particular regions or by specific groups (European Commission 2020). In order to make
comparisons across countries, researchers first need to translate texts into one language.
The costs of doing so are often eye-wateringly expensive. The EU institutions, for example,
translate documents at great expense, with an army of around 4,300 translators and 800
interpreters on its permanent staff (CdT 2017). The costs of translation for the European
Parliament alone is estimated at over 12 million euros. It goes without saying that these
budgets are out of reach for most academic institutions, let alone individual PhD students.
However, advances in machine translation may provide a solution, as social scientists
validate the use of automated translation tools for the comparative study of political com-
munication. De Vries, Schoonvelde and Schumacher (2018) use the europarl data, a set of
documents that consists of the proceedings of the European Parliament, to evaluate the
quality of machine translation compared to the ‘gold standard’ professional human trans-
lation of identical documents. Their results confirm that Google Translate is a useful tool
for researchers using bag-of-words text models for comparative questions. By providing
researchers with the ability to translate the communication of multiple governments in dif-
ferent counties into one single language, this freely available tool therefore allows us to
overcome the ultimate hurdle in researching home style.
In sum, the three barriers that once made the comparative study of home style difficult,
if not impossible, are not as insurmountable as they once were. Scholars now have access
to a wide range of machine readable datasets on communication by national governments.
They can use a wide range of automated text analysis tools to evaluate the complexity, sen-
timent, emotion, and substantive topics in this communication. And crucially, automated
translation of political speech is a valid way for them to provide cross-national comparisons
of how national governments cue their citizens on a variety of issues, including European
integration. These developments allow me to develop two original datasets of elite commu-
nication that are the cornerstone of my research.
1.3.2 Two Original Datasets : EUCOSpeech and EUParlspeech
This thesis takes advantage of the advances described in the section above to create two
original datasets to study home style and the domestic presentation of EU integration more
generally. The first is EUCOSpeech, a dataset of speeches by national leaders in press
25
conferences after European Council (EUCO) summits. There a number of reasons why this
data provides a particularly satisfactory way to study home style. First, by controlling
for the substance of the message, the data allows me to conduct a genuine comparison of
presentational style. The EUCO conclusions are agreed by all member states and a written
record of what was discussed and agreed is made publicly available (Alexandrova 2014).
It therefore provides a significant constraint for what national leaders can present, while
allowing them leeway on how they present it. Second, EUCO summits are amongst the most
high profile events of European integration widely covered by national media, which means
the cues sent by governments at these summits are particularly likely to reach citizens.
Altogether, EUCOSpeech provides an ideal way to ‘compare what national politicians say
in a similar situation in response to similar events’ (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, p.108)
The second original dataset is EUParlspeech, a dataset of over 1 million references to
EU integration made in parliamentary speeches between 1989 and 2019. The EU refer-
ences are windows of three sentences in which the speaker makes a direct reference to the
EU, its politics and/or policies. The data is created using machine readable transcripts
of parliamentary debates and validated dictionaries of EU-level terms (Rauh et al. 2019;
Konstantina 2018; Rauh and De Wilde 2014). Put simply, the method recognises key EU
level terms such ‘European Union’, ‘European Commission’, or ‘Stability and Growth Pact’
and extracts a three-sentence window around these markers. These text windows there-
fore capture all instances in which any speaker in national parliaments makes an explicit
reference to the process of European integration. Parliaments are a key arena of political
contestation for national governments, one where opposition parties attempt to hold them
to account, and therefore provide another ideal communication venue for the comparative
study of home style. EUParlspeech also covers an investigation period of thirty years, al-
lowing us to analyse longitudinal changes in home style and in how national parties frame
and present European integration domestically.
To allow for cross-national comparisons, the data are available both in the speaker’s na-
tive language and translated into English using Google Translate. The data includes seven
member states in the case of EUCOspeech, and ten in the case of EUParlspeech, covering
important structural divisions within the European Union. These datasets are the corner-
stone of my research and the third chapter in this thesis, a research note, provides a detailed
methodology on the construction of EUParlspeech as well as demonstrating the data’s face,
convergent, and predictive validity. Table 1.3 provides a summary of EUCOSpeech and EU-
Parlspeech. The example statements highlight the quality of the automated translation into
English, giving researchers coherent, fully interpretable statements on the EU by national
leaders and politicians.
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Table 1.3: Summary of EUCOSpeech and EUParlspeech
Dataset EUCOSpeech EUParlspeech
Venue Press Conferences Debates in National
after EU summits Parliaments
Period 2005 - 2018 1989 - 2019
Member States 7 member states 10 member states
Speakers Heads of Government Heads of Government, Ministers in
Government, Members of Parliament
Language Original language and English Original language and English
(machine translation) (machine translation)
Number of 6,027 statements (paragraphs) 1 million + EU references
Observations
Example “In relation to youth “Why would we want
employment - another very to veto this treaty?
important point for us - It provides the means
concrete measures were for a more effective
also adopted. The six working of the EU. Let
billion euros dedicated to us be clear about
the Youth Employment this: my hon. Friend
Initiative will be disbursed and some Opposition
in 2014 and 2015. This Members, would call for a
initiative, as you know, referendum even if we added
was agreed in February a comma to the constitutional
and was a proposal treaty, because what they
of the Spanish government. really want is to
For Spain this means take us out of Europe,
receiving almost two and they might as well
billion Euros.” be honest about it.”
(M.Rajoy, ES, 2013/06) (T.Blair, UK, 2007/06)
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1.4 Evasive and Opportunistic?
National governments, then, are accused by both EU policymakers and scholars of adopting
nationalist home styles in which they are evasive and opportunistic in their presentation of
European integration. In this thesis, I will use the original datasets described in the previous
section to show that this widely held view is based on a simplistic reading of the incentives
of national governments and mainstream parties and does not hold up to empirical scrutiny.
The alternative theoretical argument I present draws on a number of literatures but
starts from the premise that governments are office seeking (Downs 1957, Mayhew 1974):
their principal goal is to secure reelection5. It can broadly be summarised in the following
five statements: (1) Governments’ main goal is reelection: they therefore adopt the home
style that offers the highest electoral return. (2) Far from being a costless rhetorical strategy,
adopting a nationalist home style imposes a series of costs which make it a risky choice for
national governments. (3) With the politicization of European integration, governments
(and mainstream parties more generally) therefore face a rhetorical dilemma: on the one
hand, the need to signal responsiveness to more sceptical and interested domestic audiences;
on the other the reluctance to take clear positions on EU integration and to explicitly
criticise the EU. (4) Governments solve this rhetorical dilemma by adopting a home style
I label ‘technocratic-patriotic’. Technocratic, in the sense that governments actually talk
frequently about the EU, but avoid clear position taking on the issue by defusing it with
complex language. Patriotic, in the sense that governments extensively claim credit for
defending the national interest on the European stage, but in fact rarely blame or criticise
the EU directly. (5) The effect of this ‘technocratic-patriotic’ home style on the legitimacy of
the EU is unclear: whilst the EU is rarely criticised by governments and mainstream parties
directly, the lack of clarity in their cues and their tendency to claim credit for policies of
collective responsibility is problematic for democratic accountability in Europe’s multilevel
system of governance.
1.4.1 The Costs of a Nationalist Home Style
The nationalist home style, where governments are evasive and opportunistic in their pre-
sentation of EU integration, is often presented as a costless rhetorical strategy (see Section
2.3). I argue instead that it imposes a series of costs which makes it a risky choice for
national governments. Crucially, adopting it risks damaging their competence, which is
central to their prospects for reelection (see e.g. Green and Jennings 2017). First, gov-
5Governments of course have other other objectives: they want to implement certain policies for example.
Yet gaining reelection has primacy in the sense that it precedes these other objectives: it is the first objective
that must be satisfied in order to achieve these other related goals.
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ernments will find it very difficult, if not impossible, to completely evade the issue of EU
integration. As governments are expected to deliver solutions to a huge number of policy
problems facing modern societies, they find it difficult to ignore issues that have emerged on
the political agenda and risk seeming unresponsive and incompetent if they do (see Green
Pedersen 2015). The logic behind this argument is intuitive: imagine a government that
stays silent about what it hopes to achieve and what it has achieved in the multiple EU
summits that take place every year. This government would be accused of being laughably
out of touch given the centrality of EU policymaking to salient issues such as the economy,
migration, and climate change (Zurn 2014). Governments therefore talk about European
integration, not because they particularly want to, but because they have to given how
central EU policymaking has become in their own domestic politics.6 (Hix, 2011)
Beyond evasiveness, shifting blame on to the EU also damages a government’s reputa-
tion and credibility with the EU and other member states, which may damage their ability
to achieve their goals in international negotiations, and therefore the impression of com-
petence they attempt to convey. Indeed, scholars have modeled international agreements
as a series of repeated games in which players have to take into account the impact of
their current action on the future actions of other players (Putnam, 1988; Barrett, 1992;
Finus and Rundhsagen, 1998). Governments in the EU are thus incentivized to build and
maintain their reputation with other member states and scholars have shown how reluctant
governments are to antagonize their fellow member states - for instance, opposition votes in
the Council are very rare (Hagemann et al., 2017). Explicit criticism of the EU may thus
be undesirable because it is costly to their reputation – and thus their ability to achieve
their goals in future negotiations (Alexandrova et al., 2012). Blame shifting is also difficult
to do credibly given national governments’ position at the heart of the EU through their
seat in the Council (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014. McGraw and Dolan, 2007).
Even if we exclude costs to competence and focus exclusively on position taking, na-
tionalist home styles are also unlikely to offer particularly high electoral returns. This is
because, for the mainstream parties that tend to form governments, ‘Brussels-bashing’ is
likely to antagonize as many domestic audiences as it pleases. In shifting blame towards the
EU, national leaders signal congruence with their country’s growing sceptical constituency
but also alienate the substantial chunk of their electorate that is supportive of integration.
Public opinion data shows that while skepticism towards EU integration has grown, it re-
mains a minority position in the majority of EU countries . A more accurate description is
one of polarization. This is important because research in other multilevel systems shows
6Whilst this is true of mainstream parties generally (given that competence is central to their electoral
appeal), this constraint is not as prevalent for opposition parties, who are less constrained by the party
system agenda and are freer to emphasise the issues they would like. See Chapter 4 for further details
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that state senators representing divided constituencies tend to avoid clear position taking
because it offers limited electoral returns (Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012).
For mainstream parties on the right and the left, European integration constitutes a wedge
issue that cuts across the dimension of political conflict where they are dominant, and schol-
ars have shown that these mainstream parties therefore aim to avoid taking clear positions
on the issue (Hobolt and De Vries, 2020). The nationalist home style, as a clear form of
Eurosceptic position taking, is thus unlikely to offer high electoral returns for governments
and mainstream parties with domestic audiences that are divided on the issue of the EU.
To be clear, I am not saying that governments will never adopt a nationalist home style
and never offer explicit criticism of the EU. Certain mismanagements or scandals by EU
institutions may be impossible to defend, and - hypothetically - domestic electorates may
be so negatively disposed towards the EU to make blame shifting a desirable choice. What
I am saying is that the nationalist home style, rather than being a rhetorical strategy used
constantly by governments to shift responsibility for negative outcomes, is in fact largely
a rhetorical strategy of last resort that governments and mainstream parties will use in
exceptional circumstances only.
1.4.2 Governments’ Rhetorical Dilemma
The nationalist home style therefore imposes a series of costs which make it a risky choice for
national governments and the mainstream parties that form them. Evading the issue of EU
integration completely is almost impossible for a party who wishes to appear competent; and
opportunistically blaming the EU for problems is likely to antagonise other member states
and a large chunck of their electorate. In the era of the permissive consensus (Lindberg and
Scheingold, 1970) the solution was clear: governments could simply adopt Europeanist home
styles which reflected their citizens’ broadly supportive views on integration. However, the
politicization of European integration places national governments and mainstream parties
in a difficult situation when presenting Europe at home.
The politicization of European integration is subject to a rich literature (see for example
Kriesi 2007, Zurn et al 2012, Borzel and Riise 2018). Despite disagreement on its root causes,
there is a clear convergence on its empirical components (De Wilde et al. 2016; Rauh
2016: Chapter 2). EU politicization brings together the increased salience and visibility
of integration in public debates, the polarization of public opinions on the EU, and the
increased mobilization on the issue by political actors - particularly parties. Figure 1.2
illustrates this threefold conceptualisation and shows how European integration has been
politicized particularly since the Maastricht Treaty, which placed a range of salient policy
issues under the control of the EU’s supranational institutions (Hooghe and Marks 2009).
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Figure 1.2: The Politicization of European Integration
A growing literature investigates the consequences of this politicization for policymaking
in the EU. Most importantly for the purpose of this thesis, a growing literature argues
persuasively that EU politicization incentivises governments to signal responsiveness on the
European stage, as domestic audiences are paying increasing attention to what goes on in EU
policymaking. Scholars have shown how national governments in IOs signal responsiveness
to domestic audiences through their voting behaviour (Hagemann et al., 2017; Muhlbock
and Tosun, 2018), their use of formal policy statements (Wratil, 2018 ), and the positions
taken in negotiations with international partners (Schneider, 2018; Schneider and Slantchev,
2018).
Instinctively, one might think that governments would respond to EU politicization by
adopting nationalist homes styles that are more critical of the EU in their communication.
After all, not only does this rhetorical strategy signal congruence with increasingly sceptical
domestic audiences, it also offers a useful scapegoat to avoid responsibility for negative
outcomes, particularly in times of crisis. However, as I argue in the section above, this
nationalist home style remains a risky choice for governments. At the domestic level, it
is still the case that a significant part of the electorate remains supportive of integration.
At the international level, elites are still likely to look unkindly onto attempts to shift the
blame onto them, and it is still the case that ‘Brussels bashing’ may damage their ability
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to achieve their goals in subsequent negotiations.
This difficult balancing act is what I call the rhetorical dilemma of home style. On
the one hand, increased public discontent towards integration and the successful mobili-
sation of this discontent by challenger parties (see De Vries et al 2020) makes it difficult
for governments and mainstream parties to adopt purely Europeanist home styles that un-
critically laud the EU at home. On the other, adopting nationalist home styles remains a
risky strategy, particularly for governments formed by mainstream parties that have many
pro-European voters, and are likely to be involved in negotiations with EU partners for
many years to come.7
Concept Definition: The Rhetorical Dilemma of Home Style
EU politicization incentivises governments to signal responsiveness to more scep-
tical domestic audiences; yet governments and mainstream parties are reluctant to
adopt nationalist home styles that are explicit in their criticism of the EU.
The rhetorical dilemma of homes style means governments and mainstream parties are
reluctant to adopt either Europeanist home styles, which make them seem unresponsive,
or nationalist home styles, which are still likely to antagonise a wide range of international
partners and domestic audiences. In the following section, I argue that governments solve
this dilemma by adopting what I call a technocratic-patriotic home style.
1.4.3 Solving the Dilemma: The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style
The rhetorical dilemma of home style has two parts. First, governments and mainstream
parties would prefer to avoid the issue of EU integration but find it impossible to ignore.
Second, governments and mainstream parties must signal responsiveness to more sceptical
domestic audiences but are reluctant to blame the EU and antagonise international partners
and pro-European voters. Adopting what I call the ‘technocratic-patriotic’ home style helps
them solve both parts of this dilemma.
First, national governments and mainstream parties facing domestic EU politicization
want to avoid clear position taking on the issue of integration, but find it risky to ignore
the issue altogether as it risks damaging their competence and/or making them seem unre-
sponsive (see Green-Pedersen and section 1.4.1 above). Is there a solution to this problem?
7In the thesis’ conclusion, I consider whether this argument is generalisable to the small number of
non-mainstream parties who have formed governments in the EU.
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I argue that as much as possible, governments and mainstream parties will aim to avoid
clear position taking on Europe by defusing the issue with complex technocratic language.
Indeed, whilst the avoidance literature often equates issue avoidance with simply ignoring
an issue (see Rovny 2012), scholars of party competition have also shown how politicians
can obfuscate their positions by changing the substance of their communication. The sim-
plicity and complexity of language used by politicians can influence voters’ perceptions of
their positions, and voters particularly struggle to place the positions of politicians whose
language is more complex (Bischof and Seninger 2019). Language complexity is therefore
a tool that governments and parties can use strategically to obfuscate their position and I
argue that governments and mainstream parties are particularly likely to use this tool to
defuse the issue of European integration with technocratic, scientific or managerial language
(Rauh et al 2020).
This defusion strategy is particularly appealing to governments, as they are sensitive to
their reputation for competence and welcome opportunities to demonstrate it on a variety
of issues (Green and Jennings 2012, 2017). A large literature shows how public evaluations
of government performance impact vote choice (Hellwig, 2001; Helliwg and Samuels 2007)
and strong asymmetries in information mean voters update their performance evaluations
more for incumbents than for opposition parties (Fiorina 1977, 1981, Butt 2006; Green and
Jennings 2012; Green and Jennings 2018). The ability to frame issues as ones of managerial,
technocratic competence is therefore likely to appeal to parties in government. By framing
European integration as an issue as one that is principally about capable management, they
can reap the electoral benefits that come with a reputation for competence whilst avoiding
clear position taking on the issue itself.
Second, national governments facing domestic EU politicization need to signal respon-
siveness to more sceptical domestic au but are reluctant to explicitly criticise the EU. How
do governments solve this part of the dilemma? I argue that they do so by focusing on
credit claiming in their communication of European integration: showing what they have
achieved for their country on the European stage, without articulating clear positions on
European integration either way. Credit claiming is particularly relevant in the context
of the EU, because research in other multilevel systems shows how this communication
strategy is favoured by representatives of polarized constituencies, for whom articulating
clear positions is risky (Grimmer et al., 2012; Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b). As Figure 1.2
has shown, polarization is an accurate description of views on European integration, with
both an electorate and a party system that is often bitterly divided on the issue. Credit
claiming is therefore an appealing way for governments to present themselves as effective
representatives in the EU without articulating a clear pro or anti positions on European
integration.
33
Table 1.4: The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style
Home Style Technocratic-Patriotic
Evasiveness Government communicates
frequently on EU integration but
avoids clear position taking
by defusing the issue.
Opportunism Government claims
credit for collective policies
but is reluctant to criticise
or blame the EU directly.
Effect on EU Government does
Legitimacy not delegitimize the EU directly but
sends obfuscating cues on integration.
Table 1.4 summarises what I call the technocratic-patriotic home style. Its name draws
on a conception of technocracy as a managerial style of politics where issues are depoliticised
and deliberately placed outside the realm of political contestation (see Hood, 2002, 2016;
Wood and Flinders, 2014). It also draws on a conception of patriotism in which one’s nation
is put first, but distinguishes itself from nationalism by not being antagonistic towards
other nations and supranational institutions (Bar-Tal, 1997; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989,
Li and Brewer 2004). The technocratic-patriotic home style is not completely evasive:
governments that adopt it are likely to talk frequently about European integration (although
their cues are complex and often unclear). Nor is it completely opportunistic: governments
that adopt it rarely, if ever shift blame onto the EU (although neither do they share credit
with the EU for salient policy issues). The effect of this technocratic-patriotic home style
on the legitimacy of the EU is unclear: the EU is not delegitimised directly by criticism
from governments but the failure to credit the EU for salient issues it is responsible for
and the lack of clarity in governments’ and mainstream parties’ EU cues is likely, at the
very least, to harm democratic accountability in Europe’s complex, multilevel system of
governance. In the final section of this introduction, I explain how this thesis tests the
observable implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style and provide a summary of
the thesis’ chapters.
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1.5 Structure and Contributions
1.5.1 A Theory of Home Style
The central contribution of this thesis is to challenge conventional wisdom about how gov-
ernments present European integration in their domestic public spheres. In doing so, it
provides a novel theoretical account of why governments and mainstream parties present
Europe as they do, one that is grounded in existing literatures from international relations
and party competition. The argument builds on Putnam’s idea of two level games (1988)
and shows how governments manage a careful balancing act between signalling responsive-
ness at the national level and maintaining trust and credibility with international partners
at the European level. This balancing act also exists domestically as mainstream parties
increasingly face voters that are polarized on the EU issue, with one section which is scep-
tical of integration, but an equally important section that remain supportive of the EU and
international cooperation. This rhetorical dilemma of home style is not only an important
concept to understand why governments - and the mainstream parties that form them -
present Europe as they do, but also applies when presenting international cooperation more
broadly8 .
The thesis also builds on the growing literature on the consequences of EU politicization
(see Zurn 2014, 2016, Rauh 2015, 2019; Hagemann et al 2017; Schneider 2019). While
scholars has explored how politicization changes governments’ behaviour on the European
stage, there has been less emphasis about how politicization changes what governments
say about Europe in their domestic public spheres. This thesis demonstrates clearly how
domestic EU politicization affects governments’ communication of European integration,
with governments adopting more patriotic home styles in their domestic public spheres
when domestic EU politicization is high. By contrast, governments facing low domestic EU
politicization are more comfortable adopting Europeanist home styles.
More generally, the thesis contributes to debates on the legitimacy of European integra-
tion. The legitimation of EU integration is both an institutional and a discursive process,
and national governments play a key role in legitimising and delegitimising systems of au-
thority due to their prominent positions in domestic public spheres. While governments
and mainstream parties do not delegitimize the EU directly, the lack of clarity in their cues
and their reluctance to credit the EU for issues their citizens care about are likely, at the
very least, to damage democratic accountability in the EU, as accountability in multilevel
systems depends on citizens being able to clearly and correctly allocate responsibility across
8At least for IOs that are politicized. The conclusion discusses the generalizability of home style in further
detail.
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multiple levels of government.
Finally, the thesis contributes useful resources to the academic community in the form
of massive, openly accessible datasets of EU communication by political elites. The use
of EUCOSpeech (over 6000 observations from seven member states) and in particular of
EUParlspeech (over 1 million observations from ten member states) is not limited to the
study of home style. Scholars of EU integration, party competition, political communica-
tion, international relations, and general text as data scholars are likely to find alternative
uses for these rich resources,
1.5.2 Three Articles and a Research Note
The thesis consists of three articles and a research note that explore the evasiveness and
opportunism of national governments in their presentation of European integration. Chap-
ter 2 explores the opportunism of governments’ home style. I use handcoding of over 6,000
statements in EUCOspeech to capture credit and blame in national leaders’ presentation of
EU summits back to domestic audiences. The paper shows how despite increased domestic
EU politicization, governments very rarely explicitly blame the EU and/or other member
states and instead respond to EU politicization by increasing their use of credit claiming.
The paper also outlines the central role of issue salience in the likelihood of national leaders
sharing or claiming credit. National leaders are more likely to share to credit with the EU
for issues their citizens care little about, and claim credit for issues that are electorally
salient.
Chapter 3 is a research note that provides details on the construction of the EUParl-
speech data - the empirical basis of subsequent chapters - and demonstrates its face, conver-
gent, and predictive validity. Automated analysis of EU statements yield meaningful and
well-known cross party differences, with challenger parties more likely to send clear cues on
integration than mainstream parties. Moreover, these automated measures correlate highly
with expert assessments (CHES) and - in the case of the UK’s Conservative Party - indi-
vidual MPs’ ideal point estimates based on EU statements in plenary debates can predict
their subsequent vote and campaign position at the 2016 referendum.
Chapter 4 uses the EUParlspeech data to explore the evasiveness of governments’ home
style. I use a variety of automated text analysis tools to analyse over 70,000 statements on
the EU by party leaders between 1989 and 2019. The paper shows first how mainstream
parties - and in particular governing mainstream parties - consistently use more complex,
less emotive language than challenger parties when discussing the EU. Furthermore, their
EU communication is consistently more complex than the rest of their parliamentary com-
munication. The paper also shows how governments in particular find it difficult to ignore
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the issue of EU integration, and are therefore particularly likely to employ an alternative
strategy of avoidance that defuses the issue with complex, technocratic language.
Chapter 5 explores whether disintegration episodes such as Brexit change the home
style of the mainstream parties that tend to form governments. I use a combination of
automated and hand coded text analysis methods to identify and analyse over 2,000 Brexit
statements made in parliamentary debates in six member states. I show that mainstream
parties do indeed adopt more Europeanist home styles in the wake of Brexit and that
disintegration episodes - if they are salient and appear negative for the departing state -
reverse the dynamics of party competition on the EU between mainstream and challenger
parties. However, I also provide evidence that these scope conditions are unlikely to hold
in the medium term as the salience of Brexit recedes and as the monumental impact of the
COVID 19 crisis, combined with the bounded rationality of voters, obfuscates the negative
economic impact of Brexit for the UK.
Chapter 6 considers the implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style for the
legitimacy of the European project. I argue that the technocratic-patriotic home style
fosters three mechanisms of EU delegitimation by i) damaging accountability in Europe’s
multilevel system of governance, ii) leaving the floor open to Eurosceptic challengers to frame
the debate on Europe with clear, unambiguous cues, and iii) stymieing the development
of a European identity. The chapter also considers external validity of the results and
whether the concept of home style introduced in this thesis can travel to other international
organizations.
Table 1.5 summarises the three articles and research note in thesis. As a final note,
it is important to point out that the chapters in this thesis (bar the conclusion) have
been developed as standalone articles and are therefore not explicitly framed around home
style. They all however make important contributions to our understanding of the concept
and, together, the results they present are consistent with the observable implications of the
technocratic-patriotic home style. In my concluding remarks I summarise my argument and












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis offers the first comparative, quantitative study of home style in the European
Union. It goes beyond the existing largely qualitative studies of how national governments
and domestic parties present Europe by making use of the advances in text as data methods
and machine translation to develop and analyse massive, original datasets of EU commu-
nication. The results presented across the three papers are consistent with the observable
implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style: national governments actually talk
frequently about European integration but avoid clear position taking by defusing the issue
with complex technocratic language; and they rarely shift blame onto the EU directly, but
are extensive credit claimers who are particularly reluctant to share credit for salient policy
issues. The results also highlight domestic EU politicization as my central explanatory vari-
able: the higher (lower) the levels of domestic EU politicization, the higher the likelihood
that governments adopt patriotic (Europeanist) home styles.
The thesis naturally cannot provide answers regarding all aspects of home style in
the EU. It also raises a host of questions for further research. Do these insights hold
true for the small number of non-mainstream parties that enter and/or form governments?
When and why might a government adopt a nationalist home style (if ever)? And are
the results generalisable not simply to governments’ and parties’ presentation of European
integration, but to their communication of international cooperation more widely? The
thesis’ conclusion offers some tentative answers to these questions, provides an integrative
perspective on the results of the three papers, and discusses their contribution to the debate
on the EU’s crisis of legitimacy.
This introduction opened with the Eurocrat’s Complaint, the concern that governments’
evasive and opportunisitc presentation of European integration contributes to rising Eu-
roscepticism. Throughout this thesis, I will show that this concern is descriptively largely
incorrect and that the fears that governments adopt nationalist, openly critical home styles
prove largely unfounded. Yet this isn’t to say that the Eurocrat’s Complaint is inferentially
completely off the mark. Indeed, governments’ reluctance to credit the EU for salient policy
issues, as well as their rather ambivalent cues, may not delegitimise the EU directly - but
they do leave the floor open for challenger parties to frame the debate on Europe with clear,
unambiguous communication. The upcoming papers will show that governments’ home style
does not fit the stereotypical image of evasive blame shifters. Yet the technocratic-patriotic
home style, through its ambiguous cues and opportunistic credit claiming, is still likely
to pose problems for democratic accountability and legitimacy in Europe’s complex and
contested multilevel system of governance.
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2
Credit Claiming in International Organizations:
Evidence from EU Council Summits
Introduction – Credit and Blame in International Organizations
Credit Claiming at International Summits - Research Design
Results - Discussion - Conclusion
Abstract: Governments in international organizations (IOs) are assumed to exploit un-
certainty of responsibility by claiming credit and shifting blame, yet little is known about
when and how they engage in these rhetorical strategies. This article draws on the example
of the European Union (EU) to argue that domestic electoral incentives determine govern-
ments’ presentation of IOs in their domestic public spheres. I use an original dataset of over
6,000 classified statements in speeches by heads of government presenting the outcomes of
EU Summits to their national media and parliaments between 2005 and 2018, and find that
governments are more likely to claim credit when international cooperation is politicized,
and for issues that are salient to domestic audiences. Findings challenge the conventional
view that IOs receive little recognition from politicians in domestic public spheres, and that
governments frequently shift blame onto IOs. Rather, IOs are credited for policy issues
citizens care little about, whereas governments claim credit for issues that are electorally
salient. Findings have implications for citizens’ attributions of responsibility in global sys-
tems of governance. The article also makes the case for placing the concept of home style
at the heart of debates on accountability and legitimacy in IOs
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2.1 Introduction
International institutions are assumed to facilitate national governments’ attempts to claim
credit and shift blame. The division of competencies across local, national, and interna-
tional levels of governance make it difficult for citizens to attribute responsibility correctly,
and a large literature argues that politicians exploit this uncertainty through the strategic
use of communication (see Remmer, 1986; Vaubel, 2006; Moravcsik, 1994; Schmidt, 2006;
Hood, 2010; Hobolt and Tilley, 2014; Schneider, 2018; Zürn et al, 2012). This behaviour is
assumed to be pronounced in the world’s most advanced international organization (IO),
the European Union (EU), where policy areas involve overlapping responsibilities of the na-
tional and the EU level, and where the lack of a transnational public sphere places national
governments in an ideal position to claim credit for policies agreed collectively. Overall,
governments in IOs are presented as deeply opportunistic: they will frequently claim credit,
rarely credit IOs directly, and frequently shift blame onto supranational institutions to avoid
responsibility for negative outcomes (see Putnam, 1988; Cruz and Schneider, 2017; Menon,
2008; Rauh et al, 2020; De Vries, Hobolt, and Walter, 2021).
Yet despite the conviction with which this view is held, empirical evidence on the extent
of credit claiming and blame shifting in international institutions is surprisingly limited.
The contribution of this article is to focus on which actors are attributed responsibility for
positive or negative outcomes on the international stage. This is important because there is
good evidence that responsibility evaluations act as an important moderator of retrospective
voting (Anderson, 2006; De Vries et al., 2011). Democratic accountability therefore depends
on citizens’ ability to correctly attribute responsibility across multiple levels of government.
To what extent, and under what conditions, do national governments claim credit for
the work of IOs, and shift blame onto IOs to avoid responsibility themselves? In this article,
I argue that variations in domestic electoral incentives determine governments’ presentation
of international institutions in their public spheres. My argument is as follows: the politi-
cization of international institutions creates a rhetorical dilemma for national governments.
On the one hand, politicization incentivizes them to signal responsiveness to a more scepti-
cal electorate and party system. On the other, blame shifting and explicit criticism of IOs
is costly: it antagonizes voters that are supportive of international cooperation, damages
their reputation with international partners, and signals impotence on the international
stage. I argue that national governments solve this rhetorical dilemma through the use of
credit claiming – showing what they have achieved for their country without articulating
clear positions on international cooperation either way. As citizens reward governments for
‘bringing home the bacon’ for issues they care about, governments are also more likely to
claim credit for issues that matter most to their electorate.
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I test these claims with an original dataset: heads of governments’ presentation of
European Council (EUCO) summits back to domestic audiences. I focus on the EU as it is
considered the world’s most advanced IO (Hagemann et al., 2017), one whose politicization
is subject to a rich literature1 (see Zürn 2016; Walter, 2021). After each EUCO summit,
all twenty-seven EU member states collectively sign off on the EUCO’s Conclusions, but
then present them to their own national media, in their own language, and in their own
way. Each statement in national leaders’ speeches is classified for credit and blame by
human hand coders. The result: a dataset of over 6,000 statements (paragraphs) from
national leaders’ presentation of EU summits classified for credit and blame. This original
and targeted dataset allows me to conduct ‘within-case’ comparisons, in the sense that all
leaders are presenting the same stimulus.
The findings demonstrate that executives respond to EU politicization at home by in-
creasing the use of credit claiming in their communication, rather than criticizing and blam-
ing the EU. They also challenge the conventional view that the EU receives little recognition
from politicians in domestic public spheres. National governments frequently share credit
with the EU, but do so for policy issues of low public salience, whereas governments are
more likely to claim credit for issues that are electorally salient to their domestic voters.
The article makes three contributions to the literature on IOs and political commu-
nication. First, it challenges the view of national governments as opportunistic blame
shifters. IO-bashing is in fact a costly rhetorical strategy, and governments are more likely
to respond to the politicization of international cooperation by claiming credit rather than
shifting blame. Second, it shows that despite not fitting this stereotypical image, strategic
communication by national governments does threaten democratic accountability in IOs.
Governments may not be blame shifters but they are strategic in their communication and
reluctant to share credit with IOs for issues their citizens care most about, even when IOs
have clear competence in this area. Finally, the article makes the case for placing the con-
cept of home style (Fenno, 1978) at the heart of debates on the legitimacy of IOs. Public
opinion on international cooperation depends to a significant degree on elite cueing, and
while Fenno’s initial conceptualization referred to how representatives present their work in
national polities, home style is increasingly applicable to the way representatives (govern-
ments) present the work of international institutions back to domestic audiences. Scholars
researching the behaviour of national governments in IOs have largely focused on what they
do on the international stage. Of equal importance to accountability and representation
in global systems of governance is what national governments say about this work in their
own domestic public spheres.
1Importantly, IO politicization is not limited to the EU and scholars have shown that other IOs, including
the IMF, the WTO, the WHO, and the World Bank have also been politicized (see Zürn 2014).
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2.2 Credit and Blame in International Organizations
Credit claiming is one of the key activities incumbents engage in to increase their likeli-
hood of reelection (see Mayhew, 1974). By generating the belief that they are personally
responsible for a decision or policy deemed desirable, incumbents increase their standing
amongst voters (Lipinski, 2001). A large literature on economic voting shows that govern-
ments are judged on their performance in office, and that governments therefore have high
incentives to claim responsibility for positive developments in the economy (Anderson 2006;
Green and Jennings 2017). While the effectiveness of credit claiming depends crucially on
whether voters deem the message credible and legitimate (Dolan and Kropf, 2002; Grimmer
et al., 2014), credit claiming is widely used by elected officials across political systems and
cultures (Samuels, 2002; Giger and Nelson, 2011; Cruz and Schneider, 2017; Bonoli and
Shinkawa, 2006).
Global systems of governance are assumed to facilitate these attempts to appropriate
credit. The division of competencies across local, national, and international levels affects
citizens’ ability to allocate responsibility and therefore to reward or punish incumbents on
the basis of past performance. Because voters’ attribution of responsibility impacts their
decision at the ballot box, national governments will seek to influence these attributions
by claiming personal credit for positive outcomes and shifting blame for negative ones
onto other levels of government (Hood, 2010; Weaver, 1986). Scholars have shown how
governments in international institutions exploit foreign aid from IOs to gain reelection, and
use ties to IOs to shift responsibility (Remmer, 1986; Vaubel, 2006; Schmidt, 2006, 2020;
Cruz and Schneider, 2017, Alcaniz and Hellwig, 2011, Capelos and Wurzer, 2009). The lack
of a transnational public spheres also means the debate about international cooperation take
place in domestic public spheres, and is dominated by national rather than supranational
politicians (Risse, 2015). The message presented to citizens about activity in IOs therefore
comes not from supranational institutions, but from member state governments who are
incentivized to frame it to their advantage. As Moravcsik (1994, p. 24), referring to the
European Union, notes: ‘when things go badly, a technocratic Commission receives the
blame; when things go well, national leaders claim the credit.’
While this view is widely held amongst scholars of international cooperation, actual
empirical evidence on the extent of credit claiming by governments in IOs is surprisingly
limited. Hobolt and Tilley (2014) and Ladi and Tsagkroni (2019) explore blame shifting
during the economic crisis by hand coding speeches, and find that governments rarely shift
blame onto IOs, instead employing other blame avoidance strategies, in particular historical
blame–shifting that places responsibility at the hands of previous governments. Others have
found evidence of blame shifting (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020; Heinkelmann-Wild and
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Zangl, 2020). Scholars have also used automated text analysis to show that language used
by national leaders in association with IOs became more negative during crises (Rauh et
al., 2020; Traber et al., 2019). This work provides rich insights into how executives respond
rhetorically to crises, but does not tell us about the attribution of responsibility for positive
or negative situations. It therefore does not allow us to make definitive conclusions about
credit and blame in politicians’ rhetoric.
In this article, I provide an alternative approach to identify credit and blame in inter-
national institutions: heads of governments’ presentation of major international summits
to their domestic audiences. I focus in particular on European Council (EUCO) summits.
Several times a year, the heads of state of all twenty-seven member states meet to set the
EU’s political direction and priorities. These summits receive considerable media coverage,
reflecting the institution’s huge agenda setting power and determining role in shaping the
future of the European project (Alexandrova et al., 2014; Schneider, 2018; Puetter, 2012).
While the Council publishes its own conclusions after each summit, the role of presenting
them to European citizens falls to Heads of State who report back to national media and
parliaments on what has been achieved. This provides significant leeway to tailor their
presentation to domestic audiences. These presentations of major international summits
outcomes not only provide an almost ideal way to compare ‘what national politicians say
in a similar situation in response to similar events’ (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014, p.108), they
also allow us to investigate which national leaders claim credit for outcomes decided and
agreed on collectively by the member states of international institutions.
It is important to highlight that governments can use international institutions to claim
credit in two distinct ways, and that the data collected for this article means our focus
is limited to one of these strategies. National leaders can claim credit through omission:
they can simply fail to mention international institutions for a positive outcome where
these institutions played a key role, thereby implying sole responsibility. Schmidt (2006)
for example states that ‘national politicians take credit for [the EU’s] popular policies often
without mentioning the EU’s role’. The focus of this article however is on how governments
claim credit by cultivating an impression of influence (Grimmer et al., 2014): they show-
case their ability to achieve policy outcomes on the international stage that benefit their
member state. While these two strategies are distinct, the incentives that compel national
leaders to claim credit through omission and through influence are the same: influencing
voters’ attributions of responsibility to gain reelection. In the following section, I develop
a theoretical argument for explaining when and why national governments engage in credit
claiming in international organizations.
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2.3 Credit Claiming at International Summits
To what extent, and under what conditions, do national governments claim credit for the
work of IOs, and shift blame onto IOs to avoid responsibility themselves? In this theoretical
section, I present my argument. It goes as follows: (1) the politicization of international
institutions incentivises governments to signal responsiveness in their rhetoric to more scep-
tical domestic audiences. (2) However, blame shifting and explicit criticism of IOs is costly:
it antagonizes voters that are supportive of international cooperation, damages relation-
ships with international partners, and signals impotence on the international stage. (3)
This need to signal responsiveness to more sceptical domestic audiences, but reluctance to
explicitly criticize and blame IOs creates a rhetorical dilemma for national governments.
(4) Governments solve this rhetorical dilemma through the use of credit claiming – showing
what they have achieved for their country without articulating clear positions on IOs either
way. (5) As citizens reward governments for ‘bringing home the bacon’ for issues they care
about, governments are also more likely to claim credit for issues that matter most to their
electorate. Importantly this suggests that national executives have incentives to respond to
the politicization of international institutions by claiming credit rather than shifting blame:
‘look what I have achieved for us’, not ‘look at what IOs are doing to us’.
2.3.1 Politicization and Government Responsiveness in IOs
If international cooperation was once characterized by a ‘permissive consensus’ (Haas, 1958;
Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970; Keohane, 1984), today it is characterized - at least in cer-
tain cases - by a politicization that constrains elites on the international stage and has
implications for their standing in national politics. Citizens now use politically meaningful
channels like elections to express their preferences on international cooperation, often re-
warding parties that share their more sceptical views (Hooghe and Marks, 2009; Hobolt and
Spoon, 2012; Tillman, 2004; De Vries, Edwards, and Tillman, 2010). Figure 2.1 showcases
the increase in public and partisan skepticism towards international cooperation in Europe
during a period of successive crises, plotting both the percentages of those attributing a
negative image to the EU in the biannual Eurobarometer surveys, as well as the vote share
of Eurosceptic parties2. Importantly, this politicization of global governance is not lim-
ited to the EU, with a wide literature showing other international institutions, including
the IMF, the WTO, the WHO, and the World Bank, have also been politicized and face
2The bi-annual Eurobarometer question asks whether ‘in general, does the EU conjure up for you a very
positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative, or very negative image?’. The figure plots the share of those
answering ‘fairly negative’ or ‘very negative’. The vote share figure is drawn from the PopuList, a data of
support for populist, far right, far left, and Eurosceptic parties that has been used in numerous publications
in academic journals (Rooduijn et al 2019).
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Figure 2.1: The politicization of international cooperation in Europe
increasing challenges to their legitimacy (Zürn, 2004, 2014, 2018; Zürn and Ecker-Ehradt,
2013; Ecker-Ehradt, 2014; Zürn et al., 2012; Rixen and Zangl, 2014; Hooghe and Marks,
2019; Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Stephen and Zürn, 2019; Walter 2021).
This politicization of international institutions is changing the behaviour of governments
on the international stage. Scholars have shown how national governments in IOs signal
responsiveness to domestic audiences through their voting behaviour (Hagemann et al.,
2017; Muhlbock and Tosun, 2018), their use of formal policy statements (Wratil, 2018 ), and
the positions taken in negotiations with international partners (Schneider, 2018; Schneider
and Slantchev, 2018). An emerging literature also shows how politicization impacts the
rhetoric of national leaders, with the conclusion that politicization affects the sentiment
and complexity executives attach to references to international cooperation in their public
communication (Rauh et al., 2020; Traber et al., 2019).
Instinctively, one might also think that governments would respond to more sceptical
domestic audiences by attributing more negative outcomes to IOs in their communication.
After all, not only does this rhetorical strategy signal congruence with an increasingly
sceptical electorate, it could also offer a useful scapegoat to avoid responsibility for negative
outcomes, particularly in a time period marred by a succession of crises. However, I argue
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instead that far from being a costless rhetorical strategy, IO scapegoating can in fact impose
significant costs on national governments operating in complex global systems of governance.
2.3.2 The Costs of Shifting Blame
While blame shifting towards international institutions is often presented as a costless
rhetorical strategy (Menon, 2008; Hood, 2010), I argue instead that it imposes a series
of costs that make it a risky choice for national governments. First, and most obviously,
it can damage their reputation and credibility with other member states. Scholars have
modeled international agreements as a series of repeated games in which players have to
take into account the impact of their current action on the future actions of other players
(Putnam, 1988; Barrett, 1992; Finus and Rundhsagen, 1998). Governments in IOs are thus
incentivised to build and maintain their reputation with other member states: scholars have
for example shown how reluctant governments are to table opposition votes in international
institutions (Hagemann et al., 2017). As criticism of collective decisions may be costly to
their reputation – and thus their ability to achieve their goals in future negotiations - mem-
ber states have an incentive to hold their tongue even when communicating the outcomes of
international cooperation they deem unsatisfactory. This is particularly the case at major
international summits, high profile events where the concentration of media from across
the continent means member states and supranational institutions are more likely to be
made aware of how member states communicate summit conclusions to their own domestic
audiences (Alexandrova et al., 2012).
Second, IO scapegoating could antagonize as many domestic audiences as it pleases. In
shifting blame towards international institutions, national leaders signal congruence with
their country’s growing sceptical constituency but also alienate the substantial chunk of their
electorate that is supportive of international cooperation. Public opinion data shows that
while skepticism towards international cooperation has grown (see Figure 2.1), it remains a
minority position in the majority of countries whose attitudes to international cooperation
are regularly monitored in surveys. A more accurate description is one of polarization.
This is important because research in other multilevel systems shows that state senators
representing divided constituencies tend to avoid clear position taking because it offers
limited electoral returns (Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012). For mainstream
parties on the right and the left, international cooperation constitutes a wedge issue that
cuts across the dimension of political conflict where they are dominant, and scholars have
shown that these mainstream parties therefore aim to avoid clear taking clear positions
on the issue (Hobolt and De Vries, 2020). Blame shifting towards IOs, as a clear form of
IO-sceptic positon taking, is thus unlikely to offer high electoral returns for governments
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with domestic audiences that are divided on the issue of international cooperation.
Third, blame shifting may act as a signal of impotence, if not incompetence, on the in-
ternational stage. After all, shifting blame suggests a negative outcome - and therefore the
failure of national leaders to achieve what they set out to. Blame shifting is also difficult to
do credibly, given national governments’ position at the heart of the international institu-
tions they might want to scapegoat, and because IOs lack a clearly identifiable government
to point the finger at (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014. McGraw and Dolan, 2007).
To be clear, this isn’t to say that IOs don’t receive criticism in domestic public spheres,
nor that national governments will never criticize or blame international institutions. Oppo-
sition politicians have stronger incentives to criticize IOs (Heinkelmann-Wild et al., 2020),
and national leaders’ domestic audiences may be sufficiently negatively aligned towards in-
ternational cooperation to make blame shifting their optimal rhetorical strategy. Yet it does
show that far from being a costless rhetorical strategy, ‘IO-bashing’ is unlikely to offer high
electoral returns even for governments facing high levels of contestation over international
cooperation at home.
2.3.3 Credit Claiming as the Solution to Governments’ Rhetorical Dilemma
National governments in international institutions therefore face a rhetorical dilemma. On
the one hand, increased politicization and party level contestation around international
cooperation incentivizes them to signal responsiveness in their rhetoric. On the other,
explicitly criticizing IOs and other member states comes with high costs. I argue that
national governments solve this dilemma by adopting a more patriotic home style when
presenting international cooperation in their domestic public spheres.
‘Home Style’ is a classic of American political science. In his 1978 landmark study,
Richard Fenno makes the case for studying the ways members of Congress present their
work in Washington when they are back in their home state. The advances in quantitative
text analysis and computational methods allowing scholars to scrape vast amounts of text
on the web, has led to a resurgence in the study of home style in national politics (Grimmer,
2013a, 2013b; Grimmer et al., 2012, 2014). I argue that the concept of home style is also
applicable to international politics. Given the lack of a transnational public sphere, the
presentational strategies employed by governments when presenting IOs in their domestic
publics are of crucial importance for the messages citizens receive and the views they develop
on international cooperation. A patriotic home style then, is one that focuses on the benefits
of international cooperation to the speaker’s home country, rather than to the world as a
whole and/or other countries. To be more precise, a patriotic home style will involve
a strong focus on credit claiming in a leader’s communication: showing what they have
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achieved for their country on the international stage, without articulating clear positions
on international cooperation either way.
Credit claiming is particularly relevant in the context of global governance, because
research in other multilevel systems shows how this communication strategy is favoured by
representatives of polarized constituencies, for whom articulating clear positions is risky
(Grimmer et al., 2012; Grimmer, 2013a, 2013b). As Figure 2.1 has shown, polarization
is an accurate description of views on international cooperation, with both an electorate
and a party system that is often bitterly divided on the issue. Research on executives’
rhetorical responses to this shift has largely focused on position taking, with the conclusion
that national leaders take more sceptical positions about international cooperation as their
electorate becomes more divided over the issue (Rauh et al., 2020). Yet this research
ignores a strategy available to governments who want to present themselves as effective
representatives in IOs without articulating a clear pro or anti position on international
cooperation: credit claiming.
Table 2.1: Governments’ optimal rhetorical strategies when presenting international coop-
eration
Domestic Politicization of Low Domestic High Domestic
International Cooperation Politicization Politicization
Home Style Internationalist Patriotic
Attributional Strategy Credit Sharing Credit Claiming
Strategy Description Credit international institutions Credit themselves or their
and other member states government for outcomes that
for positive outcomes benefit their member state
It is also important to point out that sharing credit with IOs is not a pointless rhetorical
strategy for national governments. In doing so, they signal congruence with internationalist
domestic audiences, and maintain trust with IOs and other international partners, many of
whom will be keeping an eye on how they communicate. Table 2.1 summarises the opti-
mal rhetorical strategies for leaders facing high or low levels of domestic IO politicization.
National leaders facing low levels of IO politicization adopt an internationalist home style
in which they share credit with IOs and other member states. National leaders facing high
levels of domestic IO politicization adopt a patriotic home style, in which they claim credit
themselves without sharing credit with other international partners, but also without ex-
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plicitly blaming or criticizing international institutions.3 Of course, national leaders are not
limited to one strategy: those facing low domestic IO politicization will also look to claim
credit, and leaders facing high levels of IO politicization will also engage in credit shar-
ing. Yet the relative electoral returns of these styles predicts that the balance in leaders’
rhetoric will differ depending on the levels of politicization of international cooperation in
their domestic public spheres. My first hypotheses therefore read as follows:
Hypothesis H1a: Governments are more likely to respond to the politicization of inter-
national cooperation by increasing their use of credit claiming strategies, than by criticizing
or blaming IOs.
Hypothesis H1b: Governments are more likely to claim credit at international sum-
mits if they face high levels of domestic IO politicization, than if they face low levels of IO
politicization.
Other work on political competition argues that parties compete by emphasizing certain
issue dimensions (Budge, 2015; Petrocik, 1996; Riker, 1996). Some issues matter more to
voters than others, and governments are rewarded for delivering on those that matter most
(Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Wlezien, 2004). The electoral return of credit claiming therefore
depends on the salience of the issues for which governments claim credit. Of course, for
national leaders to frame the outcomes of international summits in a way that emphasizes
what their citizens care most about, the agenda of these summits needs to be diverse.
Analyses of the EUCO agenda from 1975 - 2014 show that while it has traditionally been
dominated by Foreign Affairs and Macroeconomics, it has also become more diverse over
time, and increasingly includes issues that are salient to the public (Alexandrova et al.,
2014). The diversity of the competencies delegated to international institutions, combined
with the salience of the issues discussed therefore provides the preconditions for governments
to tailor their presentation according to citizens’ priorities, not simply according to their
views on international cooperation.
Crucially, issue salience matters for the electoral return of credit claiming in a way
that it doesn’t for credit sharing. When communicating to highlight their internationalist
credentials to domestic audiences and international partners, it matters relatively little
whether governments are crediting IOs for a high or low salience issue. By contrast, the
electoral return from credit claiming will be higher if leaders can credibly convince domestic
audiences that they have ‘brought home the bacon’ for issues their citizens care about. The
3One might also imagine a nationalist home style in which leaders combine credit claiming with numerous
instances of blame shifting and explicit criticism of IOs. I argue that a home style focusing on blame shifting
is unlikely except as a rhetorical strategy of last resort for the reasons outlined in the ’Costs of shifting
blame’ section. A nationalist home style may also be desirable for a leader whose reelection constituency
has an aligned, negative (rather than polarized) view of international cooperation.
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effectiveness of credit claiming also depends on plausibility (Grimmer et al., 2014; Dolan
and Kropf, 2004). Experiments from communication research show that over claiming can
damage credibility (Rossiter, 1997) and survey evidence shows that citizens are capable of
making sound judgments about responsibility in IOs (Wilson and Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt and
Tilley, 2014). A national leader that presents the outcome of an international summit by
taking credit for every single positive outcome runs the risk of damaging the plausibility of
their credit claiming. Governments therefore make strategic decisions about the issues for
which to claim credit. How is this decision made?
I argue that this choice is based on the salience of issues to their domestic electorates.
To maximize the credibility and impact of their credit claiming, governments ‘save’ their
use of credit claiming strategies for the issues their citizens care most about. For issues
of high public salience, governments are more likely to credit claim; for issues that mat-
ter little to their citizens, governments are happy to credit international institutions as a
whole. My second hypotheses therefore relate to how the rhetoric of heads of government
at international summits is responsive to the issue priorities of their citizens.
Hypothesis H2a: Governments at international summits are more likely to claim
credit for policy issues that are salient to their domestic electorates.
Hypothesis H2b: Governments at international summits are more likely to share
credit for policy issues that are of low salience to their domestic electorates.
2.4 Research design
2.4.1 An original dataset
To evaluate these hypotheses, I draw on a unique dataset: all publicly available speeches
from heads of government presenting the outcome EU Council summits to national media
and parliaments. Speeches are scraped from dedicated website that stores information on
the press conferences and statements of members of government across seven member4
states between 2005 and 2018. As speeches are frequently archived by these websites, I
use the Wayback Machine that allows us to travel back to the governments’ website prior
to archiving (see Rauh et al., 2020 for other uses of this technique). This way I was able
to retrieve most speeches, although a number of missing speeches is unavoidable.5 I also
drop speeches from interim prime ministers and independents because they are less likely
4Germany, France, UK, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Denmark
5The Wayback Machine makes occasional snapshots of websites. In some cases, there are a few months
between the last snapshot and the change of government, thus leading to some gaps in the data. The
countries where the gaps in snapshots are longest are the countries with more missing data.
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to respond to electoral incentives, and drop speeches from the British Prime Minister after
the referendum result of June 2016 given the uniqueness of member state exit.
The countries in this sample cover important structural divisions within the European
Union: they are located in both the northern and the southern parts of Europe; include
powerful member states and smaller ones; and include Eurozone and non-Eurozone coun-
tries. The sample covers both the economic and migration crises that have placed the
European Union – and EUCO Summits in particular – firmly in the public spotlight (van
Middelaar, 2013). Overall, the countries and time period represent high variation regard-
ing the key independent variables of the study, namely the politicization of international
cooperation and the most salient policy issues facing the country. In the process of parsing
text data from dedicated websites, I maintain the same paragraph structure as raw HTM
documents. Speech subdivision into short paragraphs often proves beneficial in quantitative
text analysis (Ferrara, 2019). Paragraphs are coherent units of text and, in this case, I judge
them preferable to the use of single sentences, which might miss out relevant information;
and to the use of full speeches, that encompass multiple policy issues and would therefore
complicate testing hypotheses H2a and H2b. The Appendix provides a table summarizing
the 414 speeches in our dataset, divided into 6,012 individual paragraphs or ‘statements’.
There are a number of reasons why this dataset provides a more satisfactory way to
compare how national leaders allocate credit and blame than other datasets on executive
communication in the EU (see for e.g EUSpeech by Schoonvelde et al. (2016)). First, by
controlling for the substance of the message, I conduct a genuine comparative study of
presentational style (Grimmer, 2013). The EUCO Conclusions are agreed by all member
states and a written record of what was discussed and agreed is made publicly available
(Alexandrova et al., 2012, 2014, 2016). It therefore provides a significant constraint for what
national leaders can present, while allowing them leeway on how they present it. Put simply,
this original and targeted dataset allows for within-case comparisons, in the sense that all
leaders are presenting the same stimulus. Second, EUSpeech includes all publicly available
speeches by heads of government, the majority of which include references to European
integration, but are not specifically about Europe. If EUSpeech allows us to analyze how
executives refer to the EU when audiences may not be paying particular attention to their
government’s position on Europe, our dataset allows us to investigate the communication
strategies of heads of government in the public spotlight of EU summits.
2.4.2 Classifying credit and blame
In this article, I use hand coding to classify each statement (or paragraph) in national
leaders’ speeches for credit and blame, in a way that takes into account attribution. I use
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human hand coding rather than automated methods for three reasons. First, human hand
coding remains the ‘gold standard’ of content analysis (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013) and
if its costs are not prohibitive, it should be the default when performing content analysis.
While the dataset used in this article is large, it is not so massive as to make full hand
coding impossible. Second, the categories for classification are relatively nuanced, in a
way that makes automated content analysis more challenging. Third, a large, fully hand
coded dataset on responsibility attributions could be a useful resource for the academic
community, for example as a training set for supervised learning models on much larger
datasets where hand coding would be prohibitively expensive.
Statements are classified into four categories for attribution. The first is ‘descriptive’
where there is no attribution. The second is ‘credit claiming’, where governments credit
themselves or their government for a positive action or outcome. The third is ‘credit sharing’
where a positive action outcome is attributed collectively to Europe, the EU’s institutions,
or other member states. The final category is ‘blame shifting’, where responsibility for
a negative situation is attributed to the EU or other member states. Table 2.2 presents
exemplary statements and shows the various ways national leaders can claim credit for
actions on the international stage. While Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy claims credit
for bringing home revenues for Spain from the EU’s budget, the example from Sarkozy
highlights his ability to place France’s economic agenda at the top of the EUCO’s priorities.
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Table 2.2: Exemplary Statements
Date Speaker Statement Attribution EB Policy Issue
2011/10 N.Sarkozy France has called for the integration and Credit Economic
(FR) convergence of economic and fiscal policies. Claiming Situation
And that is what was decided today.
2007/06 B.Ahern The Council welcomed the outcome of the Credit Environment
(IRL) G8 summit on combating climate change, Sharing
in particular the commitment to the UN
process and reducing emissions by at least
50 per cent by 2050.This is an area
where the EU is providing real global
leadership and will continue to do so.
2013/06 M.Rajoy In relation to youth employment - another Credit Unemployment
(ES) very important point for us - concrete Claiming
measures were also adopted. The six
billion euros dedicated to the Youth
Employment Initiative will be disbursed in
2014 and 2015. This Initiative, as you know,
was agreed in February, was a proposal of
the Spanish Government. For Spain this
means receiving almost two billion Euros.
2014/10 D.Cameron That’s the frustration. But that leads me Blame EU
(UK) on to frankly the downright anger about Shifting Affairs
something that has come about at this EU
Council. And that is the completely
unjustified and sudden production of a bill for
Britain of 1.7 billion pounds, that is
supposed to be paid by by the 1st December.
This is completely unacceptable.
2015/03 A.Merkel As far as the foreign policy agenda is Descriptive Foreign
(DE) concerned the issues of Kosovo, Middle East, Affairs
Afghanistan and Africa were on the agenda.
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In order to test hypothesis H2, statements are also classified according to their policy
area in the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys.6 The Appendix presents the codebook used, as
well as our definitions for credit and blame and further examples of coded attributions.
To validate the classification, I run inter-coder reliability tests with native speakers of the
language on 15 per cent of the sample.7
2.4.3 Independent variables and controls
IO politicisation is widely considered to incorporate both public discontent toward interna-
tional cooperation and the mobilisation of this discontent by political actors, most notably
parties (De Vries et al., 2020; De Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Rauh, 2019). To operationalise the
main independent variables to test H1a and H1b, I therefore consider both public opinion on
European integration (public Euroscepticism), and the seat share of Eurosceptic parties in
national parliaments (partisan Euroscepticism). I measure public Euroscepticism with the
Eurobarometer survey question which asks respondents whether the EU conjures a positive
or negative image.8 The measure of public Euroscepticism is the survey-weighted mean of
all valid responses by country, and gives us the proportion of respondents with a negative
image of the EU. I use linear interpolation to cover time points between surveys (see Soroka
and Wlezien, 2010). To operationalise partisan Euroscepticism, I use the seat share of
Eurosceptic parties in parliament. Eurosceptic parties are identified using the Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (CHES), which contains an EU position question on a scale from 1 (strongly
opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour). I consider a party Eurosceptic if it has a lower score than
3.5, and capture the seat share of these parties in parliament, replicating a methodology
used in previous studies (Rauh et al., 2020).
The independent variable for H2 refers to the salience of policy issues to domestic elec-
torates. To capture this, I use the Eurobarometer question ‘What do you think are the two
most important issues facing our country at the moment?’ This question has been used to
capture the issue priorities of European citizens (Alexandrova et al., 2014), and is widely
used in studies of agenda setting (see Alexandrova et al., 2014; Baumgartner et al., 2009).
Finally, the models also contain a number of political and economic controls that might
6The EB has a long running question on the Most Important Issue facing your country. Its policy areas
are: Economic Situation, Unemployment, Inflation, Environment, Energy, Immigration, Crime, Terrorism,
Pensions, Foreign Affairs/Defence, Inflation, Education, and Government Debt.
7I calculate the inter-coder reliability score Krippendorff’s alpha separately for each country, and for each
coding category (attribution and policy issue). Krippendorf’s alpha varies from 0.72 to 0.91 and averages
0.78 (for the attribution category) and 0.82 (for the policy issue category) across the full sample.
8While public opinion on the EU is usually operationalized using the question on whether membership
is a good or bad thing, this question has not been asked since 2011. Scholars in previous works have shown
how the EU image question is closely related to the question on membership.
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impinge on the rhetoric of elites. First, I control for economic indicators by including
a measure of annual unemployment. I also capture the timing of elections by using a
binary variable for election years, and include dummies for whether a country holds the EU
presidency at the time of the speech. My controls also include the governing party’s EU
position and EU dissent from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, as well as public opinion on
trust in the national government from the Eurobarometer survey.
2.5 Analysis and Results
Given the nature of the data, where statements are nested within speeches by national
leaders, I run a series of multilevel logistic models to test my propositions. First, I use
the hand coded dataset to create the dependent variables for my regression models. The
dependent variables for models 1, 3 and 5 is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the
statement is an instance of credit claiming and 0 if not. The dependent variables for models
2 and 4 is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the statement is an instance of credit
sharing and 0 if not. Models 1 to 4 include fixed effects for countries, and model 5 is a
restrictive model including fixed effects for countries and random effects for leaders.
Before analyzing the results of the logistic regression models, I first explore interesting
patterns in the data. Figure 2.2 plots the proportion of statements classified as credit
claiming, credit sharing, or blame shifting and highlights the increase of credit claiming
in national leaders’ EU rhetoric between 2005 and 2018. It also shows that despite the
pronounced politicization of European integration during the investigation period (see Rauh,
2019) statements that explicitly blame or criticize the EU are rare, the only exception
coming from a handful of critical statements by Chirac in 2005, Cameron in 2014 and
Tsipras in 2018.9
Figure 2.3 plots the balance of credit sharing and credit claiming in governments’ rhetoric
– a leader that shares credit more than she claims it would therefore have a positive balance,
whereas a leader that claims credit more than she shares it would have a negative balance.
It shows that far from all being opportunistic credit claimers, national leaders often adopt
mixed attributional styles in which they share credit with the EU almost as much as they
claim credit themselves (and sometimes more). The figure provides additional face validity
for the hand coding: known internationalists such as Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron
9Out of 6,012 statements, only 41 are instances of criticism and blame. The majority of these come
from British PM David Cameron, particularly in response to Juncker’s appointment as President of the
Commission, and in response to demands for £1.7bn in top-up EU budget payments, from Greek PM Alexis
Tsipras, and from French President Jacques Chirac when negotiating the Multiannual Financial Framework
in 2005. Note that figures 2 and 3 only include 5,943 statements as classified statements from interim Greek
Prime Ministers (Papademos and Pikrammenos) are removed.
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Figure 2.2: The increase in credit claiming in national leaders’ EU rhetoric
share credit with the EU and other member states significantly more than they claim
credit themselves. The plot also confirms that national leaders who face high levels of EU
politicization in their domestic public spheres such as the UK’s Conservative leader David
Cameron, under significant pressure from within his own party on the issue of integration,
or Greek leaders involved in bailout negotiations with the Troika, claim credit significantly
more than they share credit with the EU, its institutions, and other member states.
Table 2.3 displays the results of our mixed effects logistic regression models. It provides
strong evidence for the hypotheses outlined in the previous section. There is a strong and
robust relationship between the seat share of Eurosceptic parties in national parliaments
(partisan Euroscepticism) and the attributional strategy employed by national leaders. In-
creases in partisan Euroscepticism increase the likelihood of leaders claiming credit (model
1), and decrease the likelihood of leaders sharing credit with the EU (model 2). Likewise,
there is a strong and robust relationship between public Euroscepticism and credit claiming
in leaders’ rhetoric. Interestingly though, public Euroscepticism does not have a statistically
significant negative effect on credit sharing in national leaders’ rhetoric, and the statistical
significance of the effect on credit claiming drops when including random effects for leaders.
These findings suggest that public discontent towards international cooperation needs to be
mobilised by challenger parties (see De Vries, Hobolt and Walter, 2020) to have a particu-
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Figure 2.3: Balance of credit sharing and credit claiming in national leaders’ EU rhetoric
larly strong influence on national governments’ rhetoric towards international cooperation.
Finally, increases in salience increase the likelihood of leaders claiming credit (model 3), and
decrease the likelihood of leaders sharing credit with the EU (model 4). These relationships
remain robust and significant even when specifying more restrictive models, with fixed ef-
fects for countries and random effects for leaders (models 5 and 6). The control variables
are also worth commenting on. National leaders with high levels of public trust are more
likely to share credit whereas those with low levels of trust are more likely to claim credit,
consistent with the view that domestic electoral pressure is likely to influence governments’
home style when presenting international cooperation. Finally, holding the rotating pres-
idency increases the likelihood of leaders sharing credit with the EU and other member
states. In the Appendix, I also run robustness checks: models with fixed effects for both
countries and leaders (A1.5); models with random effects for both countries and leaders
(A1.6); and models that include summit-specific random effects (A1.7) . These robustness
checks confirm the significant effect of the politicization of international cooperation and
issue salience on credit claiming by national governments.
To further illustrate how the salience of issues affects the rhetorical strategies of national
leaders, I plot the balance of credit sharing and credit claiming for two policy issues that
are amongst the most discussed at summits during the investigation period: the Economic
58
Table 2.3: Fixed and Mixed Effects Regression Results
Dependent variable:
Claim Share Claim Share Claim Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Partisan 0.028∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗
Euroscepticism (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)
Public 3.165∗∗∗ 0.192 2.125∗∗ 0.976 1.412 0.976
Euroscepticism (0.900) (0.806) (1.016) (0.930) (1.107) (0.929)
Issue 1.046∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗ 1.294∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗
Salience (0.178) (0.187) (0.195) (0.187)
Public Trust −0.864∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗ −0.902∗∗ 0.863∗∗ 0.148 0.863∗∗
in Government (0.315) (0.307) (0.354) (0.345) (0.411) (0.345)
Governing Party −0.262∗∗∗ −0.181∗ −0.560∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.182 −0.013
EU position (0.098) (0.105) (0.118) (0.120) (0.188) (0.120)
Governing Party −0.005 −0.203∗∗∗ −0.118∗ −0.095∗ −0.012 −0.095∗
EU dissent (0.053) (0.048) (0.062) (0.054) (0.080) (0.054)
Rotating −0.267 0.713∗∗∗ −0.418∗ 0.582∗∗∗ −0.276 0.582∗∗∗
Presidency (0.209) (0.174) (0.244) (0.209) (0.251) (0.209)
Unemployment −0.057∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.044∗ 0.020
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019)
Election Year 0.098 −0.248∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.189∗∗ −0.027 −0.189∗∗
(0.085) (0.084) (0.097) (0.095) (0.101) (0.095)
Constant −2.257∗∗∗ 1.026 −0.115 −0.444 −2.699∗ −0.444
(0.815) (0.819) (0.962) (0.943) (1.435) (0.942)
Observations 5,943 5,943 4,544 4,544 4,544 4,544
Country Fixed Effects (7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leader Random Effects (21) No No No No Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Figure 2.4: The balance of credit sharing and credit claiming differs for high salience and
low salience issues
Situation and the Environment. While the former was a hugely salient issue in a time period
marked by the financial and Eurozone crises, the latter was a low priority for citizens for
the duration of the time period (except for Denmark, where the Environment consistently
ranks highly as a priority for citizens – see EB survey data). Figure 2.4 shows how the
balance of credit sharing and credit claiming differs for these two issues. In Figure 2.4.1,
the majority of leaders have negative balance, meaning the share of statements in which
they claim credit is higher than those in which they share credit with the EU. By contrast,
in Figure 2.4.2, the majority of leaders share credit with the EU and its institutions more
than they claim credit themselves.
Finally, Figure 2.5 plots the marginal effects of increases in issue salience on the proba-
bility of claiming and sharing credit. The effects are clear. As issues become more salient,
this increases the probability of leaders claiming credit and decreases the probability of
leaders sharing credit with Europe, its institutions, and other member states.
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Figure 2.5: Marginal effects of issue salience on credit claiming and credit sharing
2.6 Discussion
The previous section provides evidence of a strong relationship between domestic electoral
incentives and the home style employed by governments in the EU. In this penultimate
section, I discuss the generalisability of these results. First, the findings may be EU-specific.
After all, a large literature describes the EU as ’sui generis’, an entity whose unparalleled
development makes it difficult to compare with other international institutions (Phelan,
2012). I argue that these findings are applicable to other IOs. First, the argument’s
key independent variables are not exclusive to the EU but shared by many international
institutions. IOs as diverse as the IMF, the WTO, the WHO, and the World Bank are
also contested domestically and face challenges to their legitimacy (Zürn, 2004, 2014, 2018;
Zürn and Ecker-Ehradt, 2013; Ecker-Ehradt, 2014; Zürn et al., 2012; ; Rixen and Zangl,
2014; Hooghe and Marks, 2019; Bearce and Jolliff Scott, 2019; Stephen and Zürn, 2019).
Additionally, the fact that international summits cover issues that are salient to domestic
electorates is also not limited to EUCO summits. Issues that voters care about such as the
economy, trade, and the environment are frequently covered at international summits and
have in some cases been delegated to supranational institutions (Hooghe, Lenz, and Marks,
2019). These two independent variables are of course related: international cooperation
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is politicized precisely because the issues that are delegated to supranational institutions
matter to voters (Zürn, 2018) . This is not to say that we should expect these patterns
in governments’ presentation of all IOs. Many - indeed the majority of - IOs are not
politicised, but some are, and these are precisely the ones where we should expect these
rhetorical strategies. The point here is not that other IOs are as politicised as the EU, but
that if they were, a far from inconceivable feat given the rise of national populists across
the globe, we should expect the empirical patterns described above.
One could also wonder whether the findings in this article are summit-specific. Govern-
ments may be reluctant to criticise IOs in the spotlight of international summits, but may
revert to a much more nationalist home style when back in the comfort of their nation-state.
This is a valid point of discussion that I address in two ways. First, even if these results
are only applicable to summits, they still remain significant. This is because summits are
amongst the highest profile events of international cooperation, attracting considerable me-
dia coverage (Alexandrova et al., 2012, 2014; van Middelaar, 2013). What national leaders
say around these summits is therefore likely to be amongst the most important cues that cit-
izens receive on international cooperation. However, I would go further still and argue that
the ‘summit’ home styles described in this article are likely to be replicated in governments’
home styles more widely. This is because the costs of shifting blame towards IOs, while
diminished outside the spotlight of international summits, remain significant. Scapegoating
IOs is still likely to antagonise voters that are supportive of international cooperation, and
criticising IOs and the outcomes of summits is still likely to cast doubt on a government’s
competence at achieving its goals on the international stage. The literature on home style
in domestic contexts shows that politicians’ presentational strategies are remarkably consis-
tent across venues (Fenno, 1978; Grimmer, 2013b). I suggest for the reasons outlined above
that this is also likely to be the case in international politics.
These discussion points naturally merit further investigation. Scholars should investigate
whether governments’ presentation of other IOs reflect the credit claiming patterns identified
in this article. Yet given the politicisation of international cooperation generally, the salience
of issues delegated to IOs, and the relative consistency in the costs of shifting blame towards
IOs across venues, I argue that these findings are likely not EU-specific nor summit-specific,
but a more generalisable description of national governments’ home styles when presenting
international cooperation in their domestic public spheres.
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2.7 Conclusion
International institutions provide opportunities for politicians to claim credit for themselves
and to shift blame onto other levels of government, yet there is little empirical work on when
and how politicians engage in these rhetorical strategies. In this article, I addressed this
gap by examining strategic communication by heads of government in the EU. The findings
challenge the conventional view that IOs receives little recognition from politicians in do-
mestic public spheres, and that national leaders frequently shift blame onto international
institutions. Instead, I show that governments’ communication of international cooperation
in a period of increased politicization is marked by credit claiming: ‘look at what I have
achieved for us’, not ‘look at what IOs are doing to us’.
This study highlights the key role of domestic electoral incentives in shaping govern-
ments’ strategic communication in international institutions. As public discontent towards
international cooperation rises, and as it is mobilized by political entrepreneurs, national
leaders claim credit more. I also highlighted the key role of issue salience in leaders’ attri-
butional style. As national leaders cannot reasonably claim credit for every single positive
outcome at the international level, they make strategic decisions on which ones to claim
credit for to maximize their impact. For issues of low salience, such as the environment and
foreign affairs, national governments are happy to share credit with international institu-
tions; for issues of high salience, such as the economy or immigration, national leaders are
more likely to claim credit for themselves.
These findings build on the growing literature on responsiveness in international or-
ganizations (IOs). The pressures for accountable and transparent decision-making at the
international level, combined with IOs gaining competences to effectively manage such trans-
border cooperation, means domestic electorates are likely to form more explicit preferences
over such international engagements. The literature to date has showed how governments
signal responsiveness in the international arena through their behaviour, mainly votes in
the Council (see Schneider, 2018; Hagemann et al., 2017). I show that this responsiveness
on the international stage also manifests itself in governments’ rhetoric at key international
summits.
Communication has been at the heart of studies of representation in national polities (see
Grimmer, 2013b), yet is largely absent from debates on representation and accountability
in international institutions. This study has aimed to place communication – and more
specifically the concept of home style (Fenno, 1978) - at the heart of these debates. National
governments are not simply the main actors of international institutions; they are also the
main messengers of IOs in domestic public spheres. What these national governments say
(and don’t say) about international institutions is therefore of consequence.
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Finally, this study has implications for democratic accountability in IOs, which rests on
citizens’ ability to correctly attribute responsibility across multiple levels of government.
Public opinion towards international cooperation depends to a considerable degree on elite
cueing and these findings suggest national leaders use strategic communication to shape
citizens’ evaluations to their advantage. Future research should explore the consequences of
these presentational strategies for citizens’ attributions of responsibility and evaluations in
global systems of governance. On the one hand, by rarely crediting international institutions
for issues citizens care about, governments’ communication is likely to be detrimental for
public opinion towards IOs. On the other, framing IOs more explicitly according to the
national interest may give citizens more confidence that decisions made at the international
level are in the interest of their home country. This article has shown how governments
use IOs to shape attributions of responsibility to their advantage without resorting to the
rather simplistic method of shifting blame ‘upwards’. It therefore suggests that standard
notions of electoral accountability based on performance voting are not just threatened
by the complexity of global systems of governance, but by the strategic communication of
politicians within that institutional setup.
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A New Dataset of Over 1 Million References to
European Integration in Parliamentary Speeches
Introduction – Data on the Communication of EU Integration
Introducing EUParlspeech – Face Validity – Convergent Validity
Predictive Validity – Conclusion
Abstract: This research note introduces EUParlspeech, a dataset of over 1 million ref-
erences to European integration made in the plenary debates of ten national parliaments
between 1989 and 2019. The dataset has applications for scholars of EU integration, party
competition, political communication, and international relations. This research note ex-
plains the construction of the dataset, describes its features, and demonstrates its face,
convergent, and predictive validity. Automated analysis of parties’ EU statements in par-
liament yield meaningful and well-known cross party differences, with challenger parties
more likely to send clearer, more sceptical cues on integration than mainstream parties.
Moreover, these automated measures correlate highly with expert assessments (CHES) and
- in the case of the UK’s Conservative Party - individual MPs’ ideal point estimates based
on EU statements in plenary debates can predict their subsequent vote and position at the
2016 referendum. I conclude that EUParlspeech data provide a promising new approach to
studying party contestation over European integration.
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3.1 Introduction
Having once been characterised by a ‘permissive consensus’, EU integration is now one of
the central issues of political contestation in Europe (see Lindberg 1970; Hooghe and Marks
2009, 2019; Hobolt and De Vrires 2020; Zurn 2014; Rauh 2018). The EU is salient in
domestic political debates, divides public opinion, and has been mobilised by Eurosceptic
entrepreneurs who have successfully introduced the issue into the arena of political contes-
tation. This contestation naturally takes place through the medium of language. Parties
outline their positions on European integration in speeches, manifestos, press releases and
the like. European institutions also increasingly participate in public debates to defend
integration (De Bruyker 2017). Scholars interested in conflict and contestation over Europe
have therefore developed and drawn on a number of rich datasets most notably the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) and party manifestos. These data sources have generated key
insights on the dynamics of contestation over European integration (see Rovny 2012, 2013;
Hooghe and Marks 2009; Hobolt and De Vries 2020).
Yet these datasets also present limitations for scholars interested in how Europe is
presented and contested in public. The CHES does not capture direct communication from
parties, and manifestos provide only infrequent data on how parties present Europe, as well
as obfuscating intra-party divisions on the issue. Whilst a growing literature investigates
how EU institutions directly communicate to citizens and legitimate themselves in the face
of politicization (see De Bruyker 2017; Rauh 2020, 2021; Rauh et al 2020; Schoonvelde et
al 2019), it is debatable how much of this communication actually reaches citizens given
the absence of a European public sphere and the limited resources of EU institutions. It
is still the case that citizens are more likely to receive their cues on European integration
from national politicians, than from supranational ones (Menon 2008).
In this research note, I introduce an original dataset for researchers interested in the
presentation of EU integration and contestation over Europe in domestic public spheres.
EUParlspeech is a dataset that captures over 1 million references to European integration
made in the plenary debates of ten national parliaments between 1989 and 2019. The EU
references are windows of three sentences in which the speaker makes a direct reference to
the EU, its politics and/or policies. These references are available both in the parliament’s
native language and translated into English.
I demonstrates EUParlpeech’s face, convergent, and predictive validity. Automated
analysis of parties’ EU statements in parliament yield meaningful and well-known cross
party differences, with challenger parties more likely to send clearer, more sceptical cues on
integration than mainstream parties. Moreover, these automated measures correlate highly
with expert assessments (CHES) and - in the case of the UK’s Conservative Party - indi-
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vidual MPs’ ideal point estimates based on EU statements in plenary debates can predict
their subsequent vote and position at the 2016 referendum. I conclude that EUParlspeech
data provide a promising new approach to studying party contestation over European in-
tegration and that the dataset has many applications for scholars of EU integration, party
competition, international relations, and political communication.
3.2 Data on the communication of EU integration
Politics and political conflict, both on the domestic and international stage, take place
through the medium of language (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Parties articulate positions
on issues and communicate them to citizens in manifestos, campaign speeches, and electoral
advertisements. Once elected, representatives write and debate legislation. News reports
document the day-to-day affairs that provide a detailed picture of conflict and cooperation.
On the international stage, nations regularly negotiate treaties, with language that signals
the motivations and relative power of the countries involved. These international agree-
ments are legitimised domestically through discourse and debates (Sternberg et al. 2017).
Given the centrality of communication to political science and international relations, and
the advance in computational methods and automated text analysis generally, it is unsur-
prising that researchers have constructed a growing collection of datasets that capture the
communication of actors engaging in political contestation.
In Europe, one of the central issues of this political contestation is the issue of Euro-
pean integration. The gradual transfer of authority to supranational institutions has led
to an increase in salience of EU integration, polarization of opinions towards the EU, and
mobilization on the issue by political actors, most notably parties. Whilst both the causes
and consequences of this politicization are contested, scholars agree both that European
integration has been politicized and that the features mentioned above - polarization of
opinions, salience of EU affairs, and the mobilization of political actors - are its main em-
pirical components. This politicization of European integration fits into a wider literature
arguing that new transnational cleavages are replacing the traditional left-right dimension
of political conflict (Hooghe et al, 2002; Kriesi et al, 2008).
European integration then, has become one of the central issues of political contestation
in Europe, and a number of datasets of EU communication1 are available to scholars inter-
ested in how European integration is presented and contested by political actors. Scholars
of party competition, for example, regularly use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)
to capture parties’ positions on EU integration. The CHES is a hugely valuable expert
1By EU communication I mean communication on the issue of European integration by any politcal
actor, rather than communication by the EU and its institutions.
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survey that captures the positions parties have managed to convey on a number of issues.
However, as it does not capture direct communication from parties, it does not allow us to
investigate how these impressions are created. Scholars have also used manifestos to capture
parties’ EU communication (Abou Chadi 2016). Whilst these manifestos do provide a more
direct measure of what parties are saying about Europe, they are relatively infrequent, only
being released during or in the run up to elections. Furthermore, European integration is
a wedge issue that has led to conflict within as well as between parties, and manifestos
provide only a single piece of EU communication for the whole party, therefore obfuscating
intra-party divisions. Scholars have also used the advances in computational social science
to scrape the web for executive and parliamentary communication. EUSpeech (Schoonvelde
et al, 2016) captures speeches made by national executives, whereas Parlspeech (Rauh et al,
2020) provides transcripts of all plenary debates from several European parliaments. These
are incredibly rich text resources but capture the totality of communication by parties and
executives, rather than the subset of their communication that relates directly to the EU
and European integration. Finally, a growing literature investigates direct communication
from EU institutions, for example through press releases of the Commission or the conclu-
sions of the European Council (Alexandrova 2014; Rauh 2021; De Bruyker 2018). However,
given the absence of a European public sphere and the limited resources of supranational
institutions, it is debatable how much of this communication reaches citizens. It is in-
deed much more likely that citizens will receive cues on Europe from their own national
politicians than from supranational ones. Finally, a vast literature investigates EU commu-
nication in the media, but these studies usually cover limited time periods, do not always
provide publicly available datasets, and the communication within them is often difficult to
directly attribute to specific actors (De Vreese 2007; 2014, 2016; Helbling et al. 2010)
The existing datasets on EU communication are therefore rich but incomplete. Some
capture the positions of parties, but do not convey how those positions are created and
communicated through language. Others provide direct communication by parties on Eu-
rope, but communication that is infrequent. Some provide frequent communication by
parties and executives, but on issues that are not specifically about EU integration. Others
provide frequent communication from supranational institutions, but ignore the domestic
political actors that are more likely to reach European citizens. This research note aims to
address the limitations of existing data sources by introducing a large, original dataset of





EUParlspeech is a dataset of over 1 million references to European integration made in
ten national parliaments between 1989 and 2019, available both in the parliament’s native
language and translated into English. The dataset allows for more precise, granular analysis
than previously possible and overcomes key limitations of existing data sources. Most
obviously, the dataset provides a direct, frequent measure of how parties in government and
in opposition present European integration over a significant investigation period, covering
the shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus (Hooghe and Marks 2009).
By providing speaker details for each EU reference, it also attributes clear responsibility for
EU communication, and allows scholars to investigate differences within as well as between
parties. Finally, EUParlspeech covers speeches from key domestic politicians such as party
leaders, from whom citizens are more likely to take their cues than from supranational elites.
The rest of this section outlines how the dataset was constructed.
To construct EUParlspeech, I draw on the growing range of machine readable datasets of
parliamentary speeches in Europe. Most notably, I use Parlspeech, a dataset that includes
speeches from the plenary debates of eight European Parliaments. I complement Parlspeech
with a dataset of speeches in Ireland’s lower house, the Dail (Slavin and Kop 2012), and
a dataset of plenary debates made in the Hellenic Parliament (Katsouganis 2019). I apply
the same pre-processing to all speeches, removing very short speeches of less than 10 tokens
and removing full stops that do not denote the end of the sentence2. I then use validated
dictionaries of EU level terms to capture references to European integration. To do so,
I first draw on existing validated dictionaries in German, English, Dutch, and Spanish
(Rauh, 2015; Rauh and De Wilde 2018). The original German dictionary, by Rauh (2015),
was created by reading one verbatim record of a plenary debate with an explicit EU issue
on the agenda and one without such an agenda in each year of the investigation period.
Each term-level EU reference found was then stored in the dictionary. The dictionaries in
English, Dutch, and Spanish were created by taking Rauh’s initial German dictionary and
translating it with the help of native language speakers. These dictionaries include terms
relating to the EU polity (e.g. ‘european union’, ‘european community’), EU politics (e.g.
‘european commission’, ‘european elections’ ) and EU policies (e.g. ‘eurozone’, ‘stability
and growth pact’).
For the countries in the sample who do not yet have validated dictionaries of EU level
2Whilst the package quanteda recognises some full stops that do not signal the end of a sentence, it does
not recognise them all. For example, I remove the full stop from ’hon. member’ in the House of Commons
as quanteda recognises the ”hon.” abbreviation as the end of a sentence.
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terms, namely Sweden, Denmark, Greece, and the Czech Republic, I replicate the method-
ology used by Rauh and De Wilde and translate the original German dictionary with help
from native speakers. The Appendix contains the full list of term-level EU references used
to construct EUParlspeech. It is important to note here that these dictionaries of EU levels
terms maximize precision over recall. That is to say, they include only terms for which an
EU references is evident without further context to avoid ‘false positives’. For example,
the dictionaries exclude terms such as ‘Brussels’ or ‘Schengen’ which have additional mean-
ings. The choices made here mean I capture EU references rather conservatively but guard
against false positives that might occur as many terms have rather ambiguous meanings in
different national contexts. And while this method most likely underestimates the absolute
number of EU references this is unproblematic for research purposes if we assume this bias
to be consistent over time and parties within a given country (Rauh and De Wilde 2018).
The EU references are available both in their original language, and translated into
English. To translate the references into English, I make use of Google’s automated trans-
lation service, which has proven to deliver similar results to full professional translation
for comparative bag-of-words approaches (see de Vries et al 2018). Finally, I remove any
duplicate EU references that may occur if a speaker mentions more than one EU level term
in a sentence.
Why settle on three-sentence windows as the length of these EU references? One could
for example extract the full speech in which European integration is mentioned, or identify
debates that are explicitly about Europe and extract all the speeches from these debates, or
even use tokens rather than sentences for the length of the window. I opt for three-sentence
windows for a number of reasons. First, European integration is now so integrated into
the national politics of its member states that references to the EU frequently appear in
debates that are not explicitly about Europe. Only including EU-labelled debates would
therefore run the risk of ignoring a significant number of references to European integration.
Furthermore, the labelling of parliamentary debates is sometimes incomplete (see Rauh and
De Wilde 2018), whereas the speeches themselves are consistently well captured. Three-
sentence windows also replicate the methodology from other studies (Traber et al 2020;
Rauh et al 2020) that experiment with one-sentence windows and windows based on number
of tokens and opt for three-sentence windows because they are a natural context unit for
human listeners, and because the resulting data windows are empirically most well-behaved
in distributional terms.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of EUParlspeech, including the number of EU refer-
ences in each national parliament. The sample covers important structural divisions within
the European Union: they are located in both the northern, southern, and eastern parts
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of Europe; include powerful member states and smaller ones; and include Eurozone and
non-Eurozone countries. Naturally there is cross-country variance in the number of EU
references in each parliament, reflecting the different nature of ’speaking’ and ’working’
parliaments in the sample.3 Table 3.2 provides examples of the translated EU references.
Worth noting here is the quality of the automated translation into English, giving coherent,
fully interpretable statements on EU integration by speakers in parliament.
3.3.2 Variables
All ten corpora have an identical structure with 15 variables. As the data is mainly drawn
from Parlspeech (Rauh and Schwalbach 2020), it often replicates the variables included in
those corpora. The variable date stores the day the reference to European integration was
mad made in a character vector (YYYY-MM-DD). I also include variables for the year,
the quarter, and the month in which the speech was made to facilitate aggregation.
The column speaker holds a character vector with the full name of the person having
made the EU reference as provided in the official protocol or other parliamentary sources.
As with ParlSpeech, researchers should consider that speaker names might slightly diverge
from external lists, e.g. with regards to nicknames, middle initials or titles. In Germany
for instance, a member of cabinet may be referred to by their name and ministry position.
The variables parliament and iso3country contain character terms for the name of the
parliament and the member state’s three letter country code respectively.
The variable speech provides the full speech from which the EU reference is taken in its
original language, which provides additional context and may be useful and for qualitative
researchers using EUParlspeech. I also include a variable that captures the number of
terms in this speech. The variable reference provides the three sentence EU reference in
the original language, and the variable translation provides an automated translation of
this reference into English. The variable keyword is the EU level keyword that was used
to identify the reference, in the original language. The variable agenda indicates the name
of the agenda item under which an individual speech was held, again as provided in the
respective parliamentary archive. For technical reasons mostly lying in the structure of the
respective online databases, this information is unfortunately not available for all speeches
in the corpora.
Finally, the variable party contains a character vector storing the partisan faction of
the speaker as given in the plenary protocol; and to facilitate linkage with party-level data
3For instance, plenary debates from the British House of Commons include over 2 million speeches between
1989 and 2019, whereas those from the Czech Chamber of Deputies include just under 330,000 between 1993
and 2016.
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Table 3.1: Overview of the EUParlspeech corpora
Parliament Period EU references Unique Unique
speakers parties
AT 1996-01 58,536 776 BZÖ, FPÖ, Grüne, LIF, NEOS
Nationalrat 2018-12 ÖVP, PILZ, SPÖ, STRONACH
CZ 1993-01 28,762 771 ANO, ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, KSČM,
Poslanecká sněmovna 2016-06 Nezařazeńı, ODA, ODS, SPR-RSČ,
TOP09, US, US-DEU, Úsvit, VV
DE 1991-03 100,518 412 AfD, CDU, FDP, GRUENE
Bundestag 2018-12 PDS/LINKE, SPD
DN 1997-10 85,511 609 ALT, CD, DF, EL, FF, FP, FRI,
Folketing 2018-12 IA, KD, KF, KRF, LA, LH, NQ, NY
RV, S, SF, SIU, SP, T, UFG, UP, V
ES 1996-05 56,112 1,161 GC, CiU, DL, GCC, NC, GCUP, EC,
Congreso 2018-12 EM, GER, ERC, IU, ICV, GIP, GIU
GMX, GPP, GPSOE, GUPyD, GV, EAJ, PNV, GV
GRC 1989-07 75,881 1,300 KKE, LAOS, ND, Alt. Ecol., PASOK,
Hellenic Parliament 2019-02 OP, POL.AN, SYRIZA, ANEL,
DIMAR, GD, PATRI.S, KINAL
IRL 1989-01 262,307 431 DL, FF, FG, GP, PBPA,
Dail 2013-03 PD, SF, SP, LP, WP
NLD 1994-12 84,081 911 50PLUS, CDA, CU, D66 , DENK
Tweede Kamer 2019-07 FvD, GL, GPV, LPF, PvDA
PvdD, PVV, RPF, SGP
SP, VVD
SE 1990-10 155,626 1,547 C, FP, KD, L, M, MP, NYD
Riksdag 2018-12 S, SD, V
UK 1989-01 260,285 1,876 Con, DUP, GPEW, Lab, LibDem
House of Commons 2019-11 Plaid, SNP, UKIP, UUP, Change
Total 1989-01 1,167,619 9,794 135 parties
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Table 3.2: Exemplary EU references
Date Speaker Translated EU Reference
1993/04 Josef Zieleniec The nations of Western Europe must gradually get used to
(CZ - VV) the idea that one day we will live together. The European
Communities, to a large extent the creation of the past bipolar world,
must seek their new place in the new world, they must seek a new
vision. Efforts to adjust the economy must be made on both
sides of the former Iron Curtain.
2014/11 Angela Merkel Nonetheless, as difficult and lengthy as the path may be,
(DE - CDU) overall we are on the right course in Europe. The
average budget deficit in the euro area fell below the
Maastricht limit for the first time since 2008, at 2.9 per
cent of gross domestic product. The Federal Government
supports the European Commission in strictly checking
the budget plans of the member states.
2014/05 Mariano Rajoy The first thing I want to emphasize is that, in relation
(ES - PP) to the crisis in Ukraine, the European Union has been able
to maintain a united position and to convey a clear and
resounding message on behalf of the Member States and
their institutions. This is one of the priorities of the EU,
that Europe is a leading player on the international scene and that
scene and that it speaks with one voice. From the content
of the conclusions I want to highlight the following elements.
2012/05 Geert Wilders The Dutch wanted less Europe and more Netherlands.
(NL - VPP) The political elite, however, ignored this and forced the
Treaty of Lisbon on us. This extract from the European
constitution completely ignored the wishes of the Dutch
population.
2001/05 Caspar Einem Mr. Chancellor! We Social Democrats therefore advocate that
(AT - SPÖ) the next European summit, which is supposed to be about
institutional reforms, is prepared differently. We therefore
advocate that parliamentarians - national and European - and
representatives of the governments work together in a
convention, because it is necessary to ensure that this policy
of cockfighting amongst little men is finally overcome.
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I also include the party.facts.id variable. This points to the numeric identifier for the
respective party in Doring and Regel’s (2019) Party Facts database which in turn offers
straightforward linkages to the CHES (Bakker et al 2015), the Manifesto Data (Volkens et
al 2020) or the ParlGov database (Doring and Manow 2021).
3.3.3 Applications of EUParlspeech
EUParlspeech provides many uses for researchers in political science and international rela-
tions. IR scholars can explore how international cooperation is framed in domestic debates.
Scholars interested in intraparty division and dissent can use the dataset to investigate how
different factions within parties compete and contest over Europe. Scholars of party com-
petition can explore how parties rhetorically execute their strategies. Mainstream parties,
for example, are assumed to employ strategies of avoidance on European integration as it
constitutes a classic wedge issue that cuts across the left right dimension. Yet despite the
variety of avoidance strategies available to parties, we know little about which one they
employ. Importantly, the dataset also has uses for qualitative scholars who have access
to the full speech for additional context. In the following sections, I use automated text
analysis to demonstrates the face, convergent, and predictive validity of EUParlspeech.
3.4 Face validity: Cross party differences
I first assess face validity, i.e. the extent to which automated text analysis of EUParlspeech
appears to capture known differences in the communication of European integration by
political parties. To do so, I estimate three measures of parties’ EU communication. I
capture the simplicity of an EU statement through the Flesch Reasing Ease score, a metric
widely used to capture the sophistication of text (Benoit el al 2019). I capture the tone of
an EU statement with the Lexicoder sentiment dictionary and calculate the net sentiment
for each EU statement (Young and Soroka 2012). Finally, I capture the emotiveness of
an EU statement through the ANEW dictionary. The ANEW dictionary was developed
by a team at the Center for the Study of Emotion Attention at the University of Florida,
and rates 3,188 words on three dimensions of affective meaning on a scale from one to nine
(Bradley and Lang 2017). The ANEW dictionary has been used to measure emotive rhetoric
in parliament (Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon. 2021). I replicate the methodology from
Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon (2021), which identifies emotive words as those with a
score below 3 and above 7 on the ANEW dictionary’s valence measure, and excludes words
74
with a large standard deviation4.
Political parties are assumed to employ different strategies when presenting European
integration. Mainstream parties, those that have formed governments in the past and are
likely to do so in the future, generally hold pro-European positions that they attempt to
obfuscate, for example by defusing the issue with complex technocratic language (Rauh
et al 2019). By contrast challengers parties, those who challenge established parties by
empasising new issues (see Hobolt and De Vries 2020), aim to mobilize the issue of European
integration and place it on the political agenda. The Appendix provides details on the
parties in EUParlspeech classified as mainstream or challenger, and I run linear mixed effects
models using the classification of parties as mainstream or challenger as binary independent
variables, with random effects for countries and for individual speakers. Table 3 presents
the regression results and shows that, as expected, mainstream and challenger parties use
different language when presenting European integration in parliament. Mainstream parties
use a more positive tone when presenting European integration, but use less simple, and less
emotional language. By contrast, challenger parties use more simple language, more emotive
language, and have a more negative tone in their communication of European integration.
The effects are robust to different specifications, including fixed effects for countries and
speakers (see Appendix).
Challenger parties are not a homogenous group and incorporate diversity. Regionalist
and green parties, for example are generally supportive of European integration whereas
radical right parties generally support withdrawal from the EU (Hobolt and De Vries 2020).
To provide further details on the differences between challenger parties, I repeat the mixed
effects regressions using party family from the CHES as the categorical independent vari-
able. Figure 3.3 summarises the estimation results. The results show how not all challenger
parties mobilize the issue of integration with clear communication on Europe. In particular,
radical right parties are more likely to send clear, sceptical cues on European integration.
Their communication is more emotive, has a more negative tone, and is more simple than
all other parties. Altogether, these results provide strong face validity for the usefulness
of EUParlspeech to capture cross-party differences on European integration. As expected,
challenger parties send clearer cues on European integration than their mainstream coun-
terparts. And this difference is not driven by the challenger parties that are supportive of
integration, but largely by radical right parties who oppose the EU and who have been most
successful at mobilising the issue at national and European elections (Schulte-Croos 2018).
4The use of ANEW distinguishes itself from Lexicoder sentiment analysis, by studying the degree to
which politicians use rhetoric with positive or negative emotions versus rhetoric with technical language
without affect.
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Table 1: Table 3.3: Mixed Effects Regression Results (Party Type)
Dependent variable:
Simplicity Tone Emotiveness Simplicity Tone Emotiveness
(Flesch) (Lexicoder) (ANEW) (Flesch) (Lexicoder) (ANEW)
Mainstream −1.099∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
Party (0.146) (0.0005) (0.0002)
Challenger 0.925∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Party (0.152) (0.001) (0.0002)
Constant 41.305∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 40.275∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(2.616) (0.002) (0.002) (2.611) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 1,084,123 1,084,123 1,084,123 1,084,123 1,084,123 1,084,123
Country RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leader RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Figure 3.1: Mixed Effects Regression Results (Party Family)
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3.5 Convergent validity: Comparison with expert data
Next, I assess convergent validity, i.e. the convergence of information retrieved from EUParl-
speech with existing measures that capture the positions of parties on European integration.
To do so, I draw on the CHES. The CHES is an expert survey that has been running since
1999 and captures the positions of parties on EU integration at three or four year intervals.
I aim to assess the extent to which automated measures of parties’ EU communication
in parliamentary debates converge with expert evaluations. In particular, I draw on the
CHES’ evaluation of parties’ EU positions (how strongly they are in favour/opposed to
EU integration) and their EU salience (the salience they accord to EU integration in their
public campaigning)5.
I capture parties’ EU positions and EU salience for each year of the CHES survey namely
1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. I aggregate all EU references by a party in these same
years into a single text document and use automated analysis to capture the tone of parties’
EU communication, and the share of their parliamentary communication they dedicate to
EU integration. I capture EU tone by using the Lexicoder sentiment dictionary (Soroka
and Young 2012) to capture the net sentiment of their communication. A higher value
corresponds to a more positive tone, whereas a lower value corresponds to a more negative
tone. I capture the EU share of parliamentary communication by a party by dividing the
cumulative length of their EU statements (in tokens) by the cumulative length of their
total parliamentary communication. Each observation refers to one party in each of the
CHES survey years and contains data both from the CHES survey and from my automated
measure of tone and EU share of parliamentary communication.
Figure 3.2 plots the data and demonstrates the correlations between the CHES’ expert
evaluations and the automated measures derived from EUParlspeech. Parties who are
strongly in favour of EU integration (according to the CHES) use a more positive tone
when communicating European integration in parliamentary debates. Likewise, parties
who have a high EU salience (according to the CHES) dedicate a higher share of their
parliamentary communication to European integration. While the correlation is less strong
for the salience measure than for the tone one, both these correlations demonstrate that
measures derived from automated analysis of EUParlspeech converge with the measures
captured in expert surveys.
5The exact EU position question from the CHES asks experts about the ‘overall orientation of the party
leadership towards European integration’ from 1 (Strongly Opposed) to 7 (Strongly in Favour). The EU
salience question asks experts about ‘the relative salience of European integration in the party’s public
stance’ from 0 (European integration of no importance) to 10 (European integration of great importance).
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Figure 3.2: Convergent validity: EUParlspeech and the CHES
3.6 Predictive Validity: Intra Party Divisions
One of the advantages of EUParlspeech as a dataset of EU communication is that it fa-
cilitates not only comparisons between parties, but also allows us to investigate differences
and divisions within parties. As a final validation step, I assess predictive validity: whether
positions of individual legislators from divided parties captured in EUParlspeech can help
predict their subsequent behaviour at elections and/or referendums. For this specific use of
EUParlspeech, I draw on a party that has been particularly divided by the issue of Euro-
pean integration: the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. The Conservative Party
has consistently been divided by Europe, with a vocal group of backbenchers campaigning
for withdrawal from the EU (Bale 2010). More recently, the difficulties of Theresa May in
ratifying her Withdrawal Agreement is testament to the deep and historical divisions on
Europe within the party.
To estimate the ideological positions stated in each Conservative MP’s EU rhetoric, I
use the Wordscores procedure (Laver et al 2003). The central idea behind Wordscores is
to estimate a ‘virgin’ text document’s position by using two documents whose positions
are ‘known’ to act as reference documents. As the Wordscore procedure is less useful to
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capture longitudinal trends (see Martin and Vanberg 2008; Benoit and Laver 2008), I draw
on a single parliamentary term to test whether the use of EUParlspeech can accurately
capture the positions of Conservative party MPs on the issue of integration, and predict
their subsequent behaviour at the 2016 referendum. To do so, I draw on EU statements
from Conservative MPs in the fifty-fifth legislature of the House of Commons, between
the 25 May 2010 and 30 March 2015. This fifty-fifth legislatures is highly pertinent to
estimate MPs’ EU positions, as Cameron’s announcement of his intention to hold an in/out
referendum in his Bloomberg speech of January 2013 was followed by an intense period of
negotiation and EU politicization in the House of Commons.
The correct application of the Wordscores approach depends on the validity of the
reference documents. In this case, we need as reference documents individual speakers
who represent the two extremes of the Conservative party on the issue of EU integration
(pro- European on the one hand, hard Eurosceptic on the other). To do so, I draw on the
figures of Ken Clarke and Bill Cash. Ken Clarke is a consistent and staunch Europhile
- president of the Conservative Europe Group, Co-President of the pro-EU body British
Influence and Vice-President of the European Movement UK - who consistently clashed
with his party over his more pro-European views. Bill Cash by contrast has been described
as the “most Eurosceptic” Member of Parliament and the leader of the Eurosceptics during
the Maastricht Rebellion (Blake 2010). The reference texts are therefore an aggregation of
all EU references made by Ken Clarke (pro-European reference text), and all EU references
made by Bill Cash (hard Eurosceptic reference text) in the fifty-fifth legislature. These
reference texts have clear face validity: few would argue that Bill Cash is not on the
extreme Eurosceptic end of the Conservative party (and vice versa for Clarke). This is
confirmed by the discriminatory tokens for each reference text: as expected we find that
the Eurosceptic reference text (Bill Cash) is more likely to mention ‘sovereignty‘, ‘over-
regulation’, ‘centralisation, ‘undemocratic’, and ‘renegotiation’ . By contrast, the pro-
European reference text (Ken Clarke) is more likely to reference the ‘economy’, ‘markets’,
competition’, ‘civilisation’, and ‘stabilisation’.
The virgin documents are the aggregation of EU statements for all for all other remaining
MPs, which each MP having one virgin document. I drop MPs who speak little of European
integration and whose cumulative length of EU communication is less than 200 tokens long,
as excessively short virgin documents can invalidate the results (Martin and Vanberg 2008).
This leads me to estimate the positions of 264 virgin texts (MPs). Figure 3.2 plots the
positions of Conservative MPs in the 2010-2015 parliamentary term. The x axis plots the
Wordscore position estimate, and the y axis plots the speakers’ salience of EU integration
by dividing the cumulative length of their EU communication during the parliamentary
term, by the cumulative length of their total parliamentary communication in the same
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Figure 3.3: Position Estimates of Conservative MPs (2010-2015)
term. The data show how Wordscores is useful in estimating the positions of prominent
Eurosceptics and Europhiles. Known Eurosceptics who lobbied strongly for a referendum
and campaigned for Brexit, such as Peter Bone, Priti Patel, and Jacob Rees Mogg are
placed on the Hard Eurosceptic side of the scale, as are the two MPs who would eventually
defect to UKIP (Mark Reckless and Douglas Carswell). Softer pro-Europeans, such as
Anna Soubry, Philip Hammond, and Michael Fallon are placed on the pro-European side
of the scale. The salience measure provides interesting insights into the dynamics of EU
communication: it shows how Eurosceptics in the party were consistently more likely to
mention EU integration in their communication, whereas pro-Europeans were less likely to.
Interestingly, the Wordscore scaling places the Prime Minister of the time, David Cameron,
on the Eurosceptic side, reflecting his need to rhetorically appease the dissenting Eurosceptic
faction of his party.
To assess the predictive validity of EUParlspeech, I test whether MPs’ estimated posi-
tion from the Wordscore procedure could later predict their vote and position at the 2016
referendum. To do so, I create a binary dependent variable EUrefposition that captures each
individual MP’s stated position at the 2016 referendum. The Appendix contains details on
each MP’s position. I run logistic regression models with EUrefposition as the dependent
variable. The independent variable is each MP’s Wordscore estimate from the 2010-2015
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parliamentary term. I control for a number of factors. As government loyalty usually leads
cabinet members to side with the PM’s position, I control for whether an MP was part of
the cabinet. I also include a variable to capture whether the MP held a ministry position
such as ministers of state or parliamentary under secretaries6. As recent MPs may also
feel loyalty towards the leadership, I also include a continuous variable which captures the
number of months they have been an MP. Finally, as bottom-up pressures are likely to
impact an MP’s stated position, I capture each constituency’s UKIP vote share at the 2015
general election.
Table 3.4: Logistic Regression Results (Referendum Position)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WordScore 1.474∗∗∗ 1.423∗∗∗ 1.653∗∗∗ 1.665∗∗∗
Estimate (0.495) (0.499) (0.530) (0.518)
Months 0.001 −0.0002 0.001
as MP (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
UKIP Vote 0.026 0.024 0.011





Constant −0.149 −0.641 0.064 −0.358
(0.140) (0.449) (0.496) (0.464)
Observations 225 225 225 225
Log Likelihood −149.625 −148.948 −136.377 −145.486
Akaike Inf. Crit. 303.250 305.896 282.754 300.971
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
6These ministers and parliamentary under secretaries are considered part of the PM’s ministry, but do
not attend cabinet meetings.
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Table 3.4 summarises the logistic regression results. I report the results from a base-
line model (Model 1) and models adding the controls (Models 2, 3, and 4). The results
demonstrate that the Wordscore Estimate using EUParlspeech data is a strong predictor of
MPs’ campaigning positions during the 2016 referendum, even when controlling for other
factors from the literature. The closer their EU parliamentary communication approached
the reference document of Bill Cash, the higher the likelihood they campaigned for Leave.
Conversely, the closer their EU parliamentary communication approached the reference doc-
ument of Ken Clarke, the higher the likelihood they campaigned for Remain. The controls
show how both members of Cameron’s cabinet and his ministry more widely were more
likely to campaign for Cameron’s position of Remain. In sum our our results demonstrate
that the positions of individual legislators derived from EUParlspeech can help predict their
subsequent behaviour at referendums, even when controlling for a range of relevant factors.
EUParlspeech not only has high levels of face and convergent validity, but also high levels
of predictive validity.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have introduced and validated a new dataset of over 1 million references
to European integration made in the plenary debates of ten parliaments between 1989
and 2019. The EUParlspeech approach uses validated dictionaries of EU level terms and
keyword-in-context to identify EU references in parliamentary speeches that are three sen-
tences in length. These references are translated into English with Google Translate, which
allows for cross-national comparisons of how parties present, frame, and compete over Eu-
ropean integration. The paper also addressed the face, convergent, and predictive validity
of data gathered with this approach.
EUParlspeech provides certain advantages over other datasets of EU communication
such as the CHES or party manifestos. Most importantly, it is the most direct way of
measuring speakers’ positions during actual political debates, and does not rely on the
recollection or interpretation by third parties such as experts. The data is also captured
more frequently than manifestos, which only appear at election time. And by capturing
the data at the level of individual speaker, EUParlspeech allows us to address not only
comparisons between parties, but also allows us to investigate differences and divisions
within parties.
Our choice of data sources and collection strategies should be guided by the questions we
ask. EUParlspeech adds itself to the rich - but incomplete - existing collection of datasets of
EU communication. It provides many uses for researchers in political science and interna-
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tional relations. IR scholars can explore how international cooperation is framed in domestic
debates. Scholars interested in intraparty division and dissent can use the dataset to in-
vestigate how different factions within parties compete and contest over Europe. Scholars
of party competition can explore how how parties rhetorically execute their strategies. By
making the EUParlspeech dataset publicly available, I hope that researchers will be able to
answer some of these questions, and deepen our understanding of how European integration




Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition
Introduction – Mainstream Parties and the Avoidance of Wedge Issues
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Results - Discussion - Conclusion
Abstract: It is well-established in the literature on issue competition that parties seek
to compete on issues they ‘own’. Yet, less attention has been paid to what strategies parties
employ to avoid issues they would prefer not to compete on. This paper develops a theo-
retical framework for understanding the avoidance strategies available in party competition
on issues that parties wish to make less salient to voters. Empirically, this is tested using
the wedge issue of European integration. We analyse an original dataset of over 70,000
statements on the EU by mainstream and challenger party leaders in national parliaments
between 1989 and 2019, and use automated text analysis to demonstrate that mainstream
parties in government and opposition employ different avoidance strategies. The findings
show that mainstream government parties are more likely to use an avoidance strategy
that defuses EU integration through the use of complex technocratic language. In contrast,
mainstream opposition parties are more likely to employ an avoidance strategy that ig-
nores EU integration. We also show that when wedge issues are successfully mobilized by
challenger parties, mainstream parties stop ignoring the issue but continue to avoid it with
alternate strategies of avoidance. Our findings have important implications for the literature
on party competition and democratic representation.
Note: This article is co-written with Sara Hagemann and Sara B.Hobolt. I was the
article’s lead author and contributed significantly to the research design, development and
testing of hypotheses, and drafting of the final text.
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4.1 Introduction
Issue avoidance is a central strategy for parties engaged in political competition. Whilst the
‘obfuscation’ literature initially concluded that taking ambiguous positions is costly in uni-
dimensional competition, scholars have since shown that in multidimensional competition,
avoidance can in fact be a rational strategy for parties who seek to de-emphasize issues where
they do not hold a competitive advantage (Rovny 2012; 2013; Han 2018; Heinkelmann-Wild
et al 2020; Abou-Chadi 2016). Mainstream parties are particularly likely to employ this
strategy on wedge issues that do not fit onto the dimension of political conflict where they
are dominant and risk intra party divisions and voter defection. Indeed, avoidance is listed
as one of the key ‘strategies of dominance’ available to mainstream parties to maintain their
dominant position in the political marketplace (Hobolt and De Vries 2020).
However, whilst this literature has deepened our understanding of why parties avoid
issues and with what consequence; it has largely neglected how parties manage to avoid
them in the first place. This neglect is not trivial. Mainstream parties can avoid issues in a
number of different ways, and the choice between these avoidance strategies is likely to be
consequential. Parties can avoid issues by ignoring them altogether (Hobolt and De Vries
2020) or by defusing them with complex technocratic language (Rauh et al 2019, Bale et al
2010). The difference in these strategies highlights that the choice between them is likely to
be non-trivial, yet it is rarely systematically investigated by scholars of party competition.
How do mainstream parties avoid wedge issues they would prefer not to compete on?
Put otherwise: which strategies of avoidance do they employ in their pursuit of (re)election?
This article draws on the literature of agenda setting and issue competition (see e.g. Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015) to present three central arguments. First, it argues
that mainstream parties’ communication of wedge issues is likely to be both more complex
than challenger parties’ communication of wedge issues, and more complex than the rest of
their own political communication, as complexity allows them to obfuscate their position.
Second, it argues that while they both use more complex language when presenting wedge
issues, mainstream parties in government and in opposition are likely to employ different
avoidance strategies. Because parties in government are more constrained by the party
system agenda they find it difficult to ignore wedge issues altogether and are more likely to
employ avoidance strategy of defusion, whereas, mainstream parties in opposition are more
likely to employ an avoidance strategy that ignores wedge issues. Third, it argues that main-
stream parties are likely to change their avoidance strategies when political entrepreneurs
successfully mobilise a particular wedge issue. Successful mobilisation by entrepreneurs in-
creases the risk of ignoring a wedge issue, but this does not mean that mainstream parties
begin competing on the issue. Instead, mainstream parties continue to avoid it through the
85
deployment of alternate avoidance strategies.
We test these expectations with an original dataset of communication by mainstream and
challenger party leaders on a central wedge issue in European democracies: that of EU inte-
gration. We use the EUParlspeech dataset (Hunter 2021 - see Chapter 3) to capture 79,379
EU statements made by party leaders in parliament and use a variety of automated text
tools to provide evidence for the hypotheses above. Mainstream parties consistently use less
clear language than challenger parties when discussing European integration (defuse). They
dedicate less of their communication to European integration when in opposition (ignore),
but depoliticise EU integration with complex, less emotive language when in government
(defuse). Finally, mainstream party leaders talk about Europe more when Eurosceptic niche
parties have successfully mobilised the issue in elections.
Findings have implications both for democratic legitimacy in the EU, and for the party
competition literature more widely. Political legitimacy is a fragile and contested concept,
particularly for emerging polities, and needs to be re-established continuously (Gallie 1956;
Collier et al 2006; Sternberg 2013). National governments and the mainstream parties that
compose them play a crucial role in legitimating European integration in the eyes of citizens.
Yet the results presented here show how mainstream parties often send obfuscating cues to
their citizens. The article also makes the case for studying the multiple avoidance strategies
in party competition. Parties can avoid issues in a number of different ways, and the choice
between these is likely to be consequential. This article has shown how parties can avoid
clear position taking despite mentioning an issue frequently in their communication. Indeed,
they are often rather skilled in doing so.
4.2 Mainstream Parties and the Avoidance of Wedge Issues
The ‘obfuscation’ literature in American politics initially concluded that taking ambiguous
positions is a costly strategy in the uni-dimensional context of American politics (Shep-
sle 1972; Enelow and Hinich 1981; Bartels 1986). Since then however, scholars of party
competition have shown that in multidimensional competition, avoidance can in fact be
an effective electoral strategy, particularly for parties’ secondary issues where they do not
hold a competitive advantage (Rovny 2012; 2013; Abou-Chadi 2014; 2015, Han 2018). By
blurring their positions on these issues, parties misrepresent the distance between the party
and its potential voters and maintain a broader coalition of electoral support.
Mainstream parties are particularly likely to employ this strategy on wedge issues –
those that cut along party lines and are intentionally mobilized by challengers to spark
intra-party divisions (Wiant, 2002; Heinkelmann-Wild et al 2020; Hollihan 2001 Sieberer
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2006; Kam 2009; Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Because these wedge issues do not fit neatly
onto the dimension of political competition where they are dominant, mainstream parties
will aim to keep them off the agenda and lower their salience (Parsons and Weber 2011;
Green-Pedersen 2012; van de Wardt 2014; Hutter et al. 2016; Adam et al. 2017). Examples
of wedge issues that mainstream parties have largely tried to avoid include immigration and
European integration. As the power of the EU’s supranational institutions has increased,
European integration has become ever more contested within domestic politics, and this
has led to tensions within parties on both the mainstream left and right that party leaders
seek to deemphasize. This avoidance of wedge issues is electorally beneficial: Meguid (2005,
2008) shows that mainstream parties perform better against niche parties when they refuse
to compete on the niche party’s issues, and Hobolt and De Vries (2020) list issue avoidance
as one of the three central ‘strategies of dominance’ available to mainstream parties to
maintain their leading position in the political marketplace.
This literature has deepened our understanding of when parties avoid issues and with
what consequences. However, it is less clear which strategies1 of avoidance are actually
employed by parties in the first place. Whilst one could argue that the particular ways in
which parties avoid issues is of little importance, we argue instead that studying the multi-
ple strategies of avoidance is a valuable contribution to the literature on party competition.
After all, parties can avoid and de-emphasise issues in a number of ways, for example by
ignoring them altogether (Hobolt and De Vries 2010), or depoliticizing them with complex
technocratic language (Rauh et al 2019). These strategies share the same strategic goal but
are likely to have differing effects in their attempt to de-emphasize an issue. Neglecting the
multiple avoidance strategies available in party competition could also lead to misinterpre-
tations about whether a party is really avoiding or engaging with an issue. For example,
scholars have used frequency of communication on a particular issue as a measure of a
party’s emphasis on it (Adam et al 2017). Yet failing to investigate the substance of this
communication could lead to imperfect conclusions about whether they are really engag-
ing with the issue. Parties often avoid clear position taking despite mentioning an issue
frequently in their communication.
This lack of precision surrounding strategies is reflected in the multiplication of terms
used to describe avoidance. Avoidance is referred to in the literature to as ‘ignoring’ (Green-
Pedersen and Mortensen 2015 ); ‘neglecting’ (Heinkelmann-Wild et al 2019); ‘blurring’
(Rovny 2012, 2013); ‘obfuscating’ (Bartels 1982); ‘silencing’ (Adam et al 2017); ‘muffling’
(Parsons and Weber 2011), ‘obscuring’ (Hobolt and De Vries 2020), ‘dismissing’ (Meguid
2005, 2008), ‘beclouding’ (Han 2018), ‘distracting’ (Heinkelmann-Wild et al 2020), and
1The plural here is deliberate: avoidance or obfuscation is often described as a singular strategy, but can
in fact be executed in many different ways
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‘defusing’ (Bale et al 2009, Rauh et al 2019). Importantly, these terms are not exact
synonyms and often reflect the various, intricate ways in which parties can avoid taking
positions on issues they want to de-emphasise.
Whilst these terms suggest a multiplicity of avoidance strategies, a more careful reading
of the authors’ usually brief descriptions reveals that parties can avoid issues in two principal
ways. First, and most obviously, mainstream parties can avoid issues by ignoring them.
By refusing to present a stance or mention an issue in their public communication, parties
can ensure the salience of the issue remains low. Ignoring in this case captures both the
idea that parties might simply stop discussing an issue (Rovny 2012; Hobolt and De Vries
2020), or might politicise other issues to create a distraction (Heinkelmann et al 2020). The
crucial point here is that parties decrease the share of their communication dedicated to
the issue they want to avoid, either by talking less about the issue in question, or by talking
more about other issues.
Second, mainstream parties can avoid wedge issues by defusing them (Rauh et al 2019).
This active form of depoliticisation emphasises the use of technocratic, scientific or man-
agerial language so as to avoid signaling political choice and to shield functionally necessary
decisions from the vagaries of political competition (Wood and Flinders 2014, Mair 2013).
This strategy also uses less emotive appeals, which have been shown increase participation
and activate existing loyalties (Brader, 2005) - precisely what mainstream parties seek to
avoid for wedge issues. The key point of this defusion strategy is that it entails framing
the issue in question as one which is about technocratic competence, rather than an issue
which entails political choice. 2
Table 4.1: Issue Avoidance Strategies
Strategy Ignore Defuse
Description Communicate on issue as Depoliticise with complex
little as possible. Refuse to technocratic language. Use less
present a stance. emotive communication.
2In their 2019 article, Rauh et al suggest that their conceptualisation of defusion is ’very similar to the
idea of position blurring in party competition as studied by Rovny (2012)’. It is important to note that the
two strategies outlined in this section are not intended as an exhaustive list. However they do describe the
types of avoidance strategy that are mentioned most frequently in the literature.
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Table 4.1 summarises the two key avoidance strategies available to mainstream parties.
It shows that avoidance can be executed in different ways, each of which could have differing
effects on discourse in the public sphere, and is likely to be more or less successful in helping
mainstream parties blur their positions. In the following section we present our theoretical
argument on which avoidance strategies are likely to be employed in which contexts, before
testing the argument on an original dataset of communication by political parties on a
central wedge issue in European democracies: that of EU integration.
4.3 Avoidance Strategies in Party Competition
How do mainstream parties avoid wedge issues? Do they do so by ignoring them alto-
gether? Or do they defuse wedge issues with complex technocratic language? This article
aims to address this question, and in doing so makes three central claims. First, it argues
that mainstream parties use more complex language in their communication of wedge is-
sues, as complex language allows them to obfuscate their position. Second, it argues that
mainstream parties are likely to employ different avoidance strategies when they are in gov-
ernment compared to when they are in opposition. Because parties in government are more
constrained by the party system agenda (see Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010 2015)
they find it difficult to ignore wedge issues altogether and are more likely to employ avoid-
ance strategy of defusion, whereas mainstream opposition parties are more likely to employ
an avoidance strategy that ignores wedge issues. Third, it argues that mainstream parties
are likely to change their avoidance strategies when a wedge issue is successfully mobilised
by political entrepreneurs. This successful mobilisation increases the risk of ignoring they
wedge issue, but this does not mean that mainstream parties begin competing on the issue.
Instead, mainstream parties continue to avoid it with alternate avoidance strategies.
It is important to note here that whilst this article focuses on avoidance, we do not deny
that mainstream parties are also likely to adjust their position on wedge issues, particularly
in response to the success of issue entrepeneurs. Indeed, a rich subset of the party compe-
tition literature already explores how mainstream parties adjust their positions in response
to the success of niche parties (Meguid 2005, 2008; Abou Chadi 2016, 2020). Avoidance and
adjustment strategies though are mutually inclusive: mainstream parties can adjust their
position on an issue whilst also deciding to avoid and deemphasise it in their communication.
4.3.1 Defusion through Complex Language
A growing literature has taken an interest in the complexity of politicians’ communication
(see Haselmayer and Jenny 2017; Young and Soroka 2012; Rauh 2015; Spirling 2015). Re-
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search on the linguistic habits of American and British politicians shows that conservative
politicians make less complex statements than liberal ones, and that populist parties use
simple language to convey their messages compared to the more complex messaging of
mainstream parties (Tetlock 1983, 1984; Schoonvelde et al 2018). Crucially, scholars have
also shown that the simplicity and complexity of language used by political parties matters.
Voters find it easier to place the positions of parties that use simple language, and struggle
to place parties whose language is more complex (Bischof and Seninger 2018). The simplic-
ity or complexity of language used is therefore an important tool that parties can use to
clarify or obfuscate their positions.
Linguistic complexity is also assumed to help defuse issues and avoid blame. The litera-
ture on blame avoidance shows how complexities in institutional setups and presentational
styles are useful mechanisms for governments to avoid blame for negative outcomes (Hood
2011, 2014; Wood and Flinders 2014). Furthermore, scholars have shown how the com-
plexity of national leaders’ discourse increased during the years of EU crises, a technique
the authors describe as ‘defusing political debates by resorting to technocratic, scientific or
managerial language’ (Rauh et al 2020). Are mainstream parties therefore likely to alter
the complexity of their language when communicating on wedge issues? We argue that they
are: by using more complex language when discussing an issue, they can obfuscate their
position on it. By contrast, challenger parties will attempt to mobilize wedge issues by using
less complex, more emotive language when discussing them. Our first hypotheses therefore
relate to how the complexity in parties communication is likely to differ systematically when
they discuss wedge issues. They read as follows:
Hypothesis H1a: Mainstream parties’ communication of wedge issues is more complex
and less emotive than challenger parties’ communication of wedge issues
Hypothesis H1b: Mainstream parties’ communication of wedge issues is more complex
and less emotive than the rest of their political communication.
Whilst mainstream parties both in government and in opposition are likely to use more
complex language when discussing wedge issues, this isn’t to say that they employ the
same strategies of avoidance. In fact, we argue that mainstream governing parties (MGPs)
and mainstream opposition parties (MOPs) are likely to employ quite different avoidance
strategies. Central to this argument is the concept of the ‘party system agenda’. Whilst the
study of issue competition tended to focus exclusively on the intended emphases of various
political parties or candidates, Green-Pedersen and Mortensen (2005, 2010) present a model
of issue competition that incorporates elements from the agenda setting literature. The
party-system agenda emerges from the continuous political debate among political parties.
This party political debate is a crucial element in a democratic society that often takes place
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in the mass media (see Zaller 1999), but is also institutionalised in various other ways. For
example, all democratically elected bodies, such as parliaments, have institutionalised the
party system agenda through ‘question hours’ and hearings (see Baumgartner 1989). This
agenda therefore influences and constrains political parties: they must address the issues
that are prominent on it, whilst competing to influence its very composition. In particular,
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen show how government parties and opposition parties are
not equal in their ability to ignore issues introduced onto the party system agenda.
4.3.2 Avoidance Strategies in Government and in Opposition
The literature on issue competition and agenda setting frequently distinguishes between
parties in government and parties in opposition. Whilst both will seek to focus debate on
the issues issues that are advantageous to themselves, MOPs enjoy a structural advantage
over MGPs in doing so (Green- Pedersen and Mortensen 2015). This is because governments
- and therefore government parties - are expected to deliver solutions to a huge number of
policy problems facing modern societies, even if the government bears no direct responsibil-
ity for these problems, and even though many of them may not be amenable to government
solutions in the first place. If a government does not respond to issues, it is automatically
accused of being in trouble and unable to deliver the expected policy solutions. They are
therefore forced to respond to issues as soon as they emerge onto the party agenda. Their
room for manoeuvre is more restricted: Green-Pedersen and Mortensen conclude that ‘ig-
noring issues (on the party-system agenda) is almost impossible for government parties’
(2015).
Opposition parties by contrast are much freer to ignore issues they would prefer not to
discuss. Unlike government parties, they are not to the same extent held responsible for
policy solutions, and can instead focus on criticising the government on whatever issue they
deem advantageous. For MOPs, this issue is unlikely to be any of the wedge issues that may
destabilise MGPs: scholars have shown that in multiparty systems, mainstream opposition
parties are also reluctant to engage in wedge issue competition as it may divide their own
voters and jeopardise relationships with future coalition partners (van der Wardt et al
2014). Employing an avoidance strategy that ignores wedge issues altogether is therefore a
relatively straightforward decision for MOPs. 3
Whilst mainstream parties in government will find it difficult to ignore wedge issues
altogether, particularly if they are already on the party-system agenda, this does not mean
they cannot employ alternate strategies to avoid them. We argue that defusion is likely to
be a particularly attractive avoidance strategy for MGPs. Governing parties are particularly
3At least until the issue is succesfully mobilised by political entrepreneurs (see Section 4.3.3)
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sensitive to their reputation for competence and welcome opportunities to demonstrate it on
a variety of issues (Green and Jenning 2012). A large literature shows how public evaluations
of government performance impact vote choice (Hellwig, 2001; Helliwg and Samuels 2007)
and strong asymmetries in information mean voters update their performance evaluations
more for incumbents than for opposition parties (Fiorina 1977, 1981, Butt 2006; Green and
Jennings 2012; Green and Jennings 2018). The ability to frame issues as ones of managerial,
technocratic competence is therefore likely to appeal to mainstream parties in government.
By framing the wedge issue as one that is principally about capable management, they
can reap the electoral benefits that come with a reputation for competence. Our second
hypotheses therefore refer to how avoidance strategies are likely to differ for MOPs and
MGPs. They read as follows:
Hypothesis H2a: Mainstream opposition parties are more likely to employ an avoid-
ance strategy that ignores wedge issues
Hypothesis H2b: Mainstream government parties are more likely to employ an avoid-
ance strategy that defuses wedge issues
Not only do we argue that MGPs and MOPs are likely to employ different avoidance
strategies, we also argue that this difference is likely to be larger than the difference in
strategies between mainstream parties of different party families. Whilst mainstream parties
hold different positions on the left-right dimension, they frequently hold aligned views in
their positions on wedge issues. For example, researchers have shown how mainstream
parties hold very consistent pro-European views on the wedge issue of EU integration.
This has resulted in unusual patterns of party competition in a number of countries, where
parties on both the left and right extremes advocate an anti-Europe position, while centrist
parties are predominantly pro-European (Marks and Wilson 2000, Hooghe, Marks and
Wilson 2002). This isn’t to say that we expect no differences between mainstream parties:
party leaders have personal intricacies and preferences in their presentational styles, and
certain mainstream parties may seek to accommodate the positions of niche parties who
have successfully mobilised wedge issues (Abou Chadi 2016, 2020). Nevertheless, as the
incentives to avoid a wedge issue remain similar across mainstream parties, it is presence
in government and its constraining effect with respect to the party system agenda which is
likely to be the largest determinant of strategies employed. Our third hypothesis therefore
reads:
Hypothesis H3: The difference in avoidance strategies between MGPs and MOPs is
larger than the difference in avoidance strategies between mainstream parties of different
party families.
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4.3.3 Avoidance Strategies in the Face of Issue Entrepreneurs
The previous section, building on the issue competition and agenda-setting literature argues
that MGPs are particularly responsive to issues on the party-system agenda and are there-
fore less likely to ignore wedge issues than MOPs. Naturally, these issues do not simply
appear on the party system-agenda by chance. They are introduced for example through
major events such as crises. (Baumgartner and Jones 1990, 1992). They are also strategi-
cally introduced by parties who compete to shape the party-system agenda. Of particular
importance here is the role of issue entrepreneurs (De Vries and Hobolt 2012, 2020), who
aim to raise the salience of previously dormant issues for electoral gain.
A large literature investigates the conditions under which these issue entrepreneurs are
likely to be successful (Meguid 2005, 2008; Mudde et al. 2017; Dennison and Guedes 2019;
Kriesi et al 2012). Given that entrepreneurs are crucial to the introduction of wedge issues
on the party-system agenda it is therefore highly pertinent to ask whether and how the
success of issue entrepreneurs impacts the avoidance strategies employed by mainstream
parties. We argue that the electoral success of issue entrepreneurs is likely to have an
impact. Most importantly, the successful mobilisation of wedge issue by entrepreneurs
makes an avoidance strategy of ignoring the issue more difficult and risky. First, it is
difficult for parties to completely ignore issues that other successful parties discuss because
there are institutionalised debates in, for instance, parliaments, where attention to an issue
is unavoidable. In the same way, the media will approach parties and ask for their positions
on issues to which other parties pay attention. Furthermore, ignoring an issue is potentially
dangerous because a party then loses influence on how it is framed in the public debate
when the party might later have to address it (Jerit, 2008).
Importantly, this is true of both MGPs and MOPs. Whilst it is true that government
parties are more responsive to the party-system agenda than opposition parties (Green-
Pedersen 2010), it is also true that mainstream parties as a whole are more likely to respond
to the issues introduced onto the party agenda (Green-Pedersen 2015). Mainstream parties
have a much broader and flexible issue appeal and need to be closely aligned with the
broader party system agenda to maintain their pivotal role and support in the electorate.
Once issue entrepreneurs have successfully introduced a wedge issue onto the party system
agenda, it is therefore unlikely that mainstream parties will ignore it altogether, even those
in opposition that are less constrained by incumbency. Our fourth and final hypothesis
therefore reads as follows:
Hypothesis H4: Mainstream parties are less likely to employ an avoidance strategy





Testing these hypotheses necessitates an empirical focus on what parties directly say about
wedge issues. The datasets traditionally used in the party competition literature, such as
the CHES or electoral manifestos, are therefore of limited use for our research question. The
CHES captures only the impressions conveyed by parties amongst experts, and manifestos
provide an only infrequent look at how parties frame and present issues. Instead, we draw
on an original dataset of communication by the leaders of mainstream parties on the wedge
issue of European integration.
EU integration is widely considered one of the most divisive wedge issues for mainstream
parties in Europe. On the right, conservative and right-wing liberal parties, such as the
Conservatives in the United Kingdom and the People’s Party in the Netherlands tend to
favour market integration in Europe, but oppose the transfer of authority to supranational
actors in other policy areas. The issue of European integration has been equally divisive
for parties of the left. For socialist parties, economic integration in Europe is often seen
to jeopardize national socialist achievements by facilitating international free trade. At the
same time, however, further political integration in Europe offers an opportunity to regulate
labor markets and advance social equality (Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Furthermore, this
wedge issue has been successfully mobilized by challenger parties, and a vast literature
explores the electoral success of these Eurosceptic issue entrepreneurs (Hooghe and Marks
2009, De Vries and Hobolt 2012; Kriesi et al. 2012, De Vries et al 2020).
This article therefore uses the EUparlspeech dataset to test its hypotheses on the avoid-
ance of wedge issues. EUparlspeech is an original dataset of over 1 million statements on
European integration made in the plenary debates of ten national parliaments between
1989 and 2019 (Hunter 2021). Parliaments are an important venue for communication by
political parties (Bagehot 1893), and plenary debates are among the most important in-
struments of parliaments to fulfil this communication function. The dataset was developed
using validated dictionaries of EU level terms. It uses keyword in context from the quanteda
package (see Benoit 2012) to capture EU statements that are three sentences in length and
are subsequently translated into English. Further details on the methodology employed to
create the dataset are available in Chapter 3.
We focus our analysis on the references to European integration made by leaders of
mainstream and challenger parties in six member states: Austria, Denmark, Germany,
Ireland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. The leadership of political parties is
central in determining the strategies employed in party competition, and focusing on party
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leaders ensures the analysis is limited to higher profile communication, rather than the
more technical work taking place in parliamentary committees. Table A1 in the Appendix
provides a descriptive overview of the dataset, including the countries, parties and leaders
included. In total, it includes 79,379 references to European integration made by 111 leaders
of mainstream political parties and 40 leaders of challenger parties between 1989 and 2019.
Table 4.2 below provides examples of EU statements by mainstream party leaders both in
government (Tony Blair and Angela Merkel) and in opposition (Jan Peter Balkenende), as
well as an EU statement by a challenger party leader (Geert Wilders). The German and
Dutch examples highlight the quality of the automated translation.
4.4.2 Dependent Variables
To operationalise the avoidance strategies outlined in the theory section, we use a variety of
automated text analysis tools to estimate features in leaders’ speech that are associated with
each strategy. By capturing i) the salience of EU integration in their communication, ii) the
complexity of their EU communication, and iii) the emotiveness of their EU communication,
we offer analysis of replicable and interpretable indicators of the strategies we are interested
in. For multivariate analysis, the data are aggregated to yearly panel data for each individual
leader.
First, mainstream party leaders can be said to ignore the wedge issue of EU integration
if they dedicate a low amount of their communication to the issue. We therefore capture the
EU salience4 in their parliamentary communication by dividing the cumulative length (in
words) of their EU statements in a given year, by the cumulative length of their parliamen-
tary communication within that same year. An avoidance strategy of defusion meanwhile,
implies the use of complex technocratic language. We capture the complexity of each EU
statement with the Flesch Reading score (Flesch 1948), a measure widely used to capture
the complexity of political speech (see Bischof and Senninger 2018, Schoonvelde et al 2016,
Rauh et al 2019). We measure emotiveness of EU rhetoric using a dictionary-based ap-
proach. Specifically, we use the Affective Norms of English Words (ANEW) dictionary to
identify emotive words. The ANEW dictionary was developed by a team at the Center
for the Study of Emotion Attention at the University of Florida, and rates 3,188 words on
three dimensions of affective meaning on a scale from one to nine (Bradley and Lang 2017).
The ANEW dictionary has been used to measure emotive rhetoric in parliamentary (Os-
nabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon 2021) and is thus particularly well suited for our purpose. We
4We take the narrow definition of salience as usually employed in political science, meaning the frequency
of communication on a particular issue.
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Table 4.2: Exemplary EU statements by mainstream party leaders
Date Speaker EU Statement
2007/06 Tony Blair Why would we want to veto this treaty? It provides the
(UK - LAB) means for a more effective working of the EU. Let us
be clear about this: my hon Friend, and some Opposition
Members, would call for a referendum even if we added
a comma to the constitutional treaty, because what they
really want is to take us out of Europe, and they
might as well be honest about it.
2014/11 Angela Merkel Nonetheless, as difficult and lengthy as the path may be,
(DE - CDU) overall we are on the right course in Europe. The
average budget deficit in the euro area fell below the
Maastricht limit for the first time since 2008, at 2.9 per
cent of gross domestic product. The Federal Government
supports the European Commission in strictly checking
the budget plans of the member states.
2001/10 Jan Peter Balkenende I come to talk about the future of the EU in relation
(NL - CDA) to the convention. Sometimes you get the impression
that the cabinet is somewhat avoiding the real
choices, because the documents show that they argue
for strengthening the European Commission and at
the same time for a further refinement of the role of the
Council of Ministers. I would like to point out that
the CDA group finds it very valuable that in the
Europe of tomorrow we have a balanced relationship
between countries.
2012/05 Geert Wilders The Dutch wanted less Europe and more Netherlands.
(NL - VPP) The political elite, however, ignored this and forced the
Treaty of Lisbon on us. This extract from the European
constitution completely ignored the wishes of the Dutch
population.
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replicate the methodology from Osnabrügge, Hobolt, and Rodon (2021) , which identifies
emotive words as those with a score below 3 and above 7 on the ANEW dictionary’s valence
measure, and excludes words with a large standard deviation. As an illustration, positive
emotive tokens include words such as ‘terrific’ and ‘hope’ , whereas negative emotive tokens
include words such as ‘terror’ and ‘hate’. The Appendix provides further face validity for
the use of the Flesch Reading score and the ANEW dictionary.
4.4.3 Independent Variables and controls
We use a simple binary variable to capture whether a party is in government or in opposition.
To operationalise successful mobilisation of EU integration by niche parties, we use the seat
share of Eurosceptic parties in parliament. Whilst it is technically possible for niche pro-EU
parties to emerge, it is widely acknowledged that only Eurosceptic parties have managed to
successfully mobilise the EU issue due to their proximity to a public which is more sceptical
towards integration than mainstream political elites. Eurosceptic parties are identified using
the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), which contains an EU position question on a scale
from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 (strongly in favour). We consider a party Eurosceptic if
it has a lower score than 3.5, and capture the seat share of these parties in parliament,
replicating a methodology used in previous studies (Rauh et al 2019).
4.5 Results
This section presents analysis and results. It provides compelling evidence for the hypothe-
ses presented above. First, to test the hypothesis that mainstream parties send less clear
cues than challenger parties on the wedge issue of European integration, we run a simple
OLS regression using party type (mainstream or challenger) as the independent variable.
The results, presented in Table 4.3, show that mainstream parties’ EU cues are less clear
than challenger parties’ EU cues. Their references to European are harder to understand
(Flesch Kincaid) and use less emotive language (ANEW). As expected, this difference is due
to challenger parties using significantly more negative emotive language, rather than more
positive emotive language, where the difference between the two party types is statistically
insignificant. Interestingly, the results also show that mainstream parties dedicate more of
their parliamentary communication to European integration. This confirms the view that
mainstream parties - particularly when they are in government - struggle to ignore the
issue of European integration, even though it can create a wedge within their own party.
It also suggests that challenger parties mobilize the issue of European integration through
the clarity of their EU cues, rather than the frequency of them.
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Table 4.3: Mainstream parties’ EU cues are less clear than challenger parties’ EU cues
Dependent variable:
Complexity Emotion Neg.Emotion Pos.Emotion Salience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mainstream 0.482∗∗∗ −4.454∗∗∗ −3.434∗∗∗ −1.020 0.037∗∗∗
Party (0.155) (1.307) (0.561) (1.126) (0.006)
Constant 14.486∗∗∗ 50.722∗∗∗ 13.620∗∗∗ 37.102∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.212) (1.788) (0.767) (1.542) (0.009)
Observations 786 786 786 786 811
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.064 0.064 0.055 0.283
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
To test the hypothesis that mainstream parties use more complex language when dis-
cussing wedge issues (H1b), we calculate the difference between the Flesch Kincaid score for
party leaders’ EU communication and the Flesch Kincaid score for the whole of their par-
liamentary communication. This EU complexity differential captures the extent to which
leaders use more (or less) complex language when discussing EU integration. The results,
presented in Figure 4.1, are clear: the leaders of mainstream parties consistently use more
complex language in their communication of EU integration than in the rest of their com-
munication. This finding is consistent across countries and leaders, and the size of this
effect is substantial. We find that on average, EU communication is more complex than the
rest of mainstream parties’ communication by 3.11 units on the Flesch Kincaid scale. Given
that Flesch-Kincaid is generally interpreted as the number of years of education required to
understand a text (Williamson et al 2010), this represents a far from insignificant difference
in the complexity of EU integration compared to the rest of mainstream parties’ political
communication.5
To test the hypothesis that MGPs and MOPs are likely to employ difference avoidance
strategies, (MOPs are more likely to ignore wedge issues), we also explore the salience of
5The Flesch Kincaid method was first used by the US Army for assessing the difficulty of technical
manuals in 1978, and soon after became a United States Military Standard. For example a number of U.S.
states use Flesch Kincaid to require that insurance policies be written at no higher than a ninth-grade level
of reading difficulty.
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Figure 4.1: Mainstream parties’ communication of EU integration is more complex than
the rest of their political communication
EU integration in the communication of mainstream party leaders. Figure 4.2 plots the
salience of EU integration in the communication of MGPs and MOPs. The figure presents
an interesting and unambiguous trend: mainstream opposition parties are more likely to
ignore the wedge issue of EU integration than mainstream governing parties. Importantly,
the figure plots the share of parliamentary communication dedicated to integration, so
controls for the fact that governing parties have more speaking time within parliaments.
We find that governing parties talk about Europe not simply in absolute terms, but in
relative terms also. These results substantiate concerns about the ‘opposition deficit in EU
accountability’ (De Wilde 2011, Rauh and De Wilde 2018). Whilst the gap in EU salience
amongst governing and opposition parties has always existed, it has been exacerbated since
the European crises that have institutionalised a form of emergency politics marked by
executive rule (White 2015, 2019). The results presented suggest that leaders of governing
parties not only dominate decision making in Europe, they also dominate the presentation
of European integration in domestic public spheres.
Finally, we also present results from multilevel linear regression models in Table 4.4.
Given the nature of our nested dataset, we run a mixed effect model with random effects
for speakers, parties, and countries. To test the hypothesis that the difference in avoidance
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Figure 4.2: Salience of EU integration in mainstream party leaders’ communication
strategies between MGPs and MOPs is larger than the difference in avoidance strategies
between parties of different party families (H3), we also include fixed effects for each main-
stream party family. The hypothesis that MOPs are more likely to ignore wedge issues
than MGPs are corroborated by the data. Being in government has a strong and significant
effect on the salience of EU integration in party leaders’ parliamentary communication. On
average, being in government increases the number of yearly tokens (words) dedicated to
EU integration by 6,335, all else being equal. This isn’t simply down to the fact that gov-
erning parties speak more in parliament: being in government also increases the share of
communication dedicated to EU integration by 4.6 percentage points, all else being equal.
Results show how the effect is similar for senior governing and junior governing parties in
coalitions. It is also important to note here that party families have little to no effect on
the salience mainstream parties dedicate to EU integration. What matters here seems to
be the MGP / MOP distinction.
There is also evidence that governing parties are particularly likely to employ a strat-
egy of defusion. Clearly mainstream parties use more complex language when presenting
EU integration (see Figure 4.1) but results show that being in government also decreases
the emotiveness of mainstream parties’ EU rhetoric. The effect of niche Eurosceptic party
success is substantial, and shows how mainstream parties dedicate more of their parliamen-
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Table 4.4: Multilevel Linear Regression Results - Mainstream Parties
Ignore Defuse
EU Salience EU Salience EU Complexity EU Emotion
(No. of tokens) (Share of Com) (Flesch Kincaid) (ANEW dic)
Government 6,335∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ −0.157 −0.004∗∗∗
Party (614) (0.007) (0.374) (0.001)
Senior Gov. 0.044∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗
Party (0.009) (0.002)
Junior Gov. 0.048∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
Party (0.010) (0.002)
Eurosceptic 9,971∗ 0.129∗∗ 0.130∗∗ −2.106 0.014 0.014
Seat Share (5,283) (0.066) (0.066) (3.116) (0.009) (0.009)
Conservative 2,132 −0.011 −0.011 −1.961∗ −0.001 −0.001
Party Family (2,100) (0.027) (0.027) (1.021) (0.005) (0.005)
Liberal −840 −0.027 −0.028 −1.091 0.002 0.002
Party Family (1,645) (0.021) (0.022) (0.811) (0.004) (0.004)
Socialist 235 −0.010 −0.010 −0.289 −0.001 −0.001
Party Family (1,674) (0.021) (0.022) (0.816) (0.004) (0.004)
Constant −276 0.086∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ 20.134∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(2,435) (0.029) (0.030) (1.366) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 575 575 575 558 558 558
Leader RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
101
tary communication to EU integration when more challenger parties are in parliament (p
lower than 0.05). Whilst these results do not allow us make causal claims about the effect
of niche party success on mainstream party discourse, they are descriptively interesting:
as Eurosceptic parties successfully mobilise European integration at elections, mainstream
parties find it difficult to ignore the issue, but continue to employ high complexity, low
emotion rhetoric rather than engage challenger parties in a emotive debate about the EU.
4.6 Discussion
One remaining question concerns the generalisability of the micro-level findings. The previ-
ous section provides strong evidence for the article’s hypotheses using the case of European
integration. But do these findings apply to other wedge issues? In this penultimate section,
I discuss the argument’s generalisabilty to the other central wedge issue for mainstream
parties in Western Europe: that of immigration (Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Whilst this
section does not provide original empirical evidence on how parties compete on the issue of
immigration, it will draw on existing research on party competition and framing to suggest
the patterns described in this article are not limited to the case of European integration
but also extend to the wedge issue of immigration.
First, scholars have shown that mainstream parties have struggled to ignore the issue
of immigration as the migration crisis has placed the issue on the party agenda and as the
issue has been mobilised by challenger parties. In their analysis of party competition in
Germany, Kortmann and Stecker (2019) show how mainstream parties have had to signif-
icantly increase their attention toward immigration with the advent of the refugee crisis.
This has left them facing ‘a hard time in finding the best strategy to deal with the issue’
(see also Odmalm and Super 2014). The difficulty in ignoring immigration is also evidenced
by research demonstrating how it has become a central issue of party competition (see e.g.
Abou Chadi, 2016; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2019). This suggests, as Hypothesis 4 does
above, that mainstream parties struggle to ignore the issue once it has successfully entered
the arena of political contestation. But researchers also show how mainstream parties can
still employ other strategies to avoid taking clear positions on immigration.
One central strategy mainstream parties employ is to reframe the issue. Research shows
how mainstream parties frame immigration in very different ways to challenger parties. In
an analysis of party manifestos, Odmalm (2012) shows how challenger parties attempt to
frame it according to what he describes as the ‘New’ conflict dimension (socio-cultural).
By contrast, mainstream parties consistently attempt to frame immigration according to
what he describes as the ‘Old’ conflict dimension (economic). Oldmalm’s article quotes
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extensively from manifestos: the UK’s Labour Party, for example, frame immigration as a
‘way of ensuring those who come and work here continue to make a major contribution to
our economic and social life’ (2001). Oldmalm’s findings are consistent with the argument
presented in this article, that mainstream parties attempt to defuse wedge issues, by turn-
ing a positional issue into one which is principally about left-right concerns of economic
distribution.
In his research on the framing of immigration in Western Europe, Helbling also anal-
yses the strategies employed by parties based on Habermas’ (1993) distinction between
identity-related, moral-universal, and utilitarian frames. Through handcoding over 5,000
references to immigration in the media of six European counties (Austria, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, UK), he shows how mainstream parties (social democratic,
liberal, conservative) use more utilitarian frames than challenger parties (radical left and
populist right), and that the frames are similar amongst different mainstream party families
(as in our own Hypothesis 3). He conclude that “major political actors appear to pursue a
more pragmatic discourse” (p. 35), a strategy which is closely related to the idea of defusion
we develop in this article.
A short review of the literature on party strategies on the issue of immigration is consis-
tent with the argument presented in this article. It shows that mainstream parties struggle
to ignore the issue of immigration once it enters onto the party system agenda. Instead
of engaging with the issue with clear positional cues, these mainstream parties will aim to
reframe it onto the left-right dimension and pursue a more pragmatic discourse. Of course,
the text as data methods employed in this paper can and should be employed on other wedge
issues - particularly immigration - to provide even more robust evidence for the generalis-
ability of the argument6. Yet this short review has shown that existing literature suggests
the theory has external validity and applies to wedge issues beyond EU integration.7.
4.7 Conclusion
Party competition is about more than simply adjusting positions on a unidimensional scale.
Instead, parties also compete on issues, emphasising those where they hold a competitive
advantage, but also deliberately avoiding those where they do not. Whilst it is acknowledged
that this issue avoidance is a central strategy in party competition, particularly for main-
6It is also worth noting that the studies quoted in this section rarely distinguish between governing and
opposition mainstream parties, a distinction which is important in our own argument.
7To be clear, I also believe that European integration, as an often dry, mainly legal process is a ‘most likely
case’ for the argument presented. Defusing the issue of EU integration is likely to be more straightforward
than defusing the issue of immigration. But this section shows that mainstream parties have at least
attempted to do the latter. It is less clear whether, when, and how these attempts at defusion are successful.
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stream parties, the ways in which parties avoid issues is theoretically underspecified and
empirically understudied. This article addressed this gap by focusing on the plural strate-
gies of issue avoidance. The article makes both a theoretical and empirical contribution.
Theoretically it presents a simple typology of avoidance strategies available to mainstream
parties and draws on the agenda setting and issue competition literature to present an ar-
gument on which strategy is likely to be employed in which context. Empirically, it tests
these expectations with an original dataset of mainstream party communication on an issue
they are assumed to want to avoid: that of EU integration.
The results corroborate the article’s hypotheses. Mainstream parties consistently use
more complex language when discussing EU integration, but also employ quite different
strategies in government and in opposition. MOPs employ a strategy of ignoring the issue
by dedicating less of their communication to European integration whereas MGPs defuse EU
integration with comparatively more complex language. Mainstream party leaders also talk
about Europe more but use comparatively more complex language when Eurosceptic niche
parties have successfully mobilised the issue in elections (question marks remain over the size
of these effects). Importantly, the differences between parties of different families are minor:
what really matters is the MOP / MGP distinction. A short review of party strategies on
another central wedge issue, immigration, suggested that the argument presented is not
unique to the issue of European integration but extendable to other wedge issues that place
mainstream parties in a delicate situation (though of course, this should be tested with
further original evidence and data).
This research also has implications for the EU’s crisis of legitimacy as national govern-
ments and the mainstream parties that compose them play a crucial role in legitimating
European integration in the eyes of citizens. Worryingly for supporters of the European
project, this research shows how mainstream parties send obfuscating cues to their voters
on EU integration rather than defending the EU in simple, straightforward language. Fi-
nally, further research should explore the effectiveness of different avoidance strategies. Are
governing parties less successful at avoiding issues in the eyes of voters, because they are
less likely to ignore them? Or is their strategy of defusion equally effective? This article
has shown how parties can and do execute strategies in very different ways. These different
strategies of avoidance are not a minor feature of party competition, but are in fact a crucial
component that merit further consideration.
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5
Disintegration and Party Competition:
Evidence from Parliamentary Speeches on Brexit
Introduction – Established Strategies in EU Party Competition
Disintegration and its Impact on Party Strategies - The Case of Brexit
Research Design - Results - A Permanent Reversal? - Conclusion
Abstract: Disintegration episodes such as Brexit represent a major exogenous shock
for the process of European integration. Do they lead parties to alter their strategies when
competing on the EU issue? This article argues that pro-European mainstream parties and
Eurosceptic challenger parties reverse their usual strategies after Brexit, as the UK’s neg-
ative experience reveals new information about the desirability of EU membership. I use
a combination of automated and hand-coded methods to identify and analyse 2,223 Brexit
statements in the parliaments of five member states between 2013 and 2018. I show how in
the aftermath of the Brexit vote the strategies of issue entrepreneurship and issue avoidance
usually employed by challenger and mainstream parties are indeed reversed. Challenger par-
ties avoid Brexit and significantly moderate their Euroscepticism; by contrast, mainstream
parties emphasise Brexit and significantly increase their pro-Europeanism. Results show
that party conflict on European integration is not static but a dynamic competition that
responds to outside circumstances and events. They also show that the advantage of issue
ownership can be quickly and dramatically reversed when exogenous shocks lead to large
changes in public opinion.
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5.1 Introduction
Disintegration episodes such as Brexit represent a major exogenous shock for the process of
European integration. Scholars have shown how Brexit has restructured party competition
in the UK (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2020; Glyn and Menon 2017), had a significant
impact on public opinion (De Vries 2017, 2018), and strengthened the cohesiveness of the
remaining EU27 member states (Chopin and Lequesne 2020). Others have highlighted
the risks of contagion (Walter 2021). In this article, I consider whether and how Brexit
affected the strategies of mainstream pro-European and Eurosceptic challenger parties in
other member states: did this major disintegration episode lead them to alter their strategies
when competing on the EU issue?
This article argues that Brexit had a major effect and that pro-European mainstream
parties and Eurosceptic challenger parties reversed their usual strategies after Brexit, as the
UK’s negative experience reveals new information about the desirability of EU membership.
I argue that challenger parties reverse their usual strategy of entrepreneurship (see Hobolt
and De Vries 2015) to one of avoidance and obfuscation (see Rovny 2012; Hobolt and De
Vries 2020) after the referendum. Likewise, mainstream parties reverse their usual strategy
of avoidance to one of entrepreneurship, increasing their use of clear pro-EU position taking
and criticising populists.
These hypotheses are tested with an original dataset of 2,223 statements on Brexit in
five national parliaments: the Austrian Nationalrat, the German Bundestag, the Danish
Folketing, the Dutch Tweede Kamer, and the Swedish Riksdag1. The time period ranges
from the 23rd January 2013, when David Cameron first announced his intention to rene-
gotiate the UK’s membership terms and put these to voters in a referendum, to the 31st
December 2018. I first use automated dictionary methods to identify Brexit statements2. I
then use hand coding to capture parties’ stated Brexit strategy, and the EU tone of their
communication. I show that in the aftermath of the Brexit vote challenger parties avoid
Brexit, significantly moderate their Euroscepticism, and obfuscate their stance on following
in the UK’s footsteps. By contrast, mainstream parties emphasise Brexit and send clearer,
supportive cues on European integration.
However, I also consider whether these changes are likely to be a temporary or permanent
reversal in party strategies. I argue that the former is more likely, for two reasons. First,
Brexit is unlikely to remain as salient in other member states, and I provide evidence from
Google searches that the salience of Brexit in other member states relative to the UK
1As parliaments with strong formal powers, hosting both mainstream pro-European and Eurosceptic
challenger parties, these provide good venues of party competition to test hypotheses about strategy reversal.
2This method is validated with human hand coders.
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has significantly declined over time. Second, I also argue that the monumental economic
impact of COVID-19 and the ’slow puncture’ nature of Brexit, combined with the bounded
rationality of voters, is likely to obfuscate the negative economic impact of Brexit for voters
both in the UK and the rest of the EU.
Despite the likely temporary nature of these reversals in party strategy, findings have
a number of important implications. First, they add to the body of evidence showing how
Brexit has strengthened the sociological legitimacy of the EU in other member states3.
Not only has it made public opinion more supportive of integration and expanded the
cohesiveness of the EU27 governments, it has also led mainstream parties - the traditional
defenders of EU integration in national party competition - to clarify their pro-Europeanism
and go on the offensive against Eurosceptic populists. Second, these findings show that party
strategies on the EU issue are not stable but dynamic: they respond to circumstances and
events outside their own country. Third, it shows that the advantage issue ownership (see
Petrocik 1996) can be quickly and dramatically reversed when exogenous shocks lead to
large short term changes in public opinion. I conclude that events and exogenous shocks in
one member state can have a large effect abroad and ‘turn the tables’ on party competition
in other member states.
5.2 Established Strategies in EU party competition
Having long been characterised by a ’permissive consensus’, EU integration has since been
politicized and is now an important feature of political contestation in Europe. (see Lind-
berg 1970; Hooghe and Marks 2009, 2019; Hobolt and De Vrires 2020; Zurn 2014; Rauh
2018). The EU is now salient in domestic political debates, divides public opinion, and has
been mobilized at both national and European elections. However, the structure of contes-
tation over European integration differs from the dominant dimension of political conflict
in Western Europe as it cannot easily be aligned with the dominant left-right dimension
(Hobolt and De Vries 2020). Parties on the right tend to favour economic integration in
Europe but oppose the transfer of authority to supranational actors. For parties on the left,
economic integration in Europe is often seen to jeopardise national socialist achievements by
facilitating international free trade, but further political integration offers an opportunity to
regulate labour markets and advance social equality. EU integration is therefore considered
a cross cutting wedge issue (see van de Wardt et al 2014) which risks intra party divisions
for both mainstream parties of the left and right. The lack of fit has resulted in unusual
patterns of party competition where parties on both the left right extremes advocate an
3By sociological (rather than normative) legitimacy, I refer to the belief that an exercise of authority is
appropriate (e.g. Weber 1922/1978; Tallberg and Zürn 2019).
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anti-Europe positions, while centrist parties are predominantly pro-European. The main
structure of competition on the issue of EU integration is therefore not between parties of
the left and parties of the right, but between mainstream and challenger parties who employ
different strategies when competing on the issue.
The main strategy employed by mainstream parties on the issue of EU integration has
been characterised as one of avoidance and obfuscation (Rovny 2012, De Vries and Hobolt
2020). Mainstream parties prefer to redirect onto issues that fit onto the left right dimension
of conflict where they are dominant, and because voters are generally more sceptical about
European integration than mainstream party elites, these parties generally aim to downplay
the issue’s importance and/or obfuscate their position on it. They can do so by ignoring
the issue but also by depoliticising it, for example by using complex, technocratic language
when discussing the EU (Rauh et al 2018; Hunter 2021 cf Chapter 4).
By contrast, the main strategy employed by challenger parties on the issue of EU in-
tegration is one of issue entrepreneurship (De Vries and Hobot 2020). Theories of issue
evolution and issue manipulation (Rikker et al 1996) argue that challenger parties are
highly incentivized to mobilize issues that can disturb the political equilibrium. Because
they are newcomers to the system or hold marginal positions, any potential vote gain will
constitute an improvement of their current electoral position, and by mobilizing high ap-
propriability issues which are not easily subsumed into the dominant dimension, challengers
can drive a wedge within mainstream parties and change the basis on which voters make
political choices. Challenger parties execute their entrepreneurship strategy by emphasising
European integration it in their communication and using clear, uncomplicated communica-
tion and cues that usually combine opposition to EU integration with nationalist messages
(Bischof and Wagner 2019).
The structure of party competition on Europe therefore differs from the dominant struc-
ture of party competition in Western Europe. It is not between left and right wing parties
but between mainstream parties who aim to avoid and obfuscate the issue, and challenger
parties who aim to mobilize it through issue entrepreneurship. Furthermore, the series of
crises that have hit the EU in the twenty first century have cemented this latent dimension,
with challenger parties both on the extreme left and extreme right successfully mobilizing
the issue at elections in the aftermath of the Eurozone and migration crises (Hernandez and
Kriesi 2016). In the following section, I argue that one particular form of exogenous shock
- disintegration episodes - can in fact lead parties to alter their strategies when competing
on the EU issue
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5.3 Disintegration and its Impact on Party Strategies
5.3.1 European Disintegration
The study of the EU has historically been the study of European integration. From the
1950s to the 2010s, the theoretical literature, both in international relations and comparative
politics, focused on the process of convergence between the policies, politics and polities of
the EU’s member states (Bulmer and Lequesne 2013; Chopin and Lequesne 2020). However,
recent contributions have recognised the limitations of a narrow focus on convergence and
aimed to rectify the ’pro-integration bias’ in EU studies (Borzel 2018). Central to this
rethink about have been the disintegration episodes that have hit the EU, defined here as
‘selective reductions of a state’s level and scope of integration’ (Schimmelfenig 2018).
While scholars have been careful to distinguish between a slowdown of integration and
actual disintegration (see e.g. Borzel 2018), there have nonetheless been clear cases of
European disintegration in the past decade. The most high profile of these disintegration
episodes is undeniably Brexit. The British decision to leave the EU following a referendum
shocked the political establishment in London, Brussels and beyond (De Vries 2017). Yet
Brexit is not the only example of European disintegration. Greenland, having achieved
self-rule from Denmark, also left the EC after a referendum in 1982. Disintegration is also
not limited to exiting the EU, but also applies to states that remain in the EU but exit
from specific policies. For example, the EU’s refugee crisis is seen as having led to a form of
renationalization and disintegration in security policy (Tassinari 2016; Morsut and Kruke
2018). And whilst European disintegration has only been realised in a handful of cases, it
has been considered and discussed in the domestic politics of EU member states. Serious
suggestions that Greece could leave the euro in the wake of the Eurozone crisis were made
by both academics and policymakers (Krugman 2012). And as we have seen in the previous
section, Eurosceptic parties have frequently called for exit from certain EU policies, and in
certain cases for withdrawal from the EU altogether (Vasilopolou 2018; Heinisch et al. 2020;
Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008). Borzel concludes that whilst actual cases of disintegration are
limited, nationalist discourses and practices of non-compliance have reinforced each other
in creating heightened potential for significant disintegration (2018). Given this heightened
risk, it is therefore pertinent to ask whether and how actual disintegration episodes may
affect party competition on the EU in other member states.
5.3.2 Impact on Party Strategies
Do disintegration episodes lead parties in other member states to alter their strategies
when competing on the EU issue? In this theoretical section, I draw on the literatures of
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policy diffusion, public opinion formation, and party competition to argue that European
disintegration in one member state can indeed lead to changes in the strategies employed
by parties.
First, disintegration episodes provide new information to publics and parties in other
countries about the costs and benefits associated with European disintegration. The policy
diffusion literature shows how governments and parties in one country learn from the expe-
riences in others, particularly from countries who are early adopter of policies (Shipan and
Volden 2004). Early pieces of new evidence thus provide the greatest information value,
which is why the initial examples of European disintegration are likely to be particularly
influential in providing new information about the desirability of such policies (Walter and
Martini 2020).
Second, this new information affects public opinion towards European integration. Whilst
theories of public opinion formation have ranged from utilitarian to identitarian explanations
(see Anderson 1998; Hooghe and Marks 2009), scholars have since settled on a benchmark
theory of public opinion towards the EU (De Vries 2017). According to this theory, support
for the EU essentially boils down to a comparison between the benefits of the current status
quo of membership and those of an alternative state, namely one’s country being outside
the EU. Under this theory, disintegration episodes are central to public opinion on the EU
because they provide more information about the economic and political costs and benefits
associated with the alternative state. If the disintegration experience seems difficult and
painful, this will increase support for the EU. By contrast, if the disintegration experience
seems positive, the public is likely to find the status quo less desirable, and support for the
EU decreases.
Finally, this new information and its impact on public opinion are likely to change party
strategies on the issue of EU integration. This because parties are sensitive and responsive
to changes in public opinion (Page 1994). This is true both of mainstream parties, who as
‘catch all’ parties have to be responsive to public opinion on a wide range of issues (Mair
2013; Katz and Mair, 1995; Kirchheimer 1966) but also of challenger parties as who as ‘issue
owners’ on the issue of European integration (see de Wardt 2014; Green-Pedersen 2007) will
be particularly sensitive to how public opinion evolves on the issue of the EU. In particular,
increased public support for the EU is likely to be problematic for challenger parties, who
usually benefit electorally from mobilising widespread discontent towards the EU.
Beyond simply responding to these shifts in opinion, parties are also likely to rethink
their strategies after disintegration episodes as the departing state’s experience of disinte-
gration provides parties in the rest of Europe with a form of transnational learning. As
this learning tends to be particularly strong among ideologically similar governments (e.g.,
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Grossback et al. 2004), Eurosceptic challengers in one country are likely to be particularly
receptive to information generated by the experience of disintegration elsewhere, particu-
larly as this is a policy they have historically called for themselves (Gilardi 2010; van Kessel
et al. 2020). Additionally, given the well documented feedback loop between party cues
and public opinion (see Hooghe and Marks 2005), these mechanisms are likely to have a
compounding effect: as parties and the public and both update their priors about the de-
sirability of EU membership, and in turn respond to one another’s views/cues, the changes
in both public opinion and party strategies on the issue of European integration is likely to
be substantial.
In sum, disintegration episodes provide new information to parties and voters on the
desirability of the status quo and affect parties’ calculus when deciding to emphasise or
deemphasise their positions on Europe. In the following section, I consider how the case
of Brexit, the most high profile disintegration episode to data, affected the strategies of
challenger and mainstream parties in other member states.
5.4 The Case of Brexit
5.4.1 The UK’s Negative Brexit Experience
Brexit is undoubtedly the most substantial and high profile form of European disintegration
to date. The British decision to leave the EU following a referendum shocked the political
establishment in London, Brussels and beyond and reverberated in the public spheres of
other member states (De Vries 2017). The immediate Brexit experience for the UK was
undoubtedly negative, and perceived as such by citizens in other member states (see Hobolt
et al. 2021; Malet and Walter 2020). Although some of the more pessimistic predictions
were not realised, the pound fell sharply as uncertainty among investors about Britain’s
economic future started to grow. Politically, the situation was also difficult. The UK’s
Prime Minister David Cameron resigned and the referendum result unmasked deep divisions
between different regions and amongst the constituent components of the UK, as well as
within the two major political forces in Westminster. Finally, Brexit has also put into peril
the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom, by raising the Irish border question and
reinvigorating the Scottish independence movement (Walter and Martini 2020).
Figure 5.1 summarises the Brexit experience using two measures. The first is an objec-
tive measure based on the daily spot exchange rate of the British Pound against the Euro.
The second is a subjective measure, a human-coded assessment of Brexit events from Walter
and Martini (2020)4. These measure are highly correlated and show how in the aftermath
4This measure codes individual events in the Brexit negotiations over time by assigning values on a
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Figure 5.1: The UK’s negative Brexit experience post referendum
of the referendum vote in 2016 both markets and informed observers concluded that the
Brexit experience had been painful and difficult for the UK.
Unsurprisingly, the difficulties experienced by the UK in the aftermath of the Brexit
vote significantly increased support for the EU in the remaining 27 member states (De
Vries 2018). As the economic and political uncertainty of withdrawal was made clear,
publics in other member stated updated their priors about the desirability of the status quo
of EU membership and the alternative state outside of the EU. Opinion polls conducted
after the British referendum showed that public opinion had become more favourable to
EU membership in all EU member states including the UK (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016;
Pew Research Center 2017). Other survey data (European Parliament 2018; Eurobarometer
2018; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 2018) show in the same way that support for EU membership
increased significantly after the Brexit referendum.
De Vries (2018) concludes that the UK’s Brexit experience to date has set a negative
precedent for exiting the EU (see also Hobolt et al 2021; Walter and Martini 2020). Whilst
seven point scales from -3 for very negative to +3 for very positive events. Positive events are defined as
developments that – from a perspective of the UK government – align with or are helpful for achieving stated
sovereignty-related policy goals (e.g., EU reform under Cameron, Brexit under May and Johnson). Negative
events are developments that hinder or contradict such goals.
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it is important to note that this may not last indefinitely5, it is clear that the immediate
effects of Brexit were significant, largely negative, and destabilised the UK. I argue that this
led to considerable changes to the usual strategies employed by challenger and mainstream
parties in other member states.
5.4.2 Challenger Party Strategies After Brexit
The UK’s negative Brexit experience places Eurosceptic challenger parties in a difficult
position when competing on Europe. Whilst these parties usually benefit from mobilising
the issue and calling for a renegotiation in membership terms (see Taggart 1998; Hobolt and
De Vries 2020), Brexit shows the difficulties inherent in such a policy. Furthermore, as the
public update their priors about the desirability of the alternative state outside of the EU,
their opinion towards integration becomes more supportive. Mobilizing discontent towards
the EU becomes difficult for challengers, as the in their usual position - a renegotiation of
terms and/or a referendum - becomes untenable. Mobilising discontent towards the EU is
also significantly less effective when there are simply less discontented voters.
Existing accounts corroborate the view that challenger parties moderated their Eu-
roscepticms after Brexit. Whilst these are usually based on individual case studies, they do
confirm the view that the electoral calculus of individual challenger parties was affected. Af-
ter her failure at the 2017 presidential election, le Rassemblement National’s leader Marine
Le Pen no longer defended the project of leaving the EU and the Eurozone, and refocused
her criticisms about the EU on the issue of immigration (Perrineau 2017). Similarly, Al-
ternative fur Deutschland, created in 2013 as a response to the Eurozone crisis, abandoned
the project that Germany should leave the Eurozone and return to the Deutsche Mark
(Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017; Paterson 2018).
My first hypothesis is that challenger parties reverse their usual EU strategy of issue
entrepreneurship after the referendum. Emphasising the issue is undesirable as Brexit
highlights the potential risks of their hard Eurosceptic positions. Instead, I argue that
challenger parties will largely seek to avoid Brexit in their communication. To be clear, I
am not saying that these challenger parties will suddenly become pro-European. Instead,
they are likely to abandon ‘hard’ calls for exiting the EU, and focus instead on ‘softer’
forms of criticism, such as demanding reforms or slowing down the process of integration.
My first hypotheses about the effect of Brexit on party competition in other member states
therefore read as follows:
5Institutions like the IMF and the Bank of England have already upgrade their outlook on Britain’s
economic future.
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H1: Challenger parties reverse their EU strategy from one of entrepreneurship to one
of avoidance after the Brexit referendum.
To be more precise, I argue that this reversal takes the following form:
H1a: Challenger parties moderate their Euroscepticism after the referendum.
H1b: The salience of Brexit relative to mainstream parties decreases after the referen-
dum.
5.4.3 Mainstream Party Strategies After Brexit
By contrast, the UK’s negative Brexit experience strengthens mainstream pro-European
parties’ hand when competing on Europe. These parties traditionally aim to avoid com-
peting on the issue, as EU integration is a wedge issue that can divide their voters. Fur-
thermore, EU integration is considered an issue ‘owned’ by challengers and mainstream
parties usually suffer when competing on these (Meguid 2005). However, the large shift in
public opinion makes emphasising their pro-Europeanism advantageous: it allows them to
demonstrate congruence with an electorate which is suddenly made aware of the benefits of
EU membership and the costs of the alternative state.
Brexit also gives mainstream parties an opportunity to go on the offensive and attack
Eurosceptic challengers. As an illustration of the costs of a policy challengers have long
campaigned for, it allows mainstream parties to make a wider point about the risks these
parties pose to stable, competent government. Indeed, Eurosceptic challengers such as le
Rassemblement National, the Swedish Democrats, the Danish People’s Party and the Dutch
Party for Freedom had all called for following the UK and holding their own referendum
when David Cameron first announced the UK government’s plans at his Bloomberg Speech
(Chopin and Lequesne 2020). As these parties also build their electoral appeal through an
anti-establishment rhetoric that ‘tells it like it is’ and ‘has firm convictions’, Brexit provides
an opportunity to criticise challenger parties if and when they moderate their stance.
Finally, Brexit also provides opportunities for more federalist pro-EU parties to push
for further integration. The UK’s obstructionism for integration in the field of security and
defence and fiscal capacity in Europe is well documented (see for example Buller 1995; Daly,
2019). Their departure therefore emboldens federalists to put these issues on the agenda
once more. My second hypotheses about the effect of Brexit on party competition on the
EU issue in other member states therefore read as follows:
H2: Mainstream parties reverse their EU strategy from one of avoidance to one of
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entrepreneurship after the Brexit referendum.
To be more precise, I argue that this reversal takes the following form:
H2a: Mainstream parties increase their pro-Europeanism after the referendum
H2b: The salience of Brexit relative to challenger parties increases after the referendum
5.5 Research Design
5.5.1 Original Data
To test the hypothesis about the reversal of party strategies after salient disintegration
episodes, I draw on an original dataset of Brexit statements in national parliaments. As
mentioned in the previous section, Brexit is the most high profile, substantial disintegration
episode to date, one that reverberated in public spheres across the EU. It is therefore a highly
pertinent case to test the impact of disintegration episodes in other member states. The
dataset covers parliaments in Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark.
Each of these parliaments included both mainstream pro-EU and Eurosceptic challenger
parties during the investigation period.
To identify Brexit statements I draw on the EUParlspeech dataset which captures EU
references in national legislatures (see Chapter 3). I identify Brexit statements through a
series of search strings from Walter and Martini (2020) and classify EU as Brexit statements
if they include any of these strings. These strings include mentions of ‘Brexit’ or the
presence of strings like the ‘UK’, ‘leave’ and ‘EU’ within five tokens of one another. The
Appendix contains the full list of search strings used to identify Brexit statements. I apply
this methodology to EU references made between 23 January 2013, when David Cameron
first announced in his Bloomberg speech the intention to renegotiate the UK’s membership
terms and put these to voters in a referendum; and the 31st December 2018, which is the
latest date in EUParlspeech dataset. I drop any Brexit statement made by non-Eurosceptic
challenger parties, as these parties historically do not mobilize on the EU issue as their
position is similar to that of mainstream parties6. Altogether the dataset contains a total
of 2,223 Brexit statements by pro-European mainstream parties (1,637 Brexit statements)
and Eurosceptic challenger parties (586 Brexit statements). I validate this methodology
with human hand coders, who were given a sample of 200 statements to code. This sample
included 80 randomly selected statements that the automated method classified as Brexit
6I identify parties’ EU position with the Capel Hill Expert Survey (CHES). I consider a party Eurosceptic
if they receive less than 3.5 on the ’EU position’ variable (see Rauh et al 2018). The Appendix also contains
a list of the parties classified as mainstream and those classified as Eurosceptic challengers
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statements, and 120 randomly selected EU references that the automated method did not
classify as Brexit statements. Handcoders are asked to code whether the statement made
reference to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The results demonstrates high levels of
accuracy (0.98), precision (0.938) and recall (1.000) (see Benoit 2014)7, confirming that my
automated, search string based classifier can identify Brexit statements with high levels of
accuracy.
5.5.2 Hand coding Brexit Statements
To classify these Brexit statements, I then use human hand coding, which is considered
the ‘gold standard’ of content analysis and is particularly desirable for nuanced coding
categories (Grimmer and Stewart 2013). Hand coders are asked to code Brexit statements
into two classification categories which together give a sense of the positions mainstream
and challenger parties are taking on Brexit and on European integration more widely. The
first category is the speaker’s Brexit Strategy, which captures the overall strategy pursued
by the speaker in light of the disintegration episode. The coding categories are developed in
an inductive manner, following methods emphasising rigour in thematic analysis (Fereday
et al 2006). Altogether, 15 different Brexit strategies are identified. The second category is
speaker’s EU tone, which captures the tone towards the EU specifically. This tone can be
negative, neutral, or positive.
Table 5.1 outlines the codes for the Brexit Strategy category8. For the purpose of testing
the article’s hypotheses, the explicitly pro-European and Eurosceptic Brexit strategies in
the first and third columns are of particular interest. As we are interested in a moderation
of Euroscepticsm (for challenger parties) and increase in pro-Europeanism (for mainstream
parties), I highlight the Brexit strategies that fall explicitly into these categories. Note
that to test H1, Eurosceptic Brexit strategies include harder or ‘exit’ forms of scepticism
such as following the UK (code 1). They also include ‘softer’ forms of Euroscepticism
(Taggart 2006) such as slowing integration (code 2), criticising the EU (code 3), emphasising
harm to the EU (code 4) and accommodating the UK in negotiations (code 5) . I expect
challenger parties to move from harder forms of Euroscpeticism (code 1) to softer forms of
Euroscepticism (codes 2, 3, 4, 5) after the Brexit referendum.
To test Hypothesis H2, the third column in Table 5.1 highlights the Brexit strategies that
are explicitly pro-European. I expect these to increase amongst mainstream parties after the
Brexit referendum. Finally, with regards to EU tone I expect challenger parties to use less
7Accuracy is the ratio of correctly predicted observation to the total observations. Precision is the number
of true positives over the true positives plus the false positives. Recall is the number of true positives over
the true positives and the false negatives.
8Note that the table excludes the ‘Other’ category (code 15).
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Table 5.1: Codes for Brexit Strategy category
Eurosceptic Strategies Non-positional Strategies Pro-EU strategies
Strategies that are Strategies that avoid Strategies that are
supportive of the UK’s position taking on Brexit. critical of the UK’s
disintegration bid and disintegration bid and/or
critical of the EU. defensive of the EU.
1. Follow UK: Follow UK 6. Orderly Brexit: 10. Harms UK
with unilateral renegotiations Prioritise a non Emphasise Brexit’s
and/or referendum disruptive UK withdrawal harm to the UK.
2. Slow Integration: 7. UK Remain: 11. Defend EU:
Demand reform in way Express desire for Defend EU achievements
that slows down integration UK to remain and unity of member
(e.g. shrink budget) (e.g. no cherrypicking) states.
3. Criticise EU: Use Brexit 8. Brexit Regret: 12. Criticise Populists:
as example of distant Express sadness Use Brexit as illustration
ineffective EU at the UK leaving of dangers of populism.
4. Harms EU: Emphasize 9. New Beginning: Use 13. Further Integration: Use
Brexit’s harm to Brexit as a new beginning Brexit as opportunity to
the EU Different from code 2 further integration.
and 13 as no explicit call
5. Accommodation: for more or less integration. 14. Non-Accommodation:
Accommodate the UK’s Refuse to make
disintegration bid concessions to the UK
(e.g. no cherrypicking)
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Table 5.2: Challenger Parties - Handcoded Brexit Statements
Speaker Brexit Statement Brexit EU Tone
Strategy
H.Linde It is still our conviction that it would have Follow Negative
Left Party benefited our country if Sweden had voted no the UK
Sweden in that referendum and not joined the EU.
But as long as we are members of the EU,
we work constructively in the Riksdag and
the European Parliament to develop the EU
in a more democratic direction. We therefore
believe that Sweden should follow the example
of the UK and initiate a process to renegotiate
our EU membership.
D.H. Bisschop Brexit is also a direct result of too far-reaching Criticise Negative
SGP integration, too far-reaching claims and too far- the EU
Netherlands reaching European arrogance. This lack of
awareness is the greatest threat to the survival
of the EU itself.
P.Boehringer Regarding Brexit: we call on the government to Slow Negative
AfD finally stop the constant increase in EU . Integration
Germany contributions The EU is seriously planning to
increase German contributions from 30 to 31
billion euros in 2018 to 45 billion euros per
year in the seven year plan.
J.Nissinen On the other hand, Minister of Finance Magdalena Accomodation Neutral
SD Andersson emphasised yesterday that it is important
Sweden that we oppose protectionism. The United Kingdom
has as I said in my speech, presented an action
plan to leave the EU in a reciprocal manner.
Then my question to the Social Democrats is this:
is the government prepared to accommodate Britain
in order not to create protectionism
and not to harm European trade?
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Table 5.3: Mainstream Parties - Handcoded Brexit Statements
Speaker Brexit Statement Brexit EU Tone
Strategy
D.Schlegel Much of it has already been mentioned: Brexit, Defend Positive
SPD the aftermath of the financial crisis, the high EU
Germany number of refugees and the rise of nationalists
and right wing populitsts. Nevertheless: Europe
is a success story and the European project is alive
Young people between Vienna, Warsaw, Budapest,
Lisbon, and also London appreciate peace
and freedom.
Van H. Buma But the world around us has changed. And Mr Criticise Neutral
CDA Wilders is now talking about becoming independent Populists
Netherlands and that we have to leave the European Union.
I wonder if he is aware of the fact that Britain
has been working on that since 2016, and that has
turned into one big drama.
D.Verhoeven It is fine that Cameron is proposing a reform of the Non Neutral
D66 European Union, but Europe should not let itself be Accomodation
Netherlands blackmailed by Britons who want to get the most out
of it. Membership of the EU is not a menu for us either.
Of course it is better if Great Britain remains a member,
but not at all costs.
P. Niemi I also strongly believe that the EU’s common Further Neutral
S foreign and security policy will become clearer, stronger, Integration
Sweden and more aggressive with Brexit and the accession
of the Trump administration.
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negative tone, and mainstream parties to use more positive language when discussing the
EU after the Brexit referendum. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide examples of these handcoded
Brexit statements, with Table 5.2 showing Brexit statements by challenger parties and table
5.3 showing Brexit statements by mainstream parties. These examples highlight the quality
of the automated translation.
5.5.3 Testing Hypotheses
Given the nature of the data, where statements are nested within speakers, which are nested
within parties, which are nested within countries, I use multilevel logistic regressions to test
the hypotheses statistically. Individual Brexit statements are my unit of observation and a
binary independent variable captures whether the statement is made before the referendum
date of 23 June 2016 (‘pre-referendum) or after that date (‘post referendum’). As Figure
5.1 has already shown, the UK’s Brexit experience was considered positive before the vote,
as Cameron successfully renegotiated the UK’s membership and with the UK remaining in
the EU seeming the most likely outcome. However, it turned immediately negative after the
vote, with the pound exchange rate against the Euro dropping steeply after the referendum
and remaining low in subsequent years.
To test the hypotheses about the relative salience of Brexit amongst mainstream and
challenger parties I capture and plot the number of Brexit statements made by each party
per semester, as well as the number of MPs who make at least one reference to Brexit.
I use semester rather than month or quarter, as parliaments are in recess during certain
months, and the lack of statements during these months can significantly skew the plotting
of longitudinal data. This allows me to create semester-panel data for each party with the
number of Brexit statements and number of Brexit speakers as the variable of interest.
5.6 Analysis and Results
To analyse the salience dedicated to Brexit by mainstream and challenger parties, I first
plot the number of Brexit statements made by both party types. Figure 5.2 shows how the
salience of Brexit amongst both mainstream and challenger parties is relatively low in the
years preceding the referendum, with little difference between party types. However, in the
aftermath of the vote the salience of Brexit unsurprisingly increases amongst both groups,
but particularly amongst mainstream parties. To test the hypothesis statistically, I run
an OLS model with FEs for countries and parties on two measures of Brexit salience: the
number of Brexit statements and the number of speakers who make at least one reference
to Brexit (Table 5.4). The results shows clearly how, unsurprisingly, parties speak more
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Figure 5.2: Number of Brexit Statements in National Parliaments
of Brexit after the referendum. What is more interesting are the effect sizes, which show
how the increase in salience is more substantial amongst mainstream parties than amongst
challengers. On average, and all else being equal, mainstream parties make an additional
42 statements per semester after the vote, compared to just 16 additional statements for
challengers. Similarly, an extra 11 speakers make a Brexit statement per semester after the
vote for mainstream parties, compared to an additional 4 speakers for challengers.
To demonstrate the differences in Brexit strategies before and after the referendum, I
plot in Figure 5.3 the share of statements that fall into the different categories for challenger
parties9. The legend colours reflect the Eurosceptic (purple) and pro-EU (blue) strategies
mentioned in the previous section. Figure 5.3 shows how challenger parties adopt less
explicitly Eurosceptic Brexit strategies after the referendum. Most noticeable is the large
drop in the share of statements in which Eurosceptic parties call for following the UK, either
by leaving the EU or a holding a membership referendum of their own. Whilst 45 per cent
of Brexit statements before the referendum results called for following the UK, only 4 per
cent of Brexit statements after the referendum result did the same.
9Note that for these histograms I drop the ‘Other’ coding category (code 16) which largely refers to
procedural descriptions of the negotiations.
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Table 5.4: OLS Regression Results - Mainstream and Challenger Parties
Mainstream Challenger
Brexit Brexit Brexit Brexit
Statements Speakers Statements Speakers
Post Referendum 41.714∗∗∗ 11.354∗∗∗ 16.034∗∗∗ 4.046∗∗∗
(6.128) (1.402) (2.711) (0.538)
Constant 45.417∗∗∗ 13.040∗∗∗ 14.853∗∗∗ 4.693∗∗∗
(7.642) (1.749) (3.381) (0.671)
Observations 60 60 60 60
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Instead, the focus of challenger parties after the referendum is to emphasise softer Eu-
rosceptic Brexit strategies such as slowing integration (28 per cent of statements), criticising
the EU (26 per cent) and pushing for accommodation of the UK in negotiations (22 per
cent). This transition from demanding a referendum to focusing on reform and accommo-
dation is perhaps best illustrated by Kristian Thulesen Dahl, leader of the Danish People’s
Party who in the run up to the referendum made multiple statements asking to follow the
UK (see statements 27, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35 and 97 in the dataset of Brexit statements). After
the vote however, he makes not a single reference to following the UK and focuses instead
on ensuring the UK is not ‘punished’ for its decision, stating for example in a speech to the
Folketing in December 2016 that “the Danish People’s Party has not proposed a Danish
withdrawal from the EU. Instead, the Danish People’s Party has proposed that it will work
actively to ensure that the United Kingdom, which has decided to withdraw from the EU,
gets a sensible agreement.”
Figure 5.4 plots the same histogram for mainstream parties. It shows that whilst the
level of soft Eurosceptic positions remains similar before and after the referendum, main-
stream parties significantly increase the share of their statements which can be characterised
as pro-EU. The proportion of statements defending the EU and achievements of European
integration doubles from 8 to 16 per cent, and whilst very few call for further integra-
tion before the referendum (2 per cent of statements), this increases significantly after the
referendum (8 per cent of statements).
Mainstream parties are particularly likely to use the referendum to attack populists both
122
Figure 5.3: Challenger Parties - Handcoded Categories
Figure 5.4: Mainstream Parties - Handcoded Categories
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at home and abroad. They are quick to criticise populists in the UK, whose “lies and smear
campaign have taken hold in the motherland of political debates, where judges are labeled
enemies of the people” (C.Muttonen, SPÖ, April 2017). They also use Brexit as a way to
attack populists in their own member state and ask them to clarify their position on the
EU. Emil Kallstrom from the Swedish Centre Party, for example criticised Ulla Anderson
from the Eurosceptic Left Party for her obfuscating stance on EU membership stating that
“the Left Party at least know not too speak loudly about the fact that they want to leave
the EU” (June 2018). More generally, mainstream parties use the UK’s negative Brexit
experience to make a wider point about the lies and incompetence of Eurosceptics in their
own country, as evidenced by Matthias Strolz, leader of the Austrian Liberal Party NEOS:
“When we voted in Austria in the nineties to be part of the EU, the right-wing nationalist
forces in Austria said that we shouldn’t do so because we would all have scale insects in our
yogurt and blood in our chocolate! Now I ask you: which of you has eaten blood chocolate
in the past few years and who has scale insects in their yogurt? Nobody!” (July 2016).
Multilevel logistic regression results in tables 5.5 (challenger) and 5.6 (mainstream)
confirm the hypothesis that Eurosceptic and mainstream parties respectively moderate their
Eurosceptism and increase their pro-Europeanism after the referendum. Challenger parties
are significantly less likely to call for leaving the EU after the referendum and instead are
more likely to criticise its functioning. They are also significantly less likely to use a negative
tone about the EU after the referendum. Mainstream parties are significantly more likely
to call for further integration, to defend the EU, and to criticise populists after the vote.
Finally, the results show how mainstream and challenger parties call for completely different
negotiation strategies with respect to the the UK. Mainstream parties are significantly more
likely to call for non-accommodation, whereas challenger parties are significantly more likely
to call for accommodation, which is likely to minimise economic harm to the UK and thus
make exit from the EU seem more desirable in the long term (Walter and Martini 2020).
Altogether these results corroborate the article’s central hypothesis. The exogenous
shock of Brexit significantly impacted on the strategies employed by mainstream and chal-
lenger parties on the EU issue. Challenger parties significantly moderated their Euroscepti-
cism and stopped demanding to follow the UK with a referendum of their own (their dom-
inant Brexit strategy before the referendum). Mainstream parties significantly increased
their use of pro-EU strategies such as defending the EU and demanding further integra-
tion, and went on the offensive, criticising Eurosceptic populists at home and abroad. In
the following discussion I contemplate the generalisability of the results and whether the
trends observed are likely to be a temporary or permanent fixture of party competition on
European integration.
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Table 5.5: Challenger Parties - Mixed Effect Logistic Regression Results
Brexit Strategy EU Tone
Follow Slow Criticise Accommodation Negative
UK Integration EU in Negotiations Tone
Post Referendum −3.477∗∗∗ 0.084 1.160∗∗∗ 1.750∗∗∗ −0.703∗∗
(0.578) (0.335) (0.440) (0.497) (0.273)
Constant −4.833∗∗∗ −1.611∗∗∗ −2.557∗∗∗ −4.442∗∗∗ 0.217
(1.734) (0.343) (0.447) (0.661) (0.318)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586
Country RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Speaker RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.6: Mainstream Parties - Mixed Effect Logistic Regression Results
Brexit Strategy EU Tone
Further Defend Criticise Non-Accomodation Positive
Integration EU Populists in Negotiations Tone
Post Referendum 1.771∗∗ 1.108∗∗∗ 0.854∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗ −0.043
(0.781) (0.364) (0.433) (0.001) (0.287)
Constant −5.810∗∗∗ −3.535∗∗∗ −5.182∗∗∗ −5.021∗∗∗ −2.558∗∗∗
(0.911) (0.440) (0.993) (0.001) (0.316)
Observations 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637
Country RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Speaker RE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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5.7 A Permanent Reversal?
The results above provide evidence that Brexit led to a reversal in EU party strategies
amongst mainstream and challenger parties in the years immediately following the refer-
endum. Mainstream parties reversed their strategy from one of avoidance to one of en-
trepreneurship, and challenger parties reversed their usual strategy of entrepreneurship to
one of avoidance and obfuscation. Yet given the evolving nature of Brexit it is worth consid-
ering whether the changes described are temporary or a more permanent reversal of party
strategy. In this discussion section, I argue that it is more likely to be the former for two
reasons.
First, the permanent reversal of party strategies depends on Brexit remaining salient
in public spheres outside of the UK. Scholars have shown that party and government re-
sponsiveness to public opinion is largely conditional on the issue being salient (see Wlezien
1995, 2004; Franklin and Wlezien 1997) and without remaining salient, Brexit fails to pro-
vide new information to publics and parties on the desirability of the status quo. To explore
the evolution of Brexit salience outside of the UK, I use Google Trends data. This data are
particularly appealing to capture salience, as they aggregate daily billions of instances in
which a particular term is searched on Google. Consequently, these searches can be consid-
ered good proxies for the public’s interests and concerns (Pahontu 2020; Choi and Varian
2012). Google does not reveal absolute levels of searches, rather it normalises search data
to facilitate comparisons between terms or regions. Figure 5.5 plots the Google Trends data
for the search term ’brexit’ relative to the UK, which is unsurprisingly the country with the
highest number of searches (ref = 100). The figure shows results for the year immediately
after the vote (June 2016 - June 2017) and the latest equivalent corresponding year (June
2020 - June 2021).
Figure 5.5 shows clearly how the salience of Brexit relative to the UK has dropped
over time. For example whilst the number of ‘brexit’ Google searches in Germany was
approximately a third of the number of ‘brexit’ searches in the UK for the period 2016-
2017, that figure had dropped to less than a fifth for the period 2020-2021. This shows
that whilst Brexit is likely to remain a pivotal issue for the UK for many years to come,
it is already receding as a priority in other member states, as other issues such as climate
change and the post-COVID economic recovery begin to dominate the EU agenda. As the
disintegration episode becomes less salient, it is therefore less likely to alter the strategies
employed by parties in other member states.
Second, I argue that a combination of the momentous economic hit of COVID-19, the
‘slow puncture’ nature of Brexit, and the bounded rationality of voters will make it harder
for them to estimate the impact of Brexit on the UK, and therefore the desirability (or not)
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Figure 5.5: Salience of Google searches for ‘Brexit’ relative to the UK
of their country’s alternative state outside of the EU. Indeed, whilst economists agree that
Brexit has already caused the UK significant economic harm10, this effect has been dwarfed
by the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, whose lost economic output escalates into trillions
of dollars worldwide (McKibbin and Fernando 2020). COVID-19, which has affected all
economies in the EU in similarly major ways, is likely to play an obfuscating stance when
it comes to evaluating the UK’s Brexit experience over the long run. Indeed, academics
have commented that disentangling the economic effects of Brexit from those of Covid-19
is ‘almost impossible’ and have suggested that Brexit will be a ‘slow puncture’ that harms
the UK’s economy gradually over the long term rather than the ’cliff edge’ Brexit many
commentators had predicted (Menon 2021; Grey 2021).
These confounding effects are particularly important to consider when combined with
the bounded rationality of voters (see Simon 1990). Bounded rationality asserts that deci-
sion makers want to make rational decisions, but cannot always do so because they suffer
from a number of biases that make it difficult to identify causal relationships. A range of
experiments have shown that people can make blatant errors when judging causal relations
(Alloy and Abramson, 1979; Allan and Jenkins, 1983; Lagnado and Sloman, 2015; Msetfi
10For example, studies published in 2018 estimated that the economic costs of the Brexit vote were 2.1
per cent of GDP (CEPR 2018)
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et al., 2007; Blanco et al., 2015). This is particularly the case when faced with multiple
confounders or if the effect of the policy is felt over the long run rather than shortly after
implementation. Whilst the short term effects of Brexit were clear, immediate, and nega-
tive; the longer term effects of Brexit are harder to discern, even when the evidence suggests
they might be just as harmful. This is likely to re-embolden challenger parties, who can
point to leaving the UK as something other than a complete disaster; and deter mainstream
parties, who can less obviously point to Brexit as a clear source of harm for the UK.
The results presented in this article have shown how party strategies on the issue of EU
integration are far from fixed and highly responsive to exogenous shocks. Nonetheless, on
balance, I expect that the patterns described are likely to be temporary state of affairs and
that a return to the more traditional patterns of EU party competition, where challengers
mobilise the issue and mainstream parties aim to obfuscate their stance, is more likely in
the medium term.
5.8 Conclusion
In the wake of the most significant EU disintegration episode to date, this article has con-
sidered whether Brexit led mainstream and challenger parties in other member states to
change their strategies when competing on the EU issue. My central argument is that the
UK’s negative experience revealed new information about the desirability of EU member-
ship, which made parties revise their calculus about the costs and benefits of mobilising
the issue. This led parties to reverse their usual strategies: challenger parties reversed their
usual strategy of entrepreneurship to one of avoidance, and mainstream parties reverse their
usual strategy of avoidance to one of entrepreneurship. However, I also argued that this
shift is likely to be temporary rather than permanent as Brexit declines in salience, and as
the monumental economic impact of COVID-19 combined with the bounded rationality of
voters obfuscates the negative economic impact of Brexit.
The article makes three contributions to the literature on party competition. First, it
adds to the body of evidence showing how Brexit strengthened the legitimacy of the EU
in the short term. Not only did it significantly public support for the EU (De Vries 2017)
and increase the cohesiveness of EU27 governments (Chopin and Lequesne 2020), it also
led mainstream pro-EU parties to clarify their stance on integration and go on the offensive
against populists. Second, the article has shown that party strategies on the EU issue are
not stable but dynamic and respond to events and circumstances outside of domestic public
spheres. Third, it shows that the advantage of issue ownership can quickly be reversed
when exogenous shocks lead to large changes in public opinion: in this case it suddenly
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led challenger parties’ strong Eurosceptic positions from being an electoral advantage to an
electoral liability.
Future research could explore these contagion effects in greater detail. The experience
of the British government in the aftermath of the referendum was shambolic and failed to
live up to the promises of Brexiteers. Yet more recently, as the EU muddled its vaccina-
tion procurement, the UK delivered the fastest vaccination rates in Europe, a success that
Brexiteers - somewhat disingenuously- put down to their new status outside of the EU.
This situation is a fascinating case study to test benchmarking theories of elite cueing and
public opinion formation towards European integration. As an illustration of the benefits
of EU withdrawal, has it emboldened nationalist populists to (re)advocate withdrawal from
the EU? How do pro-European elites balance criticism of the EU’s response to COVID-19
with the need to deter national populists from reigniting Eurosceptic public opinion? More
generally, the article invites scholars to consider how Brexit’s status as a ‘model’ for EU




Summary of Findings – Home Style and the EU’s Legitimacy –
Generalizability - Moving Forward - Revisiting Fenno
6.1 Summary of Findings
This thesis opened with the Eurocrat’s Complaint : the concern that governments’ evasive
and opportunistic presentation of European integration exacerbates the EU’s crisis of le-
gitimacy. This concern is articulated both by senior EU officials and scholars of European
integration, yet empirical evidence on how governments present the EU at home is limited.
In this thesis, I have made use of the advances in text as data and machine translation to
address this gap and present an original argument that challenges the stereotypical image
of governments as evasive, opportunistic blame shifters.
The central argument presented in this thesis is that governments - and the mainstream
parties that form them - face a rhetorical dilemma when it comes to presenting European
integration at home. On the one hand, the politicization of EU integration incentivises them
to signal responsiveness to more sceptical domestic audiences. On the other, the nationalist
home style which criticises and scapegoats Brussels is in fact a costly strategy because it
antagonises EU partners at the international level and risks antagonising the significant
part of the electorate which remains supportive of integration at the national level.
Instead, governments respond to the politicization of European integration by adopt-
ing a technocratic-patriotic home style. This home style is technocratic, in the sense that
governments actually talk frequently about the EU, but avoid clear position taking on the
issue by defusing it with complex language. And it is patriotic, in the sense that govern-
ments extensively claim credit for defending the national interest on the European stage,
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but in fact rarely blame or criticise the EU directly. My central explanatory variable is the
domestic politicization of European integration. When domestic EU politicization is high
(the EU is salient, public opinion is polarized, and Eurosceptic challengers mobilize the
issue at elections), national governments are more likely to adopt the technocratic-patriotic
home style. When domestic EU politicization is low, governments are more comfortable
adopting a Europeanist home style. The papers in this thesis are dedicated to testing the
observable implications of the technocratic-patriotic home style using original datasets of
EU communication by political elites. Below is a summary of the core findings.
Opportunistic Home Styles (Chapter 2):
- Heads of government rarely explicitly blame the EU, even when they face severe EU
politicization at home. Instead, they increase their use of credit claiming. See Figure 2.4
and Table 2.3.
- The EU does receives credit from governments, but for issues citizens care little about.
Governments claim credit for issues that are electorally salient. See Figure 2.5.
Evasive Home Styles (Chapter 4):
- Leaders of mainstream parties actually talk frequently about the EU, particularly when
they are in government. They also talk more about the issue when it has been mobilised
by challenger parties. See Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3.
- However they also send obfuscating cues on integration: their EU communication is
significantly more complex and technocratic than that of challenger parties. See Table 4.3.
Stable Home Styles (Chapter 2 and 4):
- Heads of government and leaders of mainstream parties consistently use more complex,
less emotive language when they talk about the EU compared to their usual parliamentary
communication. See Figure 4.4.
- Governments facing low domestic EU politicization consistently share credit with the
EU more than they claim credit themselves. Governments facing high domestic EU politi-
cization consistently claim credit more than they share credit. See Figure 2.4.
Dynamic Home Styles (Chapter 5):
- Exogenous shocks can lead to large changes in home style: politicians from mainstream
parties outside the UK - including members of government - adopt more Europeanist home
styles after the Brexit vote. See Figure 6.4 and Table 6.3.
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Collectively, these results overturn common conceptions about how governments and
parties present European integration in their domestic public spheres. Governments are not
the opportunistic blame shifters outlined in the Eurocrat’s Complaint. They talk frequently
about European integration in their domestic public spheres, and frequently share credit
with the EU and its institutions in the aftermath of major EU summits.
Conversely, we should also be wary of letting governments and ostensibly pro-EU main-
stream parties off the hook with respect to the legitimation of European integration. Gov-
ernments and mainstream parties may talk frequently about the EU, but they do so in
language which is complex, technocratic and ultimately difficult for citizens to grasp. And
whilst they do share credit with the EU, they do so for issues citizens care little about,
claiming credit for those that matter most. When Juncker claims that governments’ pre-
sentation of EU integration means “it’s no wonder anti-European tendencies are on the
rise” (Bild, 2019 - see Introduction), he may indeed have a point. In the following section
I consider the effects of the technocratic-patriotic home style on the legitimacy of the EU,
its institutions and the process of European integration more widely.
6.2 Home Style and the EU’s Legitimacy
If the Eurocrat worries so much about governments’ home style, it is because he understands
the centrality of home style to the legitimation of European governance. In this thesis’ intro-
duction, I outlined a threefold typology of home styles. For the Europeanist and the nation-
alist home style, their effects on the legitimacy of the EU are straightforward. Europeanist
home styles legitimize European integration with clear, supportive cues on integration and
by sharing credit with the EU for salient policy issues. Nationalist home styles delegitimize
European integration by failing to engage citizens in a meaningful discourse about EU in-
tegration and by scapegoating EU institutions. Yet the evidence presented in this thesis
shows that governments mainly adopt a technocratic-patriotic home style whose effects are
likely to be more nuanced. What are the implications of this technocratic-patriotic home
style for the legitimacy and legitimation of European integration?
6.2.1 Mechanisms of EU Legitimation
In this conclusion, I consider three mechanisms of legitimation and three mechanisms of
delegitimation that stem from the technocratic-patriotic home style. First, if successful,
this home style manages to depoliticize the process of European integration and place it
beyond the realms of political contestation. In many ways, this can be seen as the ultimate
form of legitimation. Institutions that are successfully placed beyond the realms of party
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politics, such as the army, the legal system, or independent central banks are more trusted in
public opinion surveys than those subject to democratic control (OECD, Eurobarometer).
Crucially though, the ability to do so depends on cross-party consensus. In her fascinating
history of EU legitimation discourses, Sternberg (2013) shows how attempts to depoliticize
the stakes of integration and EU action were consistently met by forces actively repoliticizing
them. De Wilde and Zurn also considered whether attempts by the Commission and member
state government to combat EU politicization are viable. They conclude not, as the high
levels of authority exercised by the EU, combined with incentives for challenger parties
to mobilize the issue make this an unlikely solution in the long term (2012). This isn’t
to say that the form of depoliticization described in the technocratic-patriotic home style
might not be an effective short term strategy when faced with crises. White for example,
shows how emergency politics and its technocratic discourse of exception allowed Europe’s
political elites to “advance and defend spectacular changes of lasting significance” (2015)
without the form of contestation usually seen from opposition parties. Yet overall, I am
personally sceptical that legitimation through depoliticization is a viable long term strategy
for the process of European integration.
Second, the technocratic-patriotic home style legitimises the EU by strengthening (per-
ceptions of) representation in EU policymaking. Scholars have provided convincing evidence
of responsiveness in the EU, both down the European route through the election of MEPs
in the Parliament, and down the domestic route through the election of governments in
the Council (Hagemann et al 2017; Wratil 2016). Yet citizens are often unconvinced that
governments or MEPs represent their preferences on the European stage: MEPs have low
levels of recognition in domestic public sphere and national media rarely cover votes in the
Council. By contrast, the media does pay attention to what governments - and in particular
national leaders - say about Europe. By emphasising the ways they defend and represent
the interests and priorities of their voters, national leaders crucially shape perceptions of
responsiveness and representation in EU policymaking. As the thesis’ introduction hope-
fully made clear, communication is central to the process representation and has often been
the missing link in representation studies of EU policymaking. The technocratic-patriotic
home style makes clear to the public what political scientists have known for a while: that
the electoral connection linking citizens’ views and EU policymaking is real. For that alone,
it is an important, potentially powerful mechanism in legitimising the EU as a functional,
responsive form of democratic government.
Finally, a linked - but distinct - mechanism of EU legitimation stemming from the
technocratic-patriotic home style is that it frames European integration according to the
national interest. Survey data shows consistently how European citizens feel a stronger sense
of attachment to their country than to Europe and framing EU institutions as venues where
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this national (rather than European) interest is pursued might well be one way to ensure
they remain legitimate in the eyes of voters1. Scholars have also argued that a ‘felt distance’
between EU institutions and the more confrontational nature of their own domestic politics
contributes to the EU’s democratic deficit (Follesdal and Hix, 2006). The technocratic-
patriotic home style shows that far from being a venue of consensus and backroom deals,
the EU is an arena of real political contestation where governments vigorously defend their
country’s views and interests on the European stage.
6.2.2 Mechanisms of EU Delegitimation
The technocratic-patriotic home style also triggers clear mechanisms of EU delegitimation.
Most obviously (and most worryingly) it damages democratic accountability in Europe’s
multilevel system of governance Democratic accountability, the process by which voters use
the ballot box to reward or punish incumbents for their performance, depends on voters
knowing where parties stand on issues. In a multilevel system, it also depends on voters
having a sense of which level of government is responsible for which issues. The technocratic-
patriotic home style poses problems for both.
First, the technocratic-patriotic home style damages accountability by obfuscating gov-
ernments’ stance on European integration. To make informed choices at the ballot box,
voters most know where parties, and perhaps most crucially governing parties, stand on
issues. But their use of complex, technocratic language to defuse European integration
makes it difficult to know their position (see also Bischof and Seninger 2018). Scholars have
outlined the risk of this form of depoliticization to democracy, particularly in the context of
global governance (Fawcett et al. 2015; Flinders, and Wood 2017). In his treatise on ‘Why
We Hate Politics’, Hay for example concludes that “disaffection and disengagement would
seem a most natural response to the conscious and deliberate depoliticization of democratic
governance” (2007).
Second, the technocratic-patriotic home style damages accountability by manipulating
attributions of responsibility in the EU. We already know that the division of competencies
across local, national, and international levels of governance make it difficult for citizens
to attribute responsibility correctly (see e.g. Anderson 2006). What this thesis has made
clear is that this problem is exacerbated by the opportunistic communication of national
executives. Governments may not be blame shifters but they are strategic in their com-
munication and reluctant to share credit with the EU for issues their citizens care most
about, even when the EU has clear competence in this area. Democratic accountability
1The counter argument is that this stymies the development of a European identity that many consider
necessary for legitimizing EU integration. See section 6.2.2 and Table 6.1
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depends on voters knowing who is responsible for what. The technocratic-patriotic home
style muddies these waters and manipulates attributions of responsibility to the advantage
of national executives and to the detriment of European institutions.
The technocratic-patriotic home style also risks delegitimizing the EU by leaving the floor
open for Eurosceptic challengers to frame the debate on Europe. In the absence of clear
cues from governments and mainstream parties, citizens who are increasingly interested in
EU politics are likely to seek cues elsewhere. Challenger parties are more than happy to
oblige. As Chapter 3 has shown, their EU communication is defined by simple and emotive
language which has been shown to significantly influence voters (Brader 2005; Wirz 2018;
Weeks 2015; Kuhne et al 2011). This general pattern was perhaps best illustrated in the
Brexit referendum, where a highly emotive Leave campaign outmanoeuvred a bloodless
Remain campaign that was consistently playing catch up (Shipman 2016). The outcome
serves as a stark reminder of the difficulties in combating stirring, emotive appeals with
complex, technocratic messages.
One final way the technocratic-patriotic home style fails to legitimize the EU is the re-
verse side of the third mechanism described in section 6.2.1. By framing European integra-
tion according to the national interest, governments stymie the development of a European
identity that many consider central to the legitimacy of the European project. Indeed, the-
orists have long recognised the importance of European identification (Reif,1993; Kaelbe,
2009) and that, in the words of Weber: “without identity, there can be no true, durable
legitimacy attached to a political entity” (1946). Despite hopes that further integration
would eventually lead to attachment with the new European community, this shift has
largely failed to occur: longitudinal survey data confirms that levels of European identifica-
tion have barely increased over time, and remain significantly lower than levels of national
identification. Scholars of identity formation have shown how socialization (Fligstein 2008)
and persuasion (Medrano 2009) play an important role in developing new identities, and
it strikes me that through their home styles, national governments and mainstream parties
have had opportunities to engage these channels for the development of European, as well as
national, pride and identification. They have, however, largely failed to do so (see Schmidt
2005). In particular, the unwillingness of governments to frame achievements as European
for the issues that matter most to citizens (see Chapter 2) seems to me a significant factor
in the (relative) lack of identification with the European project.
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Table 6.1: The Technocratic-Patriotic Home Style: Mechanisms of Legitimation and Dele-
gitimation
Mechanism of EU Legitimation Mechanism of EU Delegitimation
1. Places EU integration beyond 1. Damages Accountability in Europe’s
the realm of political contestation Multilevel System of Governance
2. Strengthens (perceptions of) 2. Leaves floor open for Eurosceptic
representation in EU policymaking. challengers to frame debate.
3. Frames EU integration according 3. Stymies development of
to the national interest. a European identity
Table 6.1 summarises the mechanisms of EU legitimation and EU delegitimation de-
scribed in this section. Whilst my hunch is that the mechanisms of EU delegitimation
dominate, as social scientists we owe it to ourselves to rigorously test the causal effects of
our descriptive inferences. Through conjoint and vignette experiments, future research can
discover whether and how the technocratic-patriotic home style legitimizes or delegitimizes
the process of European integration. Indeed, I consider this question the priority for future
research, an agenda which I develop in further detail later on in the conclusion (section 6.4).
6.3 The Generalisability of Home Style
One central remaining question concerns the generalisability of the micro-level findings.
This thesis is effectively an extended comparative study of how governments and parties
in Europe present the EU at home. I believe this focus was necessary given the intensity
of debates about the politicization and legitimacy of the EU, but it is worthwhile to con-
sider the external validity of these findings, and in particular whether they travel to other
international organizations (IOs).
6.3.1 Home Style beyond the EU
Are the findings presented in this thesis - in particular governments’ adoption of technocratic-
patriotic home styles - generalisable to other IOs beyond the EU? Whilst this question un-
doubtedly merits further empirical scrutiny (see section 6.4), I argue first and foremost that
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home style is a useful concept to apply when studying legitmation of global systems of gover-
nance and international insitutions more broadly. Home style in global governance matters
for much of the same reasons that home style in the EU does. The lack of transnational
public spheres (see Nanz and Steffek 2004) means citizens receive most of their information
from domestic rather than international actors. Scholars have shown that cues from gov-
ernments are more credible, and thus more effective in shaping legitimacy beliefs, than cues
from international institutions (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2020). And bureaucratic elites from
IOs frequently admonish governments in a manner similar to the Eurocrat’s complaint. In
a recent interview for example, professor Kickbusch from the World Health Organization
admonished governments for “throwing blame about” and “scapegoating the WHO” during
the COVID-19 crisis (2020).
Furthermore, the central explanatory variable in this thesis - the domestic politicization
of international cooperation - is not limited to the EU. Indeed, a wide range of IOs such as
the IMF, the WTO, the WHO and the World Bank are also contested domestically and face
challenges to their legitimacy (Zurn 2004, 2014, 2018; Zurn and Ecker-Ehradt 2014; Zurn et
al 2012; Rixen and Zangl, 2012; Stephen and Zurn 2019). And whilst a growing literature
explores how IOs legitimize themselves in the face of this politicization (Ecker-Ehrhardt
2018; Zurn 2014, Dellmuth 2018), at least as important a factor in the legitimation of
global governance is how governments legitimize IOs in their own domestic public spheres.
Naturally there are many IOs, most of them small and largely irrelevant to the electoral
fortunes of national governments. The most authoritative source to date, a dataset from
the Correlates of War (COW) project, outlines 561 international organizations between
1815 and 2005 (Pevehouse et al 2020). Governments are hardly going go be rewarded for
‘bringing back the bacon’ from the World Tourism Organization or the Intergovernmental
Organisation for International Carriage by Rail (OTIF). However, I do expect governments
to adopt the technocratic-patriotic home style under certain scope conditions. To be pre-
cise, I would expect national governments to adopt a technocratic-patriotic home style in
international organisations that meet the following criteria:
1. The IO is politicized in domestic public spheres.
2. The IO deals with issues that are salient to domestic electorate.
3. The IO has been legitimised through diverse narratives (not just problem-solving)
4. Domestic public opinion towards the IO is divided rather than universally sceptical.
Conditions 1 and 2 are fairly straightforward. Without this politicization, governments
are comfortable adopting what we might call a broadly ‘internationalist’ home style, sharing
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credit with the IO and its members. Conversely, if the IO has competence for issues that
matter to domestic electorates, governments will face pressure to ‘bring back the bacon’ for
these issues. These two conditions are related. Scholars have argued that it is precisely the
delegation of salient issues to IOs that leads to their politicization (Zurn 2014).
Condition 3 requires more explanation. A growing literature explores the legitimacy of
IOs and argues that IOs are not legitimised simply through institutional mechanisms such
as the elections of governments but also through various legitimation ‘narratives’ (see Bern-
stein, 2011; Brassett and Tsingou, 2011; Dellmuth and Tallberg 2014, Zurn 2014). These
narratives can emphasise the problem-solving capacity of the IO, or be more normative,
emphasising features such as fairness or participation (Rauh and Zurn 2020). The intu-
ition is that governments will have less qualms about criticising an IO whose legitimation is
based purely on problem-solving competence, compared to IOs who have been legitimized
through more diverse narratives. Indeed, if the IO’s legitimacy is based purely on perfor-
mance then it can be fairly criticised if and when its performance is lacking. In practical
terms, what this means is that governments are likely to be more reluctant to criticise an IO
like the UN, whose legitimation has been built on emotive narratives emphasising ‘keeping
peace throughout the world’, ‘developing friendly relations among nations’, and ‘conquer-
ing hunger, disease and illiteracy’ (UN charter) than one like the IMF whose legitimacy is
built on achieving dry economic goals such as ‘fostering global monetary cooperation’ and
‘securing financial stability’ (IMF Charter)2.
Condition 4 refines my definition of IO politicization. Crucially, politicization is not
about public opinion towards the IO being being universally unpopular, but divided. If
domestic public opinion is universally aligned against the IO, governments will have little
qualms in adopting a more nationalist home style. This has been the case for several IOs
in the past: for instance, surveys have shown how two thirds of Argentinians held negative
views of the IMF in 2018 (Wilson Center). This condition also explains why governments
with reelection constituencies that are universally sceptical of international cooperation are
likely to adopt nationalist home styles. President Trump, for example, whose voters are
aligned in their criticism of IOs, explicitly attacked NATO, the United Nations, the WHO,
and the WTO during his time in office. Table 6.2 presents a typology of home styles in
international institutions, with candidate IOs for each. Naturally, cross-national differences
in the domestic politicization of different international institutions means home styles with
vary considerably across counties and across IOs, but overall the table provides a good
summary of my thinking on the generalisability of home style.
2The intuition behind this argument is corroborated by research showing that IOs adopt more diversified
legitimation narratives (i.e. less focused on problem-solving justification) when they face higher levels of
politicisation (Rauh and Zurn 2014)
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Table 6.2: Home Styles in International Organizations
Home Style Internationalist Technocratic-Patriotic Nationalist
Description Government defends Government claims credit Government criticises
IO and shares credit for actions in the IO but and shifts blame
with international avoids clear position taking onto the IO.
partners. on the IO itself.
Most Likely IOs that are not lOs that are IOs that are
Amongst.. politicised and/or benefit politicised and have universally unpopular
from widespread been legitimized through at home.
domestic support diverse narratives (normative
as well as problem solving).
Candidate IOs African Union World Bank IMF
NATO UN (certain agencies)
Questions naturally remain. Is the relationship between home style and IO legitima-
tion similar to the mechanisms described in section 6.2? In the absence of the electoral
connection, what explains the home styles of governments from authoritarian regimes? I
see the abundance of questions raised by home style as reflections of the richness of the
concept rather than its limitations, and remain convinced that home style is useful to un-
derstand not simply the legitimation and delegitimation of the EU, but the legitimation
and delegitimation of global governance more widely.
6.3.2 Home Style Beyond Mainstream Parties
This thesis has focused on the home style of governments drawn from mainstream parties.
Yet a large literature illustrates the growing electoral success of nationalist populists in
Europe, many of whom advocate explicit Eurosceptic positions (Cudde 2007; Goodwin and
Eatwell 2014). Are the results presented across the papers - particularly the reluctance of
governments to adopt nationalist home styles that are openly critical of the EU - gener-
alisable to populist leaders? First - and this is important to point out - whilst national
populists have undoubtedly improved their electoral fortunes in the twenty first century,
this electoral success has only rarely translated into government experience (Hobolt and
De Vries 2020). Potential coalition partners are often put off by these parties’ extreme
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positions, and in certain cases they are themselves reticent to enter government in order to
preserve their anti-establishment credentials (Mair 2007). Figure 6.1 plots the number of
pro-European (above 5.5 on the CHES), Euroagnostic (between 3.5 and 5.5 on the CHES)
and Eurosceptic (below 3.5 on the CHES) heads of government in the EU’s member states
since 2004. It shows how despite the increased vote share of populist parties, heads of gov-
ernment continue to be overwhelmingly made up of the mainstream, broadly pro-European
parties that have dominated party competition in the twentieth century. This thesis has
therefore focused on mainstream parties because the story of home style is the story of how
mainstream party leaders - those who overwhelmingly form and lead governments - present
Europe to domestic audiences.
With that being said, a small minority of national populists such as Viktor Orbán
(Fidesz, Hungary) or Mateusz Morawiecki (Law and Justice, Poland) have managed to form
governments and maintain power as heads of government. Do these governments adopt the
nationalist home styles that mainstream party leaders have been so reluctant to adopt?
Whilst these questions merit further empirical scrutiny, I argue that national populists in
government face their own version of the rhetorical dilemma of home style presented in the
thesis’ introduction. Figure 6.2 illustrates public opinion towards the EU in each of the EU’s
27 member states. It shows that in the two states currently led by explicitly Eurosceptic
heads of government, public opinion is actually significantly more supportive of the EU
than in other member states. This suggests that these Eurosceptic heads of state also have
to tread carefully when presenting European integration in their domestic public spheres:
Brussels-bashing (which their instincts and preferences point toward) may in fact antagonize
a large part of the electorate, which has benefited economically from membership to the
EU (Belka 2013). Even for leaders of populist Eurosceptic parties, adopting the nationalist
home style is far from a costless rhetorical strategy.
For both leaders of mainstream and Eurosceptic populist parties then, the rhetorical
dilemma of home style stems from a disconnect between leaders’ preferences and the pref-
erences of voters on the EU issue. Leaders of mainstream governing parties (particularly in
Western Europe) are significantly more supportive of integration than their more sceptical
voters. Leaders of Eurosceptic governing parties (particularly in Eastern Europe) are sig-
nificantly more sceptical of integration than their more supportive voters. To be clear, I do
think national populists are more likely to adopt a nationalist home style than their main-
stream counterparts. However, on entering government they face their own difficulties and
constraints - including their own rhetorical dilemma of home style. I would posit that this
rhetorical dilemma pushes them - on the whole - to adopt patriotic rather than nationalist
home styles.
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Figure 6.1: Senior Governing Parties in the EU
Figure 6.2: Public Opinion Towards the EU
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6.3.3 Home Style Across Venues
Finally, one could question whether the thesis’ findings travel to other communication
venues beyond press conferences after EU summits (Chapter 2) and parliamentary debates
(Chapters 3 to 5). To be more precise: could governments not be reluctant to criticise or
blame the EU at press conferences in Brussels, but revert to more nationalist home styles
when back in the comfort of their own member state?
To be clear, the argument presented across this thesis is not intended as venue-specific.
I believe a general theory of home style is possible and important, and one that does not
travel well to multiple communication venues would not be particularly useful. Whilst
the nationalist home style is particularly costly when governments present the outcome of
summits, the central argument is that it remains costly even at home because of the divided
(not universally sceptical) nature of domestic public opinion on the EU. Studies of home
style in domestic contexts also corroborate the view that elected representatives adopt home
style that are remarkably consistent across venues (Grimmer 2010, 2012). Fenno himself
noted the consistency with which representatives presented their message as one of the most
of his most surprising findings (1978).
To go beyond corroboration from existing research, I provide additional, original evi-
dence for the consistency of home style across venues. If it is indeed the case that we should
expect more blame shifting outside the spotlight of EU summits, then national legislatures,
as a purely domestic communication venue, seem like an obvious place we might observe it.
To test this hypothesis, Figure 6.3 uses EUParlspeech to plots the difference in the share
of negative sentiment by heads of government in their EU communication and their total
communication. Whilst more negative EU communication could not be considered definite
evidence of blame shifting towards the EU3, a lack of meaningful difference between the
two would suggest that the EU isn’t particularly used as a scapegoat by national lead-
ers. As ‘most likely’ cases, I include leaders from countries where we might expect blame
shifting due to high levels of Euroscepticism and successful Eurosceptic challenger parties:
Austria, the UK, and the Netherlands. Figure 6.3 shows that there is no meaningful dif-
ference between the amounts of negative language used by national leaders when they talk
about Europe, compared to their usual parliamentary communication. In fact, they are
likely to use less negative language when talking about the EU. Combined with what we
already know about the consistency of home styles in domestic settings, this suggest that
the findings in this thesis travel across venues.
3This would also require attribution of responsibility for the negative situation, which is notoriously
difficult to capture with automated methods - see Chapter 2.
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Figure 6.3: Heads of Government Use Less Negative Language when Talking About the EU
Where I do think venues are likely to make a significant difference is the through the
role of the media. As a gatekeeper, media plays a key function in filtering down the home
style of national governments into the cues that eventually reach citizens, and therefore
shape their public opinion. In fact, I consider home style in the media, together with the
consequences of home style, and home style in global governance to be the three central
avenues for further research. I outline these in more detail in the section below.
6.4 Moving Forward
The findings in thesis bring a new set of questions and an agenda for further research.
Naturally, testing the generalisability of the results to other IOs, populist parties, and other
venues is important, but I will limit myself to three avenues that I consider most pressing and
- crucially - most feasible given the methods and data currently available to social scientists.
First, future research should explore the consequences of home style for legitimacy beliefs
in the EU. This thesis has outlined in detail how governments present European integration
and why they present it this way, and the conclusion has hinted at possible consequences
for the legitimacy of the EU. Testing these mechanisms through rigorous social science
experiments is key though, and I consider it the priority for further research. Encouragingly,
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conjoint and vignette experiments provide a cost-effective way of isolating the effects of elite
cues on legitimacy beliefs, and is in fact a method that has been used previously to estimate
the effect of government cues on the legitimacy of IOs (Tallberg and Dellmuth 2020). What
is particularly interesting about testing the consequences of the technocratic-patriotic home
style is that the experimental cueing literature4 largely test the effect of clear positional cues.
Yet this thesis has shown that governments often employ deliberately obscure language
to avoid taking clear positions, a strategy that we know is also widespread in domestic
politics (see Rovny 2012, 2014). Investigating the consequences of the technocratic-patriotic
home style will therefore yield insights not only into how governments shape the popular
legitimacy of the EU, but also about the consequences of obfuscation more widely.
A second important avenue for further research is home style in the media. By media,
I refer both to mass media, which remains influential in framing debates despite falling
circulation, and social media, which politicians increasingly use to communicate directly
with voters. Home style in the media matters so much because as a gatekeeper (see Shoe-
maker and Vos 2009) media filters the home style of national governments into the cues that
reach citizens every day, and ultimately shape their public opinion. Whilst this thesis has
provided valuable insights into what governments and parties directly say about Europe,
it is less clear which of these messages directly reach citizens. Indeed, the often long press
conference statements from EUCOSpeech are usually boiled down into a handful of key
quotes by publications with their own incentives and agenda. Exploring home style in the
media could explain one of the puzzles uncovered in this thesis, namely why EU bureaucrats
are so convinced of the prevalence of nationalist home styles, whilst my data reveals that
Brussels-bashing is in fact rare. I would posit that the media is central to this explanation.
Whilst statements explicitly blaming the EU are rare, they are particularly likely to be
picked up by journalists who welcome the chance to inject drama and conflict to the often
dry process of EU politics (Riise 2015). Using the validated dictionaries of EU level terms
developed in this thesis, in combination with databases of media reporting like LexisNexis
would be an excellent starting point and provide a rich dataset to explore the link between
home style, the cues that eventually reach citizens, and public opinion towards the EU.
A third, immediately actionable avenue for further research concerns home style in global
governance. As section 6.3.1 has suggested, the concept of home style is not limited to the
EU and seems important to other international institutions, particularly those that face
questions about their legitimacy. The first step here would be to develop a list of global
governance terms that can then be used to identify references to international cooperation
in various communication venues, in a method similar to that employed for EUParlspeech.
This should incorporate not only the names of IOs but other forms of international cooper-
4‘Experimental’ in the sense that it uses experiments to identify the causal effects of cues.
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ation such as major international treaties and trade agreements. Existing datasets, such as
the Correlates of War (COW) data or the UN’s list of multilateral treaties provide a usual
starting point. As Rauh and De Wilde (2018) have noted this is an inherently collective
activity, one that can lead to intense debates about what and what not to include. Whilst
no list can ever be definite (and indeed as all quantitative models for text are ‘wrong’ - see
Grimmer and Stewart 2013), creating first a dictionary, and then a dataset of references to
international cooperation in national legislature should be possible for a group of motivated
and linguistically diverse researchers. This would allow scholars to explore differences in
home style not only across countries, but also across IOs, and should provide them with
the means to eventually develop and rigorously test a more general theory of home style in
global governance.
6.5 Revisiting Fenno
Classics have a habit of rearing their head in surprising new ways. This thesis has adapted
Fenno’s classic concept of ‘home style’ to a new era and environment, one where significant
political authority has shifted beyond the nation state and where citizens are represented
in these international institutions by their governments. Home style in national politics
is central to representation in domestic policy making and to the legitimation of domestic
institutions (see Grimmer 2010, 2013; Fenno 1978). Likewise, home style in the European
Union is central to representation in European policy making and to the legitimation of the
EU and its supranational institutions.
Fenno’s work concludes with a plea to the Congressmen he had spent weeks observing
and fraternising with. Through his time in town halls and public forums across the country,
he grew concerned with a phenomenon that has since been labeled ‘Fenno’s Paradox’: that
whilst individual Congressmen are popular, Congress is not, and members rarely (if ever)
speak up for their institution. Fenno understood that democratic legitimacy is fragile, and
that through their home styles, the Members he observed so closely risked delegitimizing an
institution that Americans desperately needed for the functioning of their political system.
Given the events of the past year, where protestors in January 2021 stormed the US Capitol
in a violent and shocking attack, his warning seems all the more prescient and poignant and
is worth quoting in full. The emphasis added in italics is my own:
“From our home perspective it appears that most members of Congress have
enough leeway at home, if they have the will, to educate their constituents in
the strengths, as well as the weaknesses, of their institution. They have more
leeway than they allow others - even themselves - to think. They can, in other
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words, identify themselves with their own institution even at the risk of taking
some responsibility for what it does. They can, that is, if they will view the
trust of their supportive constituents as working capital - not just to be hoarded
for personal benefit but to be drawn on, occasionally, for the benefit of the
institution. It will be a risk. But by taking that risk, they avoid a possibly
greater risk: that Congress may lack public support at the very time when the
public needs Congress the most.”
It is difficult not to see the parallels with the EU and with global systems of governance
more widely. The largest issues of our day, from climate change to global inequality, traverse
national borders and cannot be solved without forms of international cooperation. Yet the
ability of IOs to solve these issues is challenged by their lack of public support. Legitimacy
will be central for IOs’ long- term capacity to deliver and make a difference in world politics.
This legitimacy is likely to be built and rebuilt not simply through the ways international
institutions legitimise themselves in the face of contestation, but through the way national
governments present, explain and defend international cooperation in their own domestic
public spheres: their home style.
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Appendix A1
This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 2 (Credit Claiming in In-
ternational Organizations: Evidence from EU Council Summits).
A1.1 Descriptive Statistics
The table below presents the descriptive statistics for the data collected for the article.
It includes the national leaders of France, Germany, the UK, Ireland, Denmark, Spain,
and Greece. Overall, the dataset consists of 6,012 statements (paragraphs) taken from 414
speeches by twenty-three national leaders in the aftermath of EU summits.
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Country Speakers Speeches Statements Source Time period
France Macron, Hollande 43 548 elysee.fr 12.2005 - 03.2018
Sarkozy, Chirac
Germany Merkel 74 725 bundeskanzlerin.de 12.2005 - 03.2018
UK Blair, Brown, 51 659 parliament.uk 03.2005 - 03.2016
Cameron
Ireland Varadkar, Kenny 61 1,092 oireachtas.ie 12.2005 - 06.2018
Cowen, Ahern
Denmark L.Rasmussen, 52 703 ft.dk 10.2006 - 10.2018
Thorning-Schmidt,
A.Rasmussen
Spain Zapatero, Rajoy, 83 1,524 lamoncloa.gob.es 03.2005 - 10.2018
Sanchez








Thank you for helping to code EUCOSpeech, a dataset of statements in speeches by na-
tional leaders communicating the outcomes of European Council (EUCO) summits to their
national media and national parliaments. This codebook explains how to code these state-
ments. Whilst your coding will be done in English, the statements you are presented with
(in column G) will be in the language for which you are a native speaker (German, Greek,
French, Danish, Spanish).
Please code directly into the EXCEL file, where speeches have already been divided
into separate statements. Note that the first and last paragraphs of each speech have been
removed from the text corpus when these simply refer to introductions and conclusions
of press conferences. A ‘statement’ refers to an individual paragraph in leaders’ speeches.
Occasionally, due to the way in which speeches were collected, you may encounter clear
formatting errors, for example a sentence that suddenly cuts off halfway through a state-
ment. In these rare cases please correct and re-format the statement by merging it with
the relevant cell and mentioning this in column J (dedicated to notes). Generally speaking,
please leave the statements in the format in which national leaders have presented them.
The EXCEL file contains nine columns. Your role is to code Attribution in column H
and Policy Issue in column I after reading the full statement (in the original language) in
column G.
A1.2.1 Coding Attribution (Column H)
In Column H, we would like you to code the statement’s attribution of responsibility. Re-
sponsibility can be attributed for both positive outcomes (credit) and negative ones (blame).
Responsibility can also be attributed to one’s self (e.g. claiming credit) or to others (e.g.
sharing credit or shifting blame). We would like you to categorise the statements according
to one of the four categories below. There are further details on each of these categories,
with examples, later on in the codebook:
When coding statements, please take into account the following:
• When coding statements, please base your evaluation on what national leaders are
communicating at face value, rather than on any subtext based on your knowledge of
the country. For example, you may think that a statement has Eurosceptic undertones,
but if the speaker is not explicitly criticising the EU, and /or its institutions then it
should not be coded as an instance of blame shifting.
• Classification categories are mutually exclusive. Occasionally, there will be statements
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Credit Credit Blame Descriptive
Claiming Sharing Shifting (No Attribution)
Statements where Statements where Statements where Statements where
governments explicitly governments explicitly governments explicitly there is no explicit
credit themselves, credit the EU, its criticize the EU, its attribution for credit or
their government or institutions, or other institutions and/or blame for a positive or
their country for member state(s) for another member state negative situation
positive outcomes or positive outcomes for negative outcomes
decisions. or decisions or decisions.
that you feel contain more than one of the attributions identified above. In this case,
use your personal judgement and knowledge of the native tongue to decide what
seems to be the dominant tone of the message (e.g. is this more an instance of credit
claiming, or more an instance of credit sharing).
• When coding, please consider both retrospective and prospective attributions of re-
sponsibility. For example, “we will overcome the economic crisis thanks to the EU”
should still be coded as instances of credit sharing. Likewise, statements such as “I
will continue to fight to defend my country’s national interest on the European stage”
should be coded as an example of credit claiming).
• Generally, when defining codes, let your decisions be guided by parsimony and reliabil-
ity. The rest of this section provides more detailed descriptions of the four categories
for classification, and examples of statements for each.
i) Credit Claiming
Our first category refers to statements where national leaders credit themselves, their
government, or their country for a positive intervention, action or outcome. This includes,
but is not limited to:
• National leaders highlighting their influence on the international stage by putting an
item on the agenda and/or making an important contribution or intervention in the
meeting
• National leaders claiming to achieve their country’s desired outcome through their
negotiations with European partners
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• National leaders using communication on the international stage to highlight their
domestic achievements. This may be by benchmarking themselves against other Eu-
ropean member states (e.g. showing that their economic growth rate is the highest in
continent)
• National leaders communicating how an idea they have defended over the long term
has become an EU policy
• National leaders explicitly highlighting their or their member state’s leadership or
contribution on specific issues in EU policymaking
Examples:
“So, I welcome the steps that Eurozone countries are committing to take today, but I
have also said that Britain isn’t in the Euro, Britain isn’t going to be joining the Euro, and
so it is right that we shouldn’t be involved in the Euro area’s internal arrangements. That
is why I secured in December a commitment which carves Britain out of future Eurozone
bailout arrangements, and why we are not joining the pact that the Euro area countries
have agreed today.” (D.Cameron (UK) 2015/1)
“For this reason, Spain has insisted from the beginning that this European Council
takes decisions with real impact on three issues that I consider fundamental: unemployment,
especially that of our young people; the financing of our small and medium enterprises, and,
thirdly, the Banking Union. I know that this last issue is not easy for people to understand,
but believe me it is fundamental to restore the flow of credit to the real economy.” (M.Rajoy
(ESP) 2013/1)
”In the area of Defense, we have agreed on the European Defense Fund’s pilot project
and the launch of the European intervention initiative on 25 June in nine countries, including
France and Germany. This is a proposal I had personally made at La Sorbonne last autumn
and Europe is thus endowed with real strategic capacity, and autonomy.” (E.Macron (FR)
2018/6)
“What contribution has the Government of Spain made? The Government of Spain has
made the following contribution: we have put the issue of the banking union firmly on the
agenda, we have to talk about the financial system, but we also have to start talking about
the fiscal union.” (P.Sanchez (ESP) 2018/6)
ii) Credit Sharing
Our second category refers to statements where governments credit the EU, its institu-
tions and/or other member states for positive outcomes or decisions. This includes, but is
not limited to:
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• National leaders highlighting Europe’s or the EU’s leadership in a particular policy
domain
• National leaders congratulating the European Council or the EU collectively for de-
cisions and actions (not simply discussions) on the European stage
• National leaders explicitly highlight benefits brought by the EU and/or European inte-
gration. This includes historical achievements such as peace or prosperity, democracy
in Europe’s sphere of influence etc
• National leaders thanking, congratulating or praising the work of the EU’s institutions
or its representatives or employees, for example the president of the Commission, the
High Representative etc.
• National leaders jointly claiming credit with another member state (for e.g. national
leaders from France and/or Germany Franco-German alliance)
Examples:
“The Council welcomed the outcome of the G8 summit on combating climate change,
in particular, the commitment to the UN process and reducing emissions by at least 50 per
cent by 2050. This is an area where the European Union is providing real global leadership
and will continue to do so.” (B.Ahern (IRL) 2015/3)
“This is, in the end, the crucial prize. It is important that we take action here in
Britain, as tomorrow’s climate change Bill will show. It is critical for the EU then to show
leadership, as it did at the summit in a remarkable and ground-breaking way. For those who
doubt the relevance of the European Union to today’s world, last week’s Council meeting
and its historic agreement on climate change is the best riposte. It shows Europe following
the concerns of its people, and giving real leadership to the rest of the world.” (T.Blair
(UK) 2007/7)
”At this summit, Europe has really come together on Libya. Today’s conclusions
endorsed the UN resolution agreed last week. They set out Europe’s determination to
contribute to that implementation of that resolution and the conclusions also recognise
that lives have been saved by the action we have taken so far.” (D.Cameron (UK) 2011/3)
“I am grateful to the Commission and would like to extend thanks to President Juncker
for the speed and quality of their proposals on migration. That so many people come to us,
shows that the distress in the world is great that there are terrible wars that drive people
to flee, and other horrible situations in many countries, where people are forced to flee from
great suffering out.” (A.Merkel (DE) 2015/10)
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”The value of the European Union once again becomes clear. This is a crisis that comes
from the United States, from the financial system of the United States, and it is a crisis that
will be overcome thanks to the European Union, its coordination capacity and its leadership
capacity.” (J.Zapatero (ESP) 2010/10)
iii) Blame Shifting
Our third category refers to statements where governments criticize, express frustration
at, or blame the EU, its institutions and/or other member state(s). This includes, but is
not limited to
• National leaders communicating their disappointment or frustration at the outcomes
of a summit, or of slow progress on particular issues
• National leaders expressing that an EU decision or policy will harm their member
state and/or Europe as a whole
• National leaders criticising and questioning the benefits of European integration more
widely
• National leaders ‘blaming Europe’ for a negative outcome or issue
Examples:
”That’s the frustration. But that leads me on to frankly the downright anger about
something that has come about at this European Council. And that is the completely
unjustified and sudden production of a bill for Britain of 1.7 billion pounds, over 2 bil-
lion euros, that is apparently supposed to be paid by 1st December. This is completely
unacceptable.” (D.Cameron (UK) 06/2014)
”The Council nominated to vote Jean-Claude Juncker as the next president of the
European Commission. Britain and Hungary opposed. We must accept the result and
Britain will now work with the Commission president, as we always do, to secure our national
interest. But let me be absolutely clear, this is a bad day for Europe. It risks undermining
the position of national governments. It risks undermining the power of national parliaments
and it hands new power to the European Parliament. It is therefore important that the
European Council has agreed today to review what has happened and to consider how we
handle the appointment of the next Commission president next time around.” (D.Cameron
(UK) 08/2014)
iv) Descriptive (No Attribution)
Our fourth category refers to statements where none of the above is present. These will
largely be descriptive statements, where there is no attribution for credit and blame. This
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includes, but is not limited to”
• National leaders listing the policy issues and items that were discussed and/or noted
in the EUCO meeting
• The announcement of a policy or decision without clear attribution for responsibility,
nor an explanation of how the decision will benefit Europe or a member state,
• Expressions of desired actions or desired policy outcomes, rather than ones that have
have actually been taken (e.g. Europe ‘must’ or ‘should’ do something)
• National leaders announcing that the European Council has discussed, made a state-
ment on a policy issue or reaffirmed its stance on said issue
Examples:
“We have a mandate for the spring summit, which is to develop a strategy to secure
the energy supply. This is related to communications that the Commission will be doing
on energy policy in early January. As far as the foreign policy agenda is concerned, the
issues of Kosovo, Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa were on the agenda.” (A.Merkel
(DE) 2015/3)
“In addition to those issues of international security and development, the Council con-
clusions and the special declaration on globalisation set out the challenges that the European
Union must address on globalisation. We agreed to maintain our focus on economic reform,
with a renewed focus on modernising the single market so that it enhances Europe’s ability
to compete in the global economy. We must continue to work towards further liberalisa-
tion in energy, post and telecoms, where market opening could generate between 75 billion
and 95 billion euros of extra benefits and contribute 360,000 jobs. Investment in research,
innovation and education—and removing barriers to enterprise—are also essential.”
“Discussions also touched on the recent conference on the western Balkans migratory
route and on the upcoming Valletta summit. This latter summit will aim to find agreement
with African partners in a fair and balanced manner on how to tackle the root causes of
the crisis, how to support development, how to provide for effective return and readmission
and how to dismantle the criminal networks that are exploiting this situation and putting
lives in danger. The European Council noted the importance of funding for international
efforts to support refugees in Turkey and other countries. (E.Kenny (IRL) 2015/3
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A1.2.2 Coding Policy Issue (Column I)
In Column I, we would like you to code the statement according to the 15 policy issues men-
tioned below. This includes all the policy issues from the Eurobarometer’s ‘Most Important
Issue’ survey question, plus two additional ones. These additional policy issues are:
• EU Affairs: for issues that relate to the internal workings and functioning of the
EU and its intuitions – for e.g. Treaty Negotiation, the EU budget, appointment of
Commissioners, discussions of other EU institutions (e.g. Parliament), etc
• N.A.: statements where no policy issues are mentioned at all, or where so many
are mentioned that it makes it impossible to pick just one (e.g. “today the Council
discussed the economy, the environment, taxation, and energy”)
Classification categories are mutually exclusive. As the EU has competencies in certain
areas more than others, and because the EUCO has a rather focused agenda (see Alexan-
drova, 2014; 2016) you will notice that certain policy issues (e.g. the Economic Situation,
Foreign Affairs . . . ) come up more than others. Some of the policy issues above may not
come up at all. As when coding attribution in column H, you may also encounter state-
ments that cover more than one policy issue. In this case use the same approach: use
your personal judgement to decide what seems to be the main policy issue mentioned in
the statement. The table below reuses the examples from Section I of the codebook, and
shows how statements could be coded for both Attribution and Policy Issue. Your job is to
recreate something similar in the attached Excel. Thanks so much for your help!
A1.2.3 Notes(Column J)
Column J is reserved for notes. Feel free to use this column for anything you would like to
bring to the attention of the researcher, but there are two notes in particular we would like
to capture:
• If you have coded column H as Credit Sharing, and the unit being credited is not the
EU or one of its institutions but another member state please use this column to note
which member state(s) is (are) being credited
• If you have coded column H as Blame Shifting, and it is not the EU or one of its
institutions being blamed but another member state, please note which member state
is being blamed /criticized.
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Policy Issue Likely topics / keywords
Economic Growth, Eurozone, economic policy, monetary policy,
Situation crisis, saving, investment, free trade
Foreign Affairs/ Peace, war, Libya, Balkans, EU enlargement,
Defence Afghanistan
Environment and Green, climate, CO2, climate, global warming
Climate Change
Immigration Schengen, refugees, migrants, migration, smugglers
Unemployment Jobs, unemployment, jobless, employment, work
EU Affairs Lisbon, budget, QMV, MFF, Commissioner, President
Government Debt Debt, deficit, Stability Growth Pact
Terrorism Terror, attack, ISIS,
Taxation Tax, Revenue,
Education Schools, Universities, Research
Health and Social Welfare, health, age, welfare state
Security
Rising Prices/ Cost of living, inflation, prices,
Inflation
Pensions Retirement, savings, pensions
Energy Supply, gas, energy,
N.A. n.a.
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A1.4 Interrater Reliability Tests
Interrater reliability tests were conducted over three rounds, with one handcoder coding the
statement in its original language, and the other handcoder coding the translated statement
(into English). The handcoders were PhD students at the London School of Economics
who were also native speakers of the language (so for example, a French native speaker
coded the statements by French leaders, a Greek native speaker coded the statements by
Greek leaders etc). The codebook was tweaked after each round following discussion with
the handcoders. The table below presents the results of Krippendorf’s alpha and Cohen’s
kappa. These results correspond to ’substantial’ agreement amongst coders (Landis and
Koch 1977). Overall 920 statements were coded by two hand coders, which is just over 15
per cent of the total sample of 6,012 statements
Country Number of Krippendorf’s a Krippendorf’s a Cohen’s k Cohen’s k
statements for Attribution for Policy Issue for Attribution for Policy Issue
France 100 0.72 0.80 0.69 0.76
UK 110 0.85 0.84 0.78 0.78
Germany 120 0.75 0.73 0.70 0.73
Denmark 110 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.73
Spain 220 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.81
Ireland 150 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.74
Greece 110 0.71 0.79 0.67 0.70
Total 920 0.78 0.81 0.74 0.76
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A1.5 Robustness Tests: Fixed Effects Regression Results
Dependent variable:
Claim Share Claim Share Claim Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Partisan 0.028∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ 0.040∗ −0.035∗
Euroscepticism (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.021) (0.021)
Public 3.165∗∗∗ 0.192 2.125∗∗ 0.976 1.406 1.559
Euroscepticism (0.900) (0.806) (1.016) (0.930) (1.161) (1.061)
Issue 1.046∗∗∗ −0.541∗∗∗ 1.427∗∗∗ −0.554∗∗∗
Salience (0.178) (0.187) (0.201) (0.200)
Public Trust −0.864∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗ −0.902∗∗ 0.863∗∗ 0.483 0.688
in Government (0.315) (0.307) (0.354) (0.345) (0.448) (0.440)
Governing Party −0.262∗∗∗ −0.181∗ −0.560∗∗∗ −0.013 0.393 0.217
EU position (0.098) (0.105) (0.118) (0.120) (0.263) (0.308)
Governing Party −0.005 −0.203∗∗∗ −0.118∗ −0.095∗ −0.100 −0.037
EU dissent (0.053) (0.048) (0.062) (0.054) (0.114) (0.122)
Rotating −0.267 0.713∗∗∗ −0.418∗ 0.582∗∗∗ −0.275 0.584∗∗∗
Presidency (0.209) (0.174) (0.244) (0.209) (0.255) (0.220)
Unemployment −0.057∗∗∗ 0.019 −0.058∗∗∗ 0.020 −0.030 0.009
(0.018) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.024) (0.023)
Election Year 0.098 −0.248∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.189∗∗ −0.026 −0.173∗
(0.085) (0.084) (0.097) (0.095) (0.103) (0.098)
Constant −2.257∗∗∗ 1.026 −0.115 −0.444 −6.082∗∗∗ −1.986
(0.815) (0.819) (0.962) (0.943) (1.807) (2.068)
Observations 5,943 5,943 4,544 4,544 4,544 4,544
Country Fixed Effects (7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leader Fixed Effects (21) No No No No Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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A1.6 Robustness Tests: Random Effects Regression Results
Dependent variable:
Claim Share Claim Share Claim Share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Partisan 0.026∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ 0.031∗∗ −0.018∗∗
Euroscepticism (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009)
Public 2.685∗∗∗ 0.768 1.604 1.765∗ 0.204 2.080∗∗
Euroscepticism (0.908) (0.821) (1.026) (0.938) (1.083) (0.970)
Issue.Salience 1.047∗∗∗ −0.562∗∗∗ 1.349∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.186) (0.196) (0.191)
Public Trust −0.847∗∗∗ 0.586∗ −0.877∗∗ 0.676∗∗ 0.179 0.558
in Government (0.312) (0.305) (0.351) (0.345) (0.406) (0.387)
Governing Party −0.257∗∗∗ −0.210∗∗ −0.538∗∗∗ −0.081 0.152 −0.096
EU position (0.096) (0.103) (0.116) (0.120) (0.193) (0.149)
Governing Party −0.014 −0.199∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗ −0.103∗∗ −0.023 −0.096
EU dissent (0.052) (0.047) (0.061) (0.052) (0.084) (0.062)
Rotating −0.261 0.712∗∗∗ −0.410∗ 0.574∗∗∗ −0.283 0.593∗∗∗
Presidency (0.209) (0.174) (0.243) (0.208) (0.252) (0.214)
Unemployment −0.045∗∗ −0.0001 −0.044∗∗ −0.009 −0.007 −0.016
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Election Year 0.088 −0.236∗∗∗ 0.018 −0.171∗ −0.051 −0.153
(0.085) (0.083) (0.097) (0.095) (0.101) (0.096)
Constant −0.894 0.813 1.086 −0.229 −2.905∗∗ −0.225
(0.811) (0.795) (0.955) (0.927) (1.378) (1.119)
Observations 5,943 5,943 4,544 4,544 4,544 4,544
Country Random Effects (7) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Leader Random Effects (21) No No No No Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Issue Salience 1.427∗∗∗ −0.545∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.197)
Public Trust −0.016 0.818∗∗
in Government (0.446) (0.366)
Governing Party −0.266 −0.027
EU Position (0.194) (0.125)
Governing Party −0.028 −0.114∗∗










Country Fixed Effects (7) Yes Yes
Leader Random Effects (21) Yes Yes
Summit Random Effects (86) Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Appendix A2
This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 3 (A New Dataset of Over
1 Million References to European Integration in Parliamentary Speeches).
A2.1 List of Tokens used to Develop EUParlspeech
This section provides a list of tokens used to identify references to European integration.
The tokens in English, German, Spanish, and Dutch are drawn from Rauh and De Wilde
(2018). The initial German dictionary was developed by Rauh (2015) who developed the
dictionary by reading one verbatim record of a plenary debate with an explicit EU issue on
the agenda and one without such an agenda in each year of the investigation period. Each
term-level EU reference found was then stored in the dictionary. Afterwards, the individual
terms were generalised by regular expressions to include all possible inflections, plurals and
derived compound terms possibly used in the German language.
The tokens in Czech, Danish, Swedish, and Greek were developed using the same
methodology as Rauh and De Wilde (2018). That is to say, that Rauh’s initial dictio-




Table A2.1: List of English tokens (House of Commons and Dail Eireann)
european constitutional treaty; rome treat(y/ies); maastricht treat(y/ies);
amsterdam treat(y/ies); nice treat(y/ies); lisbon treat(y/ies);
ec; economic and monetary union; eec; emu; eu; euratom; european integration; european unification;
european cooperation; european communit(y/ies); european economic communit(y/ies);
european atomic energy communit(y/ies); european institution(s);
european project(s); european treat(y/ies); single european act;
treat(y/ies) of rome; treat(y/ies) of maastricht; treat(y/ies) of amsterdam;
treat(y/ies) of nice; treat(y/ies) of lisbon;
treaty establishing a constitution for europe; ecb; ecj; ep; european official(s);
european union ; european civil servant(s); european executive;
european politics; european polic(y/ies); european central bank; european commission(er);
european competenc(e/es/ies); european council; european court of justice; european election(s);
european level(s); european member state(s); european parliament; european procedure(s);
european summit(s); mep(s); policy on europe; csdp; esdp; common foreign and security polic(y/ies);
common security and defence polic(y/ies); european security and defence polic(y/ies); eurozone;
euro zone; euro area; cfsp; european act(s); european bill(s); european law(s);
european legislation(s); european statute(s); european aim(s); european goal(s);
european target(s); european decision(s); european directive(s);
european engagement(s); european guideline(s); european measure(s); european action(s);
european provision(s); european prescription(s); european requirement(s);
european allowance(s); european standard(s); european norm(s); european market;
european agenda(s); european budget(s); european fund(s); european fond(s);
european programme(s); european regulation(s); european strategie(s); european case-law;
european jurisprudence; european legal; european single market; european internal market;
european currency; european mandate(s); police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters;
single currency; stability and growth pact; europe’s constitutional treaty; ec’s; eec’s; eu’s; euratom’s;
european union’s; european ([a-z]*){0,1} integration; european ([a-z]*){0,1} unification
Table A2.1 (Continued): List of English tokens (House of Commons and Dail Eireann)
european ([a-z]*){0,1} cooperation; european ([a-z]*){0,1} polic(y/ies);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} act(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} bill(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} law(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} legislation(s)
european ([a-z]*){0,1} statute(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} aim(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} goal(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} target(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} decision(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} directive(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} engagement(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} guideline(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} measure(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} action(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} provision(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} prescription(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} requirement(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} allowance(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} standards; european ([a-z]*){0,1} norm(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} agendas; european ([a-z]*){0,1} budgets;
european ([a-z]*){0,1} fund(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} fond(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} programme(s); european ([a-z]*){0,1} regulation(s);
european ([a-z]*){0,1} strateg(y/ies); european ([a-z]*){0,1} union;
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Table A2.2: List of Spanish tokens (Congreso)
unión europea; comunidad europea de la enerǵıa atómica; comunidad económica europea
comunidad(es) europea(s); ue; cee; euratom; tratado(s) constitutivo(s); tratado de maastricht
tratado de ámsterdam; tratado de niza; tratado de lisaboa; tratado de roma; tratado de fusión
tratado de funcionamiento; acta única europea; tfue; tue; aue; constitución europea
tratado por el que se establece una constitucion para europa; tratado constitucional
ampliación de la ce; ampliaciónes de la ce; unión económica y monetaria; uem; proyecto europeo
proyecto común europeo; unificación europea; integración europea; marco institucional de la ce
instituciones europeas; constitución europea; comisión europea; parlamento europeo; consejo europeo
banco central europeo; comisario(s) europeo(s); funcionario(s) europeo(s); ejecutivo europeo
elecciones europeas; eurodiputado(s); consilium; tjue; bce; poĺıtica europea; mandato europeo
alto representante de la unión para asuntos exteriores; competencias de la ce
poĺıtica exterior y de seguridad común; cooperación policial y judicial; presupuesto europeo
programa(s) europea(s); regulación(es) europea(s); reglamento(s) europeo(s)
reglamento(s) europeo(s); norma(s) europea(s); objetivo(s) europeo(s); medida(s) europea(s)
instrumento(s) europeo(s); estándar(es) europeo(s); cooperación(es) europea(s); derecho europeo
directiva(s) europea(s); reglamento(s) europeo(s); reforma(s) europea(s); normativa(s) europea(s)
compromiso(s) europeo(s); estrategia(s) europea(s); poĺıtica europea de seguridad y de defensa
esdp; pcsd; ordenamiento juŕıdico europe(o/a); jurisdicción europe(o/a);
procedimiento de infracción; cuestión prejudicial; moneda(s) europea(s); moneda única;
moneda común europea; zona euro; eurozona; zona del euro; fondo europeo;
pacto de la estabilidad y de crecimiento; mercado(s) ([a-z]*){0,1} europeo(s);
agenda ([a-z]*){0,1} europea; legislación(es) ([a-z]*){0,1} europea(s); ley(es) ([a-z]*){0,1} europea(s)
derecho(s) ([a-z]*){0,1} europeo(s); procedimiento(s) ([a-z]*){0,1} europeo(s)
procedimiento legislativo europe(o/a)
Table A2.3: List of Dutch tokens (Tweede Kamer)
europese unie; europese economische gemeenschap(pen); europese gemeenschap(pen);
europese atoom gemeenschap(pen); eu; eg; eeg; euratom; e(u/g)-verdrag(en); europese verdrag(en);
verdrag(en) van rome; verdrag(en) van maastricht; verdrag(en) van amsterdam; verdrag(en) van nice;
verdrag(en) van lissabon; rome-verdrag(en); maastricht-verdrag(en); amsterdam-verdrag(en);
nice-verdrag(en); lissabon-verdrag(en); europese eenheidsakte; europese grondwet;
grondwet voor europa; e(u/g)-uitbreiding; europese monetaire unie; europese project(en);
europese integratie; europese eenwording; europese samenwerking; e(u/g)-institutie(s);
europ(ese/ees) institutie(s); economische en monetaire unie; emu; europees grondwettelijk verdrag;
e(u/g)-commissie; europese commissie; e(u/g)-commissaris(sen); europese commissaris(sen);
e(u/g)-ambten(aar/aren); europese ambten(aar/aren); europese executive; europ(ese/ees) parlement(s);
e(u/g)-parlement; ep; (europese/eg/eu) verkiezingen; (euro/eu-/eg-)parlementarier(s);
raad van ministers; europese president; (eu/eg)-voorzitter(schap); europese raad; (eu/eg)-top;
euro(pese) top; e(u/g)-lidst(aat/aten); europ(ees/ese) hof van justitie; europ(ees/ese) gerechtshof;
europese centrale bank; ecb; hoge vertegenwoordiger van de unie voor buitenlandse;
europ(ees/ese) beleid; europ(ese/ees) niv(o/eau); e(u/g)-niv(o/eau); europ(ees/ese) proces(sen);
europ(ees/ese) besluit(vorming); e(u/g)-bevoegdheid(en); europese bevoegdh(eid/eden);
europ(ese/ees) mand(aat/aten); gemeenschappelijke markt;
europ(ese/ees) buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid; politiële en justiële samenwerking in strafzake;
gemeenschappelijk(e) veiligheids- en defensiebeleid; evdb;
gemeenschappelijk(e) buitenlands- en veiligheidsbeleid; vweu; europese munteenheid;
gemeenschappelijke munt; eurozone; stabiliteits- en groeipact; ecb-[a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*;
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Table A2.3 (Continued): List of Dutch tokens (Tweede Kamer)
e(u/g)-([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}beleid; europ(ees/ese) ([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}beleid;













e(u/g)-([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}recht(spraak / sorde ); e(u/g)-([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}richtlijnen(en);
europese ([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}richtlijnen(en); e(u/g)-([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}verordening(en);
e(u/g)-([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}beslissing(en); europese ([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}beslissingen;
e(u/g)-([a-zèëéê̈ıöü]*){0,1}besluit(en / vorming(sprocess(en)); e(u/g)-[1-9]{1,2};




Table A2.4: List of Swedish tokens (Riksdag)
europeiska unionen; europeiska gemenskaperna; europeisk gemenskap; eu; eg; eu:s; eg:s;
europeiska konstitutionella fördraget; europas konstitutionella fördrag; romfördrag(et/en);
maastrichtfördrag(et/en); amsterdamfördrag(et/en); nicefördrag(et/en); lissabonfördrag(et/en);
ekonomiska och monetära unionen; europeiska ekonomiska gemenskap(en/erna);
europeiska ekonomiska samhällen; eeg(:s); beuratom(s); europeisk integration;
europeisk enhet; europeiskt enande; europeiskt samarbete;
europeiska atomenergi(gemenskapen/samhällen/gemenskaperna); europeisk(a) institution(er);
europeisk(a/t) projekt; europeiska fördrag(et); europeiska unionens; enda europeisk handling;
europeiska enhetsakten; romfördrage(t/n); maastrichtfördrage(n/t); fördrag i maastricht;
amsterdamfördrage(n/t); fördrag av trevligt; nicefördrage(n/t); trevliga fördrag;
lissabonfördrage(n/t); fördrag(et) om upprättande av en konstitution för europa;
europeiska centralbanken; ecb; (europeiska/eu-)domstolen; (europa/eu-)parlamentet; ep;
europeisk(a) tjänsteman; europeisk politik; europeisk(a) kommission(en/ar); eu-kommission(en/ar);
europeiska kommissionärer; europeisk kompetens; europeisk befogenhet; europeiska kompetenser;
europeiska befogenheter; eu:s befogenheter; europeiska r̊adet; europeiska domstolen;
europeiska vale(n/t); eu-val(en); europeisk verkställande direktör; europeisk(a) niv̊a(er);
europeisk(a/t) medlemsländ(erna); europeiska förfarande(n/t); (europeiska/euro/eu-)toppmötet
medlem(mar) av det europeiska parlamentet; ledamot(er) av det europeiska parlamentet
eu-parlamentariker; politik för europa; (europesik/gemensam) utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik;
(europeiska/gemensam) säkerhets- och försvarspolitiken; euroomr̊adet; eurozone(n);
gusp; (europeisk/eu-)politik; europeisk(a) handling(ar); europeisk förteckning; europeisk(a) lag(ar);
europeisk(a) lagstiftning(ar); europeisk(a) stadg(ar); europeisk(t/a) m̊al(et); europeisk(a/t) beslut(et);
(eu-/europeisk(a/t)) direktiv(et); europeisk(a/t) engagemang; europeiska uppdrag; europeisk(a) riktlinje(r);
europeisk(a) åtgärd(er); europeisk(a) bestämmelse(r); europeisk(a/t) recept; europeisk(a) föreskrift(er);
europeiska recept; europeiska föreskrifter; europeisk(a/t) krav(et); europeisk ersättning;
europeisk(a) utsläppsrätt(er); europeisk(a) standard(er); europeisk(a) norm(er);
europeisk(a) budget(ar); europeisk(a) fond(er); europeisk förtjust; europeisk(a) fond(s);
europeisk(a/t) program(met); europeisk(a) regler(ing(ar)); europeisk(a) strategi(er);
europeisk rättspraxis; europeisk jurisprudens; europeisk laglig; europeiska inre marknaden;
europeisk(a) valut(a/or); europeisk(a/t) mandat(et); polis- och rättsligt samarbete i brottm̊al;
polissamarbete och straffrättsligt samarbete; gemensam valuta; stabilitets- och tillväxtpakten;
europeiska dagordning(ar/en);
Table A2.5: List of Danish tokens (Folketing)
europæiske union; europæisk(e) fællesskab(er); eu(s); ef(s); europæisk forfatningstraktat;
europas forfatningsmæssige traktat; romtraktaterne; maastrichttraktaterne; amsterdamtraktaterne;
nicetraktat(en/erne); lissabontraktat(en/er); økonomiske og monetære union;
europæiske økonomiske fællesskab; eøf(’s); euratom; euratom; europæisk integration;
europæisk forening; europæisk samarbejde; europæisk atomenergifællesskab;
europæiske atomenergifællesskab; europæisk(e) institution(er); europæisk(e) projekt(er);
europæisk(e) traktat(er); europæiske unions; europæiske fælles akt; traktat om en forfatning for europa;
europæisk centralbank; ecb; eu-domstolen; europæiske union domstol; europa-parlamentet;
ep; (europæisk(e)/eu) embedsmand; europa politik; europæisk(e) kommiss(ion/aer(er);
europæisk(e) kompetence(r); europæiske r̊ad; der; eu-domstolen; europæisk niveau;
europæiske niveauer; europæiske medlemslande; europæisk procedur(er); europæisk(e) topmøde(r);
europaparlamentsmedlem; mep; fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik; fusp;
europæisk(e) udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik; fælles sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik;
europæisk(e) sikkerheds- og forsvarspolitik; europæiske love; europæisk(e) lovgivning(er);
europæisk lov; europæiske vedtægter; europæisk(e) m̊al; europæisk(e) beslutning(er);
europæisk(e) direktiv(er); europæisk(e) engagement(er); europæisk(e) retningslinje(r);
europæisk(e) foranstaltninge(r); europæisk(e) handlinger; europæisk(e) bestemmelse(r);
europæisk angivelser; europæiske krav; europæisk(e) standard(er); europæisk(e) norm(er);
europæisk(e) dagsorden(er); europæisk(e) budget(ter); europæisk(e) fond(e); europæisk(e) program(mer);
europæisk regulering; europæisk(e) strategi(er); europæisk retspraksis; europæisk juridisk;
europæiske indre marked; det europæiske indre marked; europæisk(e) valuta(er);




Table A2.6: List of Greek tokens (Hellenic Parliament)
Table A2.7: List of Czech tokens (Poslanecká sněmovna)
evropsk(á/é) uni(e/i); evropsk(á/é) společenstv́ı; evropsk(á/é) komunit(a/y); eu; es;
ř́ımsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y); maastrichtsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y); smlouv(a/y) z nice; nicejsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y);
lisabonsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y); hospodářská a měnová unie; hmu; evropsk(á/é) hospodářsk(á/é) společenstv́ı;
euratom; evropsk(á/é) společenstv́ı pro atomovou energii; evropsk(á/é) integrace; evropsk(é/á) sjednoceńı;
evropsk(á/é) spolupráce; evropsk(é/á) instituce; evropsk(ý/é) projekt(y); evropsk(á/é) smlouv(a/y);
jediný evropský zákon; ř́ımská smlouva; smlouvy ř́ıma; maastrichtská smlouva; smlouvy z amsterdamu;
smlouva zakládaj́ıćı ústavu pro evropu; smlouva o ústavě pro evropu; evropsk(á/é) centrálńı banka; ecb;
evropský soudńı dv̊ur; esd; evropský parlament; ep; evropsk(ý/á) úředn(́ık/ice); evropšt́ı úředńıci;
evropský státńı úředńık; evropšt́ı státńı úředńıci; evropsk(á/é) politik(a/y); evropsk(á/é/ý) komis(e/ař);
evropšt́ı komisaři; evropsk(á/é) kompetence; evropsk(á/é) rada; evropsk(á/é) volby; evropsk(á/é) exekutiva;
evropsk(á/é) úroveň; evropsk(ý/á/é) člensk(ý/é) stát(y); evropsk(ý/á/é) postup(y);
europoslan(ci/ec); europoslankyně; společná zahraničńı a bezpečnostńı politika;
společná bezpečnostńı a obranná politika; evropská bezpečnostńı a obranná politik(a/y); eurozóna; szbp;
evropsk(ý/á/é) zákon(y); evropsk(á/é) účty; evropsk(á/é) právo; evropsk(á/é) legislativ(a/y);
evropsk(á/é) stanovy; evropsk(ý/é) ćıl(e); evropsk(á/é) rozhodnut́ı; evropsk(á/é) směrnice;
evropsk(á/é) závazky; evropsk(ý/á/é) pokyn(y); evropsk(á/é) opatřeńı; evropsk(á/é) akce;
evropsk(é/ý) předpis(y); evropsk(é/ý) požadav(ek/ky); evropsk(é/ý) př́ıspěv(ek/ky);
evropsk(á/é) norm(a/y); evropsk(á/é) agend(a/y); evropsk(é/ý) rozpoč(et/ty); evropsk(é/ý) fond(y);
evropsk(á/é) ústavńı smlouva; ehs; evropsk(ý/á/é) summit(y);
evropsk(á/é) právńı předpisy; evropsk(á/é) angažovanost;evropská zahraničńı a bezpečnostńı politik(a/y);
evropsk(á/é) ustanoveńı; evropsk(é/ý) standard(y);
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Table A2.7 (Continued): List of Czech tokens (Poslanecká sněmovna)
evropsk(é/ý) program(y); evropsk(á/é) nař́ızeńı; evropsk(é/á) strategie; evropsk(á/é) judikatura
evropsk(á/é) jurisprudence; evropsk(á/é) právńı; evropský jednotný trh; evropský vnitřńı trh
evropsk(á/é) měn(a/y); evropsk(ý/á/é) mandát(y); policejńı a soudńı spolupráce v trestńıch věcech;
jednotn(á/é) měna; pakt o stabilitě a r̊ustu; jednotný evropský akt; eurokomisařk(a/y); eurokomisařk(y/i);
řádný legislativńı postup; evropsk(é/ý) akt(y); evropsk(é/ý) návrh(y) zákon(a/̊u); evropsk(é/ý) záměr(y);
evropsk(é/ý) závaz(ky/ek); evropská činnost; evropský požadav(ek/ky); evropsk(é/ý) př́ıspěv(ek/ky);
evropsk(á/é) regulace; evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} politik(a/y); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} uni(i/e);
evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} akt(y); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} zákon(a/̊u/y);
evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} ustanoveńı; evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} ćıl(e); evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]*){0,1} záměr(y);
evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} ćıl(e); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} rozhodnut́ı; evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} směrnice;
evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} závaz(ek/ky); evropsk(ý/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} pokyn(y);
evropská ([a-z]*){0,1} činnost; evropsk(é/y/á) ([a-z]*){0,1} předpis(y);
evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]*){0,1} př́ıspěv(ek/ky); evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]*){0,1} standard(y);
evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]*){0,1} agend(a/y); evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]*){0,1} rozpoč(et/ty);
evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]*){0,1} program(y); evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]*){0,1} regulace;
evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} legislativ(a/y); evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]*){0,1} opatřeńı;
evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]*){0,1} požadav(ky/ek); evropsk(á/é) ([a-z]*){0,1} norm(a/y);
evropsk(é/ý) ([a-z]*){0,1} fond(y); evropsk(é/á) ([a-z]*){0,1} strategie;
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Table A2.8: List of German tokens (Bundestag)
europäisch(e/en/er) union; europäisch(e/er/en) gemeinschaft(en);
europäisch(e/er/en) atom gemeinschaft(en); europäisch(e/en/er) wirtschafts gemeinschaft(en);
eu; eg; ewg; euratom; e(u/g)-vertrag(s/es); vertrag von (amsterdam/maastricht/nizza/lissabon);
vertrag(s/es) von (maastricht/amsterdam/nizza/lissabon); (lissabonner/amsterdamer) vertrag(s/es);
einheitlich(e/en/er) europäisch(e/en/er) akte; römisch(e/en) verträge; aeu-vertrag(es/s);
eu-verfassung(svertag(es)); europäisch(e/en/er) verfassung(svertrag(s)); e(u/g)-erweiterung(en);
europäisch(e/en/er) währungsunion; europäisch(e/en) projekt(s/es); europäisch(e/en/er) einigung;
europäisch(e/en/er) integration(sproze(ss/ß)(e/es)); e(u/g)-institution(en);
europäisch(e/en/er) institution(en); wirtschafts- und währungsunion; ewu; wwu; ewwu;
e(u/g)-kommission; europäisch(e/en/er) kommission; e(u/g)-kommissar(e);
europäisch(e/en/er) kommissar(e/en); e(u/g)-beamt(e/en/er); europäisch(e/en/er beamt(e/en/er);
europäisch(e/en) exekutive; europäisch(e/en) parlament(s/es); europaparlament(s/es);
e(u/g)-parlament(s/es); ep; europawahl(en); europaabgeordnet(e/en/er); eu-abgeordnet(e/en/er);
e(u/g)-ministerrat(s/es); ratspräsidentschaft; e(u/g)-ratspräsidentschaft; e(u/g)-gipfel(n);
europagipfel(n); europäisch(e/er/en) gipfel(n); e(u/g)-mitgliedstaat(en);
europäisch(e/er/en) mitgliedstaat(en); eu-mitglieds(land/länder); europäisch(e/es/er/en) mitgliedsländ(er)
e(u/g)-staat(en); e(u/g)-länd(er); europäisch(e/er/en) gerichtshof(s/es); eugh; e(u/g)-gericht(shof(s/es)) ;
europäisch(e/en/er) zentralbank; ezb; ezb-direktorium; ezb-rat;
hoh(e/er/en) vertreter(s/in) für außen- und sicherheitspolitik; europapolitik; europäisch(e/er/en) ebene;
e(u/g)-ebene; europäisch(e/en/er) verfahren; europabühne; e(u/g)-kompetenz(en);
europäisch(e/er/en) kompetenz(en); europäisch(e/en/er) mandat(e/s);
europäisch(e/en/er) binnenmarkt(s/es); gemeinsam(e/en/er) außen -und sicherheitspolitik;
polizeilich(e/en/er) und justizielle zusammenarbeit; europäısch(e/en/er) ziel(e);
e(u/g)-instrument(en); europäısch(e/er/en) standard(s); europäısch(e/er/en) zusammenarbeit;
europarecht(s/es); e(u/g)-engagement(s); europäisch(e/en/er) sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitik;
esvp; europäisch(e/er/en) sicherheits- und verteidigungsunion; esvu;
gemeinsam(e/en/er) sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitik; europäisch(e/er/en) recht(sprechung);
europäisch(e/er/en) recht(setzung/sordnung); vertragsverletzungsverfahren;
vorabentscheidungsverfahren; aeuv; europäisch(e/en/er) währung(en); e(u/g)-währung(en);
gemeinschaftswährung; eurozone; euro-zone; euroraum(s); euro-raum(s);
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Table A2.8 (Continued): List of German tokens (Bundestag)
stabilitäts- und wachstumspakt(s/es); e(u/g)-([a-z]*){0,1}minister;
e(u/g)-([a-z]*){0,1}politik(en); europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]*){0,1}politik(en);





e(u/g)-([a-z]*){0,1}ziel(e); e(u/g)-([a-z]*){0,1}maßnahmen; europäisch(e/er/en) ([a-z]*){0,1}maßnahmen;





europäisch(e/er/en) entscheidung(en); e(u/g)-leitlinie(n); europäisch(e/er/en) leitlinie(n);
e(u/g)-([a-z]*){0,1}reform(en); e(u/g)-([a-z]*){0,1}strategie(n);





A2.2 Classification of Parties
Table A2.9: Party Classification for Face Validity
Country Party Name (Party Family in Brackets)
AT BZÖ (rad right); FPÖ (rad right); Grüne (green); independent (other); JETZT (rad left)
Jetzt – Liste PILZ(rad left); LIF (liberal); NEOS (liberal); ÖVP (christ dem);
PILZ (rad left); SPÖ (socialist); STRONACH (other)
CZ ANO (other); ČMUS (regionalist); ČSSD (socialist); HSD-SMS (regionalist)
KDU-ČSL (christdem); KSČM (rad left); LB (rad left); LSNS (other) ; LSU (liberal) ;
Nez.-SZ (other); Nezařazeńı(other); ODA (cons); ODS (cons); ONH (other);
SPR-RSČ (rad right); SZ (green); TOP 09 a Starostové (conservative);
TOP09-S (conservative); US (conserv); US-DEU (conservative);
Úsvit (rad right); VV (liberal)
DE AfD (radical right); CDU/CSU (christian democratic); FDP (liberal);
GRUENE (green); independent (other); PDS/LINKE (rad left); SPD (socialist)
DN ALT (green); CD (liberal); DF (rad right); EL (rad left); FF (cons); FP (liberal)
FRI (liberal); IA (regionalist); KD (christ dem); KF (conservative); KRF (confessional);
LA (liberal); LH (other); NQ (regionalist); NY (rad right); RV (liberal); S (socialist);
SF (rad left); SIU (regionalist); SP (cons); T (regionalist); UFG (other);
UP (other); V (liberal)
ES GC-CiU (regionalist); GC-DL (other); GCC (regionalist); GCC-NC (regionalist);
GCs (liberal) ;GCUP-EC-EM (rad left); GER (regionalist); GER-ERC (regionalist);
GER-IU-ICV (rad left); GIP (rad left); GIU (rad left); GIU-ICV (rad left); GMX (regionalist)
GPP (conservative); GPSOE (socialist); GUPyD (other);
GV EAJ-PNV (regionalist); GV-PNV (regionalist)
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Table A2.9 (continued): Party Classification for Face Validity
Country Party Name (Party Family in Brackets)
GR ANEL (rad right); DIKKI (rad left); DIMAR (socialist); KKE (rad left); LAOS (rad right);
ND (cons); OP (green); PASOK (socialist), POLA (cons); Potami (socialist);
SYN (rad left); SYRIZA (rad left); XA (rad right)
IRL Clann na Poblachta (regionalist); Democratic Left (socilaist);Fianna Fáil (cons);
Fine Gael (christ dem); Green Party (green); Independent (other); Ind. Fianna Fáil (other);
Independent Labour (other); People Before Profit Alliance (rad left); Progr. Dem. (liberal);
Sinn Féin (regionalist); Sinn Féin the Workers’ Party (rad left); Socialist Party (rad left);
The Labour Party (socialist); The Workers’ Party (rad left)
NLD 50PLUS (other); CDA (christian dem); CU (confessional); D66 (liberal); DENK (other);
FvD (rad right); GL (green); GPV (confessional) ; LPF (rad right); other (other);
PvdA (socialist); PvdD (green); PVV (radical right); RPF (confessional);
SGP (confessional); SP (radical left); VVD (liberal)
SW C (liberal); FP (liberal); KD (christian democratic); L (liberal); M (conservative);
MP (green); NYD (rad right); S (socialist); SD (radical right); V (radical left)
UK APNI (liberal) Birkenhead Social Justice (other); Change UK (liberal);
Con (conservative); DUP (regionalist); GPEW (green); Independent (other);
Lab (socialist); LibDem (liberal); other (other); PlaidCymru (regionalist);
Referendum (other); Respect (rad left); SDLP (socialist); SDP (liberal); SNP (regionalist);
Indep. (other); UKIP (rad right); UKUP (regionalist); UPUP (regionalist) ; UUP (regionalist)
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A2.3 Conservative MPs’ Referendum Positions
Table A2.10: Remain Conservative MPs
Alan Duncan; Alan Haselhurst; Alan Mak; Alberto Costa; Alec Shelbrooke; Alex Chalk; Alistair Burt
Alok Sharma; Alun Cairns; Amanda Milling; Amanda Solloway; Amber Rudd; Andrew Griffiths
Andrew Jones; Andrew Mitchell; Andrew Selous; Andrew Tyrie; Angela Watkinson’ Anna Soubry
Antoinette Sandbach; Ben Gummer; Ben Howlett; Ben Wallace; Bob Neill; Brandon Lewis
Byron Davies; Caroline Dinenage; Caroline Nokes; Caroline Spelman; Charlie Elphicke; Chloe Smith
Chris Philp; Chris Skidmore; Chris White; Claire Perry; Craig Whittaker; Craig Williams; Damian Collins
Damian Green; Damian Hinds; Daniel Poulter; David Cameron; David Evennett; David Gauke
David Lidington; David Mackintosh; David Morris; David Mowat; David Mundell; David Rutley
David Tredinnick; Dominic Grieve; Ed Vaizey; Edward Argar; Edward Garnier; Edward Timpson
Elizabeth Truss; Eric Pickles; Flick Drummond; Gary Streeter; Gavin Barwell; Gavin Williamson
George Freeman; George Hollingbery; George Osborne; Graham Evans; Graham Stuart; Grant Shapps
Greg Clark; Greg Hands; Guto Bebb; Guy Opperman; Harriett Baldwin; Heidi Allen; Helen Grant
Helen Whately; Hugo Swire; Jackie Doyle-Price; Jake Berry; James Berry; James Brokenshire
James Cartlidge; James Heappey; James Morris; Jane Ellison; Jeremy Hunt; Jeremy Lefroy; Jeremy Quin
Jeremy Wright; Jo Churchill; Jo Johnson; John Glen; John Howell; John Penrose; John Stevenson
Johnny Mercer; Jonathan Djanogly; Julian Knight; Julian Smith; Justine Greening; Karen Bradley
Keith Simpson; Kelly Tolhurst; Kenneth Clarke; Kevin Foster; Kevin Hollinrake; Kris Hopkins; Lucy Frazer
Luke Hall; Maggie Throup; Marcus Jones; Margot James; Maria Miller; Mark Field; Mark Garnier
Mark Harper; Mark Lancaster; Mark Menzies; Mark Pawsey; Mark Prisk; Mark Pritchard; Mark Spencer
Mary Robinson; Matt Warman; Matthew Hancock; Mel Stride; Michael Ellis; Michael Fallon
Michelle Donelan; Mike Freer; Neil Parish; Nicholas Boles; Nicholas Soames; Nick Gibb; Nick Herbert
Nick Hurd; Nicky Morgan; Nicola Blackwood; Nigel Huddleston; Oliver Colvile; Oliver Dowden
Oliver Heald; Oliver Letwin; Patrick McLoughlin; Paul Beresford; Peter Aldous; Peter Bottomley
Peter Heaton-Jones; Philip Dunne; Philip Hammond; Phillip Lee; Rebecca Pow; Richard Benyon
Richard Graham; Richard Harrington; Rob Wilson; Robert Buckland; Robert Goodwill; Robert Halfon
Robert Jenrick; Robin Walker; Roger Gale; Rory Stewart; Sajid Javid; Sam Gyimah; Sarah Newton
Sarah Wollaston; Seema Kennedy; Shailesh Vara; Simon Burns; Simon Hart; Simon Hoare; Simon Kirby
Stephen Crabb; Stephen Hammond; Steve Brine; Tania Mathias; Theresa May; Thomas Tugendhat
Tobias Ellwood; Victoria Atkins; Victoria Prentis; Wendy Morton; Neil Carmichael (Stroud)
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Table A2.11: Leave Conservative MPs
Adam Afriyie; Adam Holloway; Andrea Jenkyns; Andrea Leadsom; Andrew Bingham; Andrew Bridgen
Andrew Murrison; Andrew Percy; Andrew Rosindell; Andrew Stephenson; Andrew Turner; Anne Main
Anne-Marie Trevelyan; Bernard Jenkin; Bill Cash; Bill Wiggin; Bob Blackman; Bob Stewart
Boris Johnson; Caroline Ansell; Charles Walker; Charlotte Leslie; Cheryl Gillan; Chris Davies
Chris Grayling; Chris Green; Chris Heaton-Harris; Christopher Chope; Christopher Pincher
Conor Burns; Craig Mackinlay; Craig Tracey; Crispin Blunt; Daniel Kawczynski; David Amess
David Burrowes; David Davies; David Davis; David Jones; David Nuttall; David Warburton
Derek Thomas; Desmond Swayne; Dominic Raab; Edward Leigh; Fiona Bruce; Gareth Johnson
Geoffrey Clifton-Brown; Geoffrey Cox; George Eustice; Gerald Howarth; Glyn Davies; Gordon Henderson
Graham Brady; Greg Knight; Heather Wheeler; Henry Bellingham; Henry Smith; Iain Stewart
Ian Liddell-Grainger; Jack Lopresti; Jacob Rees-Mogg; James Cleverly; James Davies
James Duddridge; James Gray; James Wharton; Jason McCartney; John Baron; John Hayes
John Redwood; John Whittingdale; Jonathan Lord; Julian Brazier; Julian Lewis; Julian Sturdy
Justin Tomlinson; Karen Lumley; Karl McCartney; Kit Malthouse; Kwasi Kwarteng; Laurence Robertson
Liam Fox; Lucy Allan; Marcus Fysh; Maria Caulfield; Mark Francois; Martin Vickers; Matthew Offord
Michael Fabricant; Michael Gove; Michael Tomlinson; Mike Penning; Mims Davies; Nadhim Zahawi
Nadine Dorries; Nigel Adams; Nigel Evans; Nigel Mills; Nusrat Ghani; Owen Paterson; Paul Maynard
Paul Scully; Penny Mordaunt; Peter Bone; Peter Lilley; Philip Davies; Philip Hollobone; Priti Patel
Ranil Jayawardena; Rebecca Harris; Rehman Chishti; Richard Bacon; Richard Drax; Richard Fuller
Rishi Sunak; Robert Syms; Scott Mann; Sheryll Murray; Stephen Barclay; Stephen McPartland
Stephen Metcalfe; Stephen Phillips; Steve Double; Steven Baker; Stewart Jackson; Stuart Andrew
Suella Fernandes; Theresa Villiers; Tim Loughton; Tom Pursglove; Victoria Borwick; Will Quince
William Wragg; Zac Goldsmith; Iain Duncan Smith; Mike Wood; ; Anne Marie Morris; Royston Smith
Michael Gove
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Table A2.12: Publicly Undeclared Conservative MPs
Anne Milton; Eleanor Laing; Huw Merriman; Jesse Norman; John Bercow; Pauline Latham;
Tracey Crouch;
Table A2.13: Members of Cameron Cabinet (Control Variable for Regressions in Table 3.4)
Alun Cairns; Amber Rudd; Chris Grayling; David Cameron; David Mundell; George Osborne;
Greg Clark; Iain Duncan Smith; Jeremy Hunt; John Whittingdale; Justine Greening;
Michael Fallon; Nicky Morgan; Oliver Letwin; Philip Hammond; Sajid Javid; Stephen Crabb;
Theresa May; Theresa Villiers
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Table A2.14: Members of Cameron Ministry (Control Variable for Regressions in Table 3.4)
Alistair Burt; Alun Cairns; Amber Rudd; Andrea Leadsom; Andrew Selous; Anna Soubry;
Ben Gummer; Ben Wallace; Brandon Lewis; Charlie Elphicke; Chris Grayling; Claire Perry;
Damian Hinds; David Cameron; David Gauke; David Lidington; David Mundell;
Desmond Swayne; Dominic Raab; Ed Vaizey; Gavin Barwell; Gavin Williamson;
George Eustice; George Freeman; George Hollingbery; George Osborne; Greg Clark;
Guto Bebb; Guy Opperman; Harriett Baldwin; Hugo Swire; Iain Duncan Smith;
Jackie Doyle-Price; James Brokenshire; James Duddridge; James Wharton; Jane Ellison;
Jeremy Hunt; Jeremy Wright; Jo Johnson; John Hayes; John Penrose; John Whittingdale;
Julian Brazier; Julian Smith; Justin Tomlinson; Justine Greening; Karen Bradley; Kris Hopkins;
Marcus Jones; Margot James; Mark Francois; Mark Harper; Matt Hancock; Mel Stride;
Michael Fallon; Mike Penning; Nicholas Boles; Nick Gibb; Nicky Morgan; Oliver Letwin;
Philip Dunne; Philip Hammond; Priti Patel; Richard Harrington; Rob Wilson; Robert Buckland;
Robert Goodwill; Robert Halfon; Rory Stewart; Sajid Javid; Sam Gyimah; Sarah Newton;
Stephen Barclay; Stephen Crabb; Theresa May; Theresa Villiers; Therese Coffey;
Tobias Ellwood; William Hague
Appendix A3
This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 4 (Ignore or Defuse? Avoidance
Strategies in Party Competition).
Note that as the units of observation for Chapter 4 are aggregated EU references into one
large document for each leader per year, these documents are often very long, and are therefore
inappropriate to provide face validity. Instead, tables A3.2, A3.3, A3.4, and A3.5 provide face
validity for the complexity (Flesch-Kincaid) and emotiveness (ANEW) measures using individual
EU references from EUParlspeech by the party leaders, from a randomly selected year (2004).
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Table A3.1: Mainstream and Challenger Parties and their Leaders
Parliament Parties Leaders
AT ÖVP, SPÖ, LIF, NEOS Kurz, Mitterlehner, Spindelleger, Proll, Molterer
Nationalrat BZÖ, FPÖ, STRONACH Schussel, Kern, Faymann, Gusenbauer, Klima
Vranitsky, Mlinar, Schmidt, Meinl, Strolz, Bucher,
Westenthaler, Strache, Haupt, Riess, Haider, Lugar, Dietrich
K.Jacobsen,
DE CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP Kohl, Schauble, Merkel, Engholm, Scharping,
Bundestag PDS/LINKE, AfD Lafontaine, Schroder, Muntefering, Platzeck
Beck, Gabriel, Schulz, Nahles, Lambsdorff, Kinkel ,
Gerhardt, Westerwelle, Rosler, Lindner, Gysi,
Bisky, Lafontaine, Lotzsch, Ernst, Kipping, Gauland
DK KF, V, RV, LA, S, CD P.S.Moller, P.C.Moller, Bendtsen, Espersen, Barfoed
Folketing SF, DF, EL, FP Poulsen, Ellemann, A.Rasmussen, L.Rasmussen,
Jelved, Vestager, Ostergaard, Khader, A.Samuelsen,
P.N.Rasmussen, Lykke, Thorning-Schmidt,
Frederiksen M.Jakobsen, Nielsen, Sovndal, Vilhelmsen,
Dyhr, Kjaersgaard, Thulesen-Dahl, Schmidt-Nielsen,
Skipper, K.Jacobsen
IRL FF, FG, LP, PD Haughey, Reynolds, Ahern, Cowen Martin, Dukes
Dail PBPA, PD, SF, SP, WP Bruton, Noonan, Kenny, Spring, Quinn, Rabbitte,
Gilmore, O’Malley, Harney, McDowell, Cannon
Adams, Higgins, Barrett, De Rossa
NLD CDA, PvdA, VVD, Heerma, Scheffer, Balkenende, Verhagen,
Tweede D66, PVV, SP, GPV, Buma, Kok, Melkert, Bos, Cohen, Samsom,
LPF, RPF, SGP Asscher, Van Mierlo, De Graaf, Dittrich,
Pechtold, Bolkestein, Dijkstal, Zalm, Van Aartsen
Rutte, Wilders, Marijnissen, Kant, Roemer,
Schutte, Herben, Van As, Van Dijke, Van der Staaij,
Van der Vlies
UK Con, Lab, Lib Dem, Thatcher, Major, Hague, Duncan Smith,
House of UKIP Howard, Cameron, May, Johnson,
Commons Kinnock, Smith, Blair, Brown, Miliband, Corbyn,
Ashdown, Kennedy, Campbell, Clegg, Farron
Cable, Swinson, Carswell
Total 24 mainstream parties 111 mainstream party leaders
21 challenger parties 40 challenger party leaders
Note: Mainstream parties are in bold, challenger parties are in italics. On the few occasions where the party leader is not
in parliament, we use the party’s parliamentary leader (e.g. Douglas Carswell in the case of UKIP).
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Table A3.2: Face Validity: Low Complexity EU Statements
Country and Speaker EU Statement Flesch-Kincaid
Date
DK A.Rasmussen We stand with a new and united Europe. The EU 6.423
2004-07 (V) which Denmark has spearheaded, is now becoming a
reality. The new EU must be a success, and that is why
we need the EU’s new Constitutional Treaty.
NLD Balkenende We can look back on a very successful meeting. If 6.441
2004-12 (CDA) I compare last week’s European Council with that
of December, the difference is night and day. But actually,
we have to go back to June 2003
UK M.Howard So what happened? We have just had elections to 6.423
2004-06 (Con) the European Parliament during which the Prime
Minister did not make a single speech on Europe. That is
what he means by leadership.
DK P.Kjærsgaard I take that discussion with the Social democrats 7.293
2004-10 (DF) very seriously. Now, we do not intend to give up
our opposition to the EU. However, it was a
strange question.
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Table A3.3: Face Validity: High Complexity EU Statements
Country and Speaker EU Statement Flesch-Kincaid
Date
NLD Wilders I also do not need a referendum to say that, which is 19.40929
2004-06 (PVV) why I am submitting the following motion. The House
after hearing the deliberation, expresses its opinion
that Turkey should never become a member of the European
Union and therefore no negotiations on a possible European
accession of Turkey should beconducted with that country;
calls on the cabinet to vigorously oppose both Turkey’s EU
accession and the start of accession negotiations with
that country and to veto any possible attempt
by the EU to start negotiations with Turkey.
DK Rasmussen We must make an effort to strengthen our dialogue 26.045
2004-12 (V) with the Arab countries on the development of democracy
and with more respect for human rights, on the protection
of womens’ rights in society and their participation in public
life and the labour market, on the development of better
education systems, development of better social care systems,
a broad effort to create societies with greater political stability.
To this end, the government has taken a number
of initiatives and we have also done so in collaboration with the
other Nordic and Baltic EU countries. We are pushing
the EU to strengthen its partnership with the Arab
countries in this area, and we also hope that it can enter
into a partnership with the United States, so that significant
forces in the Wester world and the Arab counties there can
be an intensified dialogue on such a development of democracy
democracy and the safeguarding of human rights as a
means of preventing terrorism in the longer term.
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Table A3.4: Face Validity: High Emotiveness EU Statements
Country and Speaker EU Statement ANEW score
Date
DE Schroder For the people in the old, but also in the new 0.2307
2004-07 (SD) member states, accession is linked to the hope of
life in freedom and prosperity, in peace and security.
Peace through integration is part of the European
Union’s recipe for success. But we have to recognize
that peace is by no means a matter of course everywhere
in Europe, namely in the Balkans, which is why it
is still necessary and will continue to be
necessary to continue our commitment there.
NLD Balkenende The European Council in December was actually 0.1351
2004-12 (CDA) a failure. In comparison, things went a lot
of better this year: the official enlargement of the EU, the
major event in Ireland on May 1, and now an ambitious
constitutional treaty. So we are working to heal last
year’s wounds.
UK M.Howard Let me make it clear: any proposal for a new 0.1621
2004-03 (Con) constitution must be put to the British people.
At least seven other member states fo the European
Union are giving their people a say. The Irish Government
will trust the Irish people; the Dutch Government will trust
the Dutch people; the Danish Government will trust
the Danish people; and the Portuguese Government will
trust the Portuguese people.
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Table A3.5: Face Validity: Low Emotiveness EU Statements
Country and Speaker EU Statement ANEW score
Date
DK Rasmussen The proposal entails, among other things, a 0.000
2004-03 (V) liberalization of the ownership regulations applicable
to real estate brokerage companies, a reduction in the
number of mandatory services in real estate brokerage
and pricing of the sub-services in a real estate brokerage.
Amendment of the Companies Act, the Financial Statements
Act and the Securities Trading Act. The Proposal
implements the Takeover Directive 2004/25 which aims
to create a uniform transparent framework for takeover
bids in Europe. The directive is part of the EU financial action
plan , which aims to promote the integration of European
financial markets.
NLD Balkenende In the European Union, the European Commission 0.002
2004-05 (CDA) is the institution that independently supervises
the proper application of EU treaties and rules, makes
proposals for legislation and carries out executive
activities, within the specified powers. The members
of the European Commission, the treaty states, perform
their duties completely independently, in the general
interest of the community. In the performance of their




This Appendix provides supporting information for Chapter 5 (Disintegration and Party
Competition: Evidence from Parliamentary Speeches on Brexit).
A4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table A4.1: Brexit Statements - Descriptive Statistics
Country Mainstream MP Brexit Challenger CP Brexit Total Brexit
Parties (MP) Statements Parties (CP) Statements Statements
Austria NEOS, 243 BZO, FPO, 63 306
OVP, SPO STRONACH
Denmark KF, LA 228 DF, EL 157 385
RV, S, V
Germany CDU, FDP 408 AfD, LINKE 88 496
SPD
Netherlands CDA, CU, D66 360 50PLUS, FvD 171 531
DENK, PvdA, PVV, SGP, SP
PvdD, VVD
Sweden C, FP, KD, 398 SD, V 107 505
L, M




Thank you for helping to code this dataset of statements on Brexit by parliamentarians in
five European legislatures (AT, DE, DK, SW, NL). This codebook explains how to code
these statements.
Please code directly into the EXCEL file. A ‘Brexit statement’ refers to a three sentence
reference to Brexit within a speech. Occasionally, due to the way in which speeches were
collected, you may encounter clear formatting errors, for example a sentence that suddenly
cuts off halfway through a statement. In these rare cases please correct and re-format the
statement by merging it with the relevant cell and mentioning this in column J (dedicated
to notes). Generally speaking, please leave the statements in the format in which MPs
have presented them. The EXCEL file contains nine columns. Your role is to code Brexit
Strategy in column H and EU tone in column I after reading the full statement in column
G.
A4.2.1 Coding Brexit Strategy (Column H)
In Column H, we would like you to code the statement’s Brexit Strategy, which captures the
overall strategy pursued by the speaker in light of the disintegration episode. Altogether,
14 different Brexit strategies are identified. There are further details on each of these
categories, with examples, later on in the codebook:
When coding statements, please take into account the following:
• When coding statements, please base your evaluation on what speakers are commu-
nicating at face value, rather than on any subtext based on your knowledge of the
country.
• Classification categories are mutually exclusive. Occasionally, there will be statements
that you feel contain more than one of the strategies identified below. In this case, use
your personal judgement to decide what seems to be the dominant strategy presented
in the statement.
• Generally, when defining codes, let your decisions be guided by parsimony and reli-
ability. The rest of this section provides more detailed descriptions of the categories
for classification, and examples of statements for each.
1) Follow the UK: Follow example of the UK by unilaterally negotiating membership
terms with the EU and/or putting these terms to voters in a legally binding referendum.
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e.g: “But as long as we are members of the EU, we work constructively in the Riksdag
and the European Parliament to develop the EU in a more democratic direction. We there-
fore believe that Sweden should follow the example of the United Kingdom and initiate a
process to renegotiate our EU membership.” (H.Linde, Left Party, SE)
2) Slow Integration: Use Brexit to demand reform within the EU in a way that slows
down the process of integration, for example by shrinking the size of the EU budget.
e.g: “The Finance Committee is today delivering harsh EU criticism of the Commis-
sion regarding EU finances. Sweden has for a long time criticized the EU budget for being
outdated. In the light of Brexit, this would be an excellent opportunity to reform the EU
budget.” (H.Svenneling, Left Party , SE)
3) Criticise EU: Use Brexit as an illustration of the consequences of an ineffective,
distant EU. This differs from the previous coding category by not explicitly calling for any
EU reforms in the wake of Brexit. Also includes criticism of the EU not explicitly linked to
Brexit.
e.g: “There is no credible response to the widely felt Euroscepticism here. I do hear
another call for more Europe, while a member state is leaving the EU for the first time in
some 60 years. Brexit is partly a direct result of too far-reaching integration, too far-reaching
claims and too far-reaching European arrogance. ” (De heer Bisschop, SGP, NL)
4) Emphasise harm to the EU: Emphasise the fact that the UK’s exit of the EU
will/has caused harm to the EU and/or more harm to the EU and/or the speaker’s member
state than to the UK. Also includes mentions that the damage to the UK was overstated /
any mentions of ’Project Fear.
e.g: “The worst that could happen to the EU has become reality: Brexit. The second
economic force of the European Union, the EU’s first military force, has decided with a
majority of 52 per cent to leave the EU. This has led the EU to the edge of the abyss and
that will not improve in the future.” - (De heer Beertema, PVV, NLD)
5) Accommodation in negotiations: Accommodate the UK’s disintegration-bid.
This includes, but is not limited to, granting the exceptions demanded and ensuring the
UK isn’t ‘punished’ for its vote. Includes both accommodation of David Cameron’s demands
pre-referendum and accommodation of the UK’s demands post-referendum
e.g: “Now people in Brussels, Paris and Berlin are afraid that the example could set a
precedent, that other states in Europe will regain their sovereignty. That is also the reason
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why the EU Commission is planning to arbitrarily restrict British access to the internal
market during the transition phase if necessary; You have to imagine this. By supporting
these plans for the exclusion of Germany’s most important foreign trade partner in the
EU - you all support these exclusion plans - you are making free trade and competition
within Europe hostage to a failed EU ideology - a foolish mistake, a mistake with grave
consequences European cohesion; for the historical good economic relations between Great
Britain and the rest of the continent must be preserved; otherwise Europe will fall behind in
the global economy.” (Alice Weidel, AfD, DE)
6) Non-accommodation in negotiations: Refuse to make concessions or grant ex-
ceptions to the UK. This includes, but is not limited to, tying the benefits of cooperation
to the existing agreement and references to no ‘cherry picking’ of membership terms. In-
cludes both non-accommodation of David Cameron’s demands pre-referendum and non-
accommodation of the UK’s demands post-referendum
e.g: “The primary goal, dear colleagues, for the Brexit negotiations is to preserve the
unity of the European Union.Â Germany has a special responsibility for European integration
and has benefited from it in its own way: historically, politically, economically.Â For Great
Britain there must be no cherry-picking in the negotiations.” (Norbert Spinrath, SPD, DE)
7) Orderly Brexit: Prioritise a non-disruptive UK withdrawal, for example one that
avoids a ’no deal’ Brexit and maintains links with the UK in key policy areas. No clear
mention of accommodation or non-accommodation
e.g: “In any case, we have the greatest interest in ensuring that the relationship between
the European Union and Great Britain remains as close as possible in the future. Not only
in terms of economic policy - Great Britain is a large and important market, but vice versa,
the European Union is also a large and important market for Great Britain - but also in
terms of security policy, the British are of course very, very important, especially when it
comes to neighborhood policy.” (G. Blumel, OVP, AT)
8) UK remain: Express desire for the UK to remain a member state both in the run
up to the vote, and in its aftermath.
e.g: “Again, I would like to say: we want Britain to remain part of the European
Union. It is in our interest that Britain is part of the European Union. We have many,
many different views in common and a strong and unbreakable friendship with Britain.”
(H. Thorning-Schmidt, S, DK)
9) Brexit regret: Express sadness and regret at the UK leaving the European Union.
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Includes descriptions of Brexit as a ‘lose-lose’ situation
e.g: “We would probably all have wished for a nicer present for the 60th anniversary
of the Treaty of Rome, a nicer present than March 29, the day Brexit was officially an-
nounced. We too, many of us, regretted it very much, and as a European I personally regret
this decision very much, because it also takes away a piece of my identity - this is my
feeling.” (C.Muttonen, SPO, AT)
10) New beginning: Use Brexit as a new beginning and/or a wakeup call for the
EU. Differentiates itself from categories 2 (Slow Integration) and 13 (Further Integration)
in that it does not explicitly say whether this new beginning means a smaller or larger role
for the EU and its institutions.
e.g: “There are discussions about both Brexit and other countries where people become
more skeptical of the EU. I think it’s like this because people think that the EU may be doing
something wrong. That is why I think it will be even more important that we sharpen the
EU and do it much better.” (C.Barenfeld, M, SW)
11) Emphasise harm to the UK: Emphasise the fact that the UK’s exit of the EU
will cause harm to the UK and/or more harm to the UK than to the EU
e.g: “No matter how wrong Britain’s exit from the EU is, no matter how much it will,
I believe, in the end do more harm to the United Kingdom than to us.” (S.Gabriel, SPD,
DE)
12) Defend EU/ EU unity: Defend achievements of European integration and em-
phasise the unity and coherence of remaining member states.
e.g: “If you had asked me at the beginning of the year how things would go with the EU
in 2017, I would not have been so sure of the answer. But then came Trump, Erdogan and
Putin, and it was discovered that the idea of a common Europe might not be so bad after
all.” (C.Korber, CDU, DE)
13) Criticise Populists: Use Brexit as an illustration of the dangers and false promises
of populists. This includes both populists in the UK (e.g. lies in the referendum campaign)
and populists in the speaker’s member state.
e.g: “But the world around us has changed. And Mr Wilders is now talking about
becoming independent and that we have to leave the European Union. I wonder if he is
aware of the fact that Britain has been working on that since 2016, and that has turned into
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one big drama” (Van H.Burma, CDA, NL)
14) Further Integration: Use Brexit as an opportunity to further European integra-
tion. Includes, but is not limited to, increases in the EU budget, or further integration in
the area of security and defence.
e.g: “Asymmetrical shocks - which are currently being talked about again and again
with a view to Brexit - are a danger that we really shouldn’t underestimate, especially in
politically uncertain times. From our point of view, the euro zone should therefore be given
its own fiscal capacity - if possible integrated in the EU budget - in order to be able to
effectively cushion risks. In my opinion, a European digital tax could serve as a single
source of funding.” (Johannes Schraps, SPD, DE)
15) Other: Statements that do not correspond to any of the thirteen Brexit strate-
gies above. For example, simple descriptions of the negotiation points to go through in
upcoming/previous summits.
e.g: “Mr President, first of all I would like to approve the committee’s proposal and
rejection of all reservations. Mr President, the four freedoms of the European Union have
been put under scrutiny by the United Kingdom’s Brexit decision. We all know that they
include the free movement of goods, services, people and capital.” (P.Niemi, S, SE)
A4.2.2 Coding EU Tone (Column I)
In Column I, we would like you to code the statement according to its EU tone: the tone
the speaker adopts with respect to the EU, its institutions, and/or European integration
more widely.
1) Positive EU Tone: Speaker adopts a warm/positive tone when referencing the EU,
its institutions, and/or European integration more widely.
e.g: “With the decision on Brexit, I am firmly convinced that Great Britain has taken the
wrong path. If you had asked me at the beginning of the year how things would go with the
EU in 2017, I would not have been so sure of the answer. But then came Trump, Erdogan
and Putin, and it was discovered that the idea of a common Europe might not be so bad
after all.” (C.Korber, CDU, DE)
2) Neutral EU Tone: Speaker adopts a neutral tone when referencing the EU, its
institutions, and/or European integration more widely.
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e.g: “Mr President, first of all I would like to approve the committee’s proposal and
rejection of all reservations. Mr President, the four freedoms of the European Union have
been put under scrutiny by the United Kingdom’s Brexit decision. We all know that they
include the free movement of goods, services, people and capital.” (P.Niemi, S, SE)
3) Negative EU Tone: Speaker adopts a cold/negative tone when referencing the EU,
its institutions, and/or European integration more widely.
e.g: “There is no credible response to the widely felt Euroscepticism here. I do hear
another call for more Europe, while a member state is leaving the EU for the first time in
some 60 years. Brexit is partly a direct result of too far-reaching integration, too far-reaching
claims and too far-reaching European arrogance. ” (De heer Bisschop, SGP, NL)
A4.2.3 Notes (Column J)
Column J is reserved for notes. Feel free to use this column for anything you would like
to bring to the attention of the researcher, for example if you are hesitating between two
coding categories.
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A4.3 Identifying Brexit Statements
To identify Brexit statements I draw on the EUParlspeech dataset which captures EU
references in national legislatures (Hunter 2021). I identify Brexit statements through a
series of search strings from Walter and Martini (2020) and classify EU as Brexit statements
if they include any of these strings:
Identifying Brexit statements from EUParlpeech: Text-Corpus Search terms
(Brexit OR (UK OR United Kingdom OR Britain) w/5 (EU OR European Union)
w/5 (withdraw* OR leav* OR ((remain* OR continu*) w/5 member*)) OR (UK
OR United Kingdom OR Britain) w/5 ((referendum OR renegotiat*) w/5 mem-
ber* w/5 (EU OR European Union)) OR (UK OR United Kingdom OR Britain)
w/5 (relations OR relationship w/1 (with OR to)) w/5 (EU OR European Union
OR Europe) )
I validate this methodology with human hand coders, who were given a sample of 200
statements to code. This sample included 80 randomly selected statements that the au-
tomated method classified as Brexit statements, and 120 randomly selected EU references
that the automated method did not classify as Brexit statements. Handcoders are asked
to code whether the statement made reference to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The
results demonstrates high levels of accuracy (0.98), precision (0.938) and recall (1.000) (see
Benoit 2014), confirming that my automated, search string based classifier can identify
Brexit statements with high levels of accuracy. The dataset with full hand coding used to
validate the automated method of identifying Brexit statements available upon request
193
A4.4 Interrater Reliability Tests
Interrater reliability tests were conducted over two rounds, with two handcoders coding the
same random sample of 220 Brexit statements. This represents approximately 10 per cent of
the total sample of 2,223 statements. The codebook was tweaked after each round following
discussion with the hand coders. The table below presents the results of Krippendorf’s
alpha and Cohen’s kappa. These results correspond to ’substantial’ agreement amongst
coders (Landis and Koch 1977).
Number of Krippendorf’s a Krippendorf’s a Cohen’s k Cohen’s k
statements for Brexit Strategy for EU tone for Brexit Strategy for EU tone
220 0.75 0.82 0.71 0.77
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A4.5 Robustness Tests - Multinomial Logistic Regression Re-
sults
Table A4.3: Mainstream Parties - Multinomial Logistic Regression Results
Brexit Strategy EU Tone
Further Defend Criticise Non-Accomodation Positive
Integration EU Populists in Negotiations Tone
Post Referendum 1.370∗ 0.885∗∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.462 0.016
(0.751) (0.378) (0.415) (0.512) (0.254)
Constant −4.098 −1.595 −1.216 -4.346 −2.454∗∗∗
(7.256) (8.043) (4.352) (17.185) (0.290)
Observations 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637 1,637
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A4.4: Challenger Parties - Multinomial Logistic Regression Results
Brexit Strategy EU Tone
Follow Slow Criticise Accommodation Negative
UK Integration EU in Negotiations Tone
Post Referendum −1.880∗∗∗ 0.228 0.898∗ 1.249∗∗ −0.617∗∗
(0.435) (0.388) (0.461) (0.530) (0.244)
Constant −6.060∗∗∗ 0.124 −0.534 −9.225∗∗∗ 0.231
(0.398) (0.351) (0.409) (0.495) (0.225)
Observations 586 586 586 586 586
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Party FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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